JohnDe
La dolce vita
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A decent article from Paul Kelly, makes sense. A Yes victory will transform our nation's political character, but I think that a strong No vote will as well.
A Yes victory will transform nation’s political character
Australians are now being asked to abandon their post-Federation constitutional conservatism. The voice referendum is vital in its own right – but at stake is whether the political character of the nation is changing in a culture more defined by emotion, feeling and utopian sentiments.
Success for the voice will shatter one of our deepest political orthodoxies – that the Constitution transcends contemporary and popular renovation and exists as a protective shield against “the demands of the present” ranging from an Indigenous voice to an Australian as head of state.
Does the Constitution exist impervious to the culture? If so, is this a good or bad thing? The architects of the Constitution put a priority on their design – they specified the Constitution could be altered only by agreement of a majority of the people and a majority of the states.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has reminded Australians of the Latin phrase “carpe diem” ahead of the… Indigenous Voice to Parliament referendum. Mr Albanese said October 14 will be an opportunity to “seize the day”. “To finally recognise Indigenous Australians in our Constitution,” he said during a media conference on Tuesday. “But also, to give them an advisory group so that we can listen to them to get better results. “That’s what’s at stake on October 14.”
The people had to say yes and the federation had to say yes. The Constitution was built to resist innovation. It was designed to transcend the cycles of politics and partisan campaigns. The upshot is the vast changes in Australia’s democratic culture over 122 years have won expression across the political system but rarely impinge on the Constitution.
This was the intention. If the voice is defeated, following the 1999 defeat of the republic referendum, the irresistible conclusion will be that the Constitution is not a vehicle for progressive reform. Politics is the vehicle for progressive reform.
In retrospect, people will ask: why wasn’t the voice legislated first given the numbers existed in parliament to do exactly that?
The two most recent referendums have been ambitious – the republic and the voice. They are different to most referendum proposals because they seek changes to the form of government – to switch Australia from a constitutional monarchy to a republic and to create a constitutionally sanctioned body to represent Indigenous people.
The history is clear: the more significant the reform, the more difficult the referendum.
That’s why the passage of the voice will break the mould. It will mean Australia has changed fundamentally. It will mean the public has broken from constitutional conservatism under pressure to offer a new form of substantial Indigenous recognition.
The scale of such transformation should not be underestimated. The last successful referendum was in 1977 – that’s 46 years ago.
Aust female politicians federal parliamentary women who will vote yes during Republic referendum standing outside Parliament House in Canberra 20 Oct 1999.
Yet the three referendums passed on that occasion didn’t change the form of government. They were technical or incremental – a retiring age for judges, allowing people in the territories to vote in referendums and filling a Senate vacancy with a senator from the same party. They were uncontentious and nonpartisan.
The previously successful referendum – the famous 1967 inclusion of Aboriginal people in the census and enabling the commonwealth to make laws for Aboriginal people – were carried because it meant Aboriginal people were becoming part of the nation and that a discrimination against them was being removed. Again, there was no change to the structure of government.
The history of the republican referendum is loaded with lessons. Of course, we don’t yet know if the lessons remain valid. That will be determined on October 14. But here are the lessons.
First, majority support for the republic referendum in the polls was never a guarantor of success. Republicans easily outnumbered monarchists – but that wasn’t enough. In the two years before the vote, support for the republic hovered around 50 per cent. John Howard said later that to be confident the republic needed preliminary polling around 80 per cent, given the certain erosion that would follow.
Second, elite support is influential but not enough.
After the vote, Howard said: “Remember that the Yes case had on its side the whole of the Labor Party, most of the Australian Democrats, 30-40 per cent of the Liberal Party, every premier with the exception of Richard Court, and you know, putting it mildly, 95 per cent of the Canberra press gallery and the editorial support of all newspapers, except the West Australian and the Weekend Financial Review.”
Yet it lost comprehensively, 55-45 per cent and in all six states.
While Howard was opposed, there was more cross-party support for the republic than there is for the voice.
Third, party affiliation still matters in a referendum. While the Coalition was divided in 1999, the vote in Coalition seats was critical. Out of 80 Coalition-held seats, 63 voted against the republic. Out of 64 Liberal Party seats, 47 voted against.
On referendum eve, Newspoll showed Coalition voters split 62-35 per cent against. About 80 per cent of National Party voters were in the No camp. The Coalition was too opposed for the referendum to succeed.
Fourth, deep support cannot substitute for the lack of wide support. There was enthusiasm for the republic from higher income, tertiary-educated seats. The most prosperous 34 seats voted Yes while the farther from the central GPO, the more people voted No. The mood for the voice is more emotional than for the republic. But the test is getting support across the suburbs and regions. The republic in Queensland polled a shocking 37.4 per cent and in Western Australia 41.5 per cent. Its support was too narrow.
Fifth, the politics of a referendum is not the politics of an election – yet our mindset defaults to the election reflex. It’s a bad mistake. In an election both sides seek a mandate; it’s a competition over agendas, like Penrith versus the Broncos. In a referendum, however, only the Yes side seeks a mandate. The No side needs no mandate and offers no agenda. Its purpose is to defeat the referendum by any means.
By definition, the task of the Yes case is more difficult.
Unlike in an election, the No side doesn’t need to be united. Indeed, it helps if it isn’t united, that casts its net wider. The No case in 1999 was riven by division – compromising monarchists and direct-election republicans. They couldn’t have disagreed more. Agreement on their own model was impossible. But it didn’t matter – they only needed to oppose the referendum.
Many republicans in 1999 voted down the referendum because they didn’t like the model. In the voice referendum, No case backers can support or oppose treaties, support or oppose the principle of the voice, believe the voice goes too far or doesn’t go far enough – but they can unite on voting No. Saying No is enough.
Ian Sinclair (top) presiding over two-day deliberative polling meeting that represented all side of republic debate.
Finally, the republican proposal was subject to a far more consultative debate than anything the voice has experienced. That is just a fact. The republican model, unlike the voice, emerged through a constitutional convention.
Paul Keating championed the cause as prime minister from 1991, eight years before the referendum. It was a central pledge at Keating’s 1993 and 1996 election campaigns. He raised the issue with the queen, commissioned an outstanding committee headed by Malcolm Turnbull that produced a two-volume analysis, and an inclusive, national conversation followed.
To neutralise the issue, the Liberals promised a convention that took place under Howard in Old Parliament House, a participatory event with appointed and elected delegates that helped to finalise a model. During the referendum the Yes case called the change “small and safe” and, while true, the republic still went down.
In summary, according to the conventional rules of politics, the republic should have won. But referendums aren’t governed by the usual rules of politics. They are unique. The history, so far, is that support for any constitutional change in the form of Australia’s government must reach across the country with much bipartisanship needed to prevail.
If the voice defies this norm, then Australia can legitimately say it has changed forever as a country.
PAUL KELLY
EDITOR-AT-LARGE
