I was thinking a positive would be letting the west see how the Russian military operated in real time hardware / people / strategy etc and allowing them to prepare for defensive / offensive operations should they be required.
I wonder how the US would react if mexico was to start bringing in the Chinese army .That is the exact parallel to ukraine/RussiaThe hypocrisy of US politicians knows no bounds.
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Republican Hawks have been able to sit back and watch the democrat hawks take the running.
Mick
I wonder how the US would react if mexico was to start bringing in the Chinese army .That is the exact parallel to ukraine/Russia
I think they would and did it for Cuba..but I agree that was eons agoI'm a bit confused. Your hypothetical scenario is that the US invades Mexico?
Kinda hard for the Ruskis to say it was the fault of the drone hitting the fighter jet.JUST IN - U.S. releases a video showing the collision of the Russian fighter jet with the MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea.
The Russian fighter appears to dump fuel as it intercepts the U.S. drone on the first attempt and apparently hits it on the second. Then the signal is lost.
@disclosetv
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JUST IN - U.S. releases a video showing the collision of the Russian fighter jet with the MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea.
The Russian fighter appears to dump fuel as it intercepts the U.S. drone on the first attempt and apparently hits it on the second. Then the signal is lost.
@disclosetv
View attachment 154492
Focus on Ukraine’s talks with China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin
While the world begins to factor in the global implications of the forced takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS, there is a second event that has at least the potential to be even more transforming – this week’s Ukraine talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin
Both Ukraine and Russia believe they can win the war and don’t seem in the mood for peace talks. But an important part of Xi Jinping’s ambitious vision for his term as president depends on a resolution to the conflict.
And Xi also knows that every day the war continues propels Russia into becoming a “vassal state” of China – that is, a puppet or satellite state. Most expect any “peace” plan that comes out of this week’s China-Russia talks will be heavily oriented to the Russian stance, but there is at least a chance of a surprise.
To make sure Putin understands he is becoming a Chinese “vassal state” last month, Xi instructed China’s Ministry of Natural Resources to issue new map regulations that replace the current Russian names of eight places along the Russian-Chinese border with Chinese names.
Heading the list was the great Russian Pacific port city of Vladivostok which was called Hai Shen Wai before Russia annexed it in 1860 during the second opium war, under threat to set Beijing ablaze.
But Putin responded to Xi’s map ”instruction” by personally visiting Russian-occupied Mariupol on the eve of Xi’s visit. Russia does not yet accept that it is becoming a Chinese vassal state.
Xi’s underlying vision incorporates economic realism.
China has played the property investment economic card and so looking at lower growth rates and a population ageing problem, which longer term threatens Xi’s reputation.
At the same time, the western world’s reaction to Ukraine and the formation of Pacific alliances means that the invasion of Taiwan as a Chinese nation-inspiring strategy carries high risk.
But Xi has a plan that would transform China and enshrine Xi with a status that ranks with Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping – the Belt and Road infrastructure project and its signature structure, the massive 9000km fast-train project linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
In the last 2000 years only one country has established a global transport network – the British Empire.
Once China links the Pacific to the Atlantic, this would then be the base for a British Empire-style network, making China only the second country to achieve such a feat. But Xi has always known he needed the support of both Russia and Ukraine.
Over the last five years, Russia has been reluctant to approve a train through its territory until the situation in Ukraine was “resolved”.
China could not negotiate meaningfully with Ukraine because that would have put Russia off-side. A quick Russian victory in Ukraine would have “resolved” the issue. But it did not happen.
A fast train line has already been completed between China’s Pacific coast and its ancient capital, Xian. Currently, it is possible to complete the train journey from Xian to Europe, but it is slow.
Using the best route, a fast train journey from Xian to Brussels or other European ports must pass through Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.
Russia is now a European (and global) pariah, so there is no way Europeans will allow a fast rail line to the Atlantic that passes through Russia or an Ukraine that is not totally independent.
But a Chinese-brokered solution that guarantees Ukraine most of its land and port access accompanied by massive amounts of rehabilitation expenditure would provide attraction. Ukraine could not join NATO.
And also on the China-Russia negotiating table would be the starting point of this great train line which, from the Chinese point of view, should be the “Chinese city” of Hai Shen Wai.
Or maybe the city will stay in the name and control of Russia and remain with its Russian name of Vladivostok.
The issue of Hai Shen Wai/Vladivostok will be on the China-Russia negotiating table.
I can’t emphasise enough that there is clearly a streak of very optimistic forecasting in canvassing a China-driven Ukraine peace scenario, particularly given the historic close relationships between Xi and Putin.
But I put the scenario on display just in case positive signs emerge.
ROBERT GOTTLIEBSEN BUSINESS COLUMNIST
What does Xi Jinping want from Vladimir Putin?
Ever since the second world war geopolitics have been moulded by the “strategic triangle” between China, Russia and America. Co-ordination between Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin in the early 1950s fuelled American determination to halt the spread of communism. That led to America fighting wars in Korea and Vietnam, its commitment to defend Taiwan, and multiple proxy conflicts elsewhere.
A decade later Mao’s schism with Nikita Khrushchev laid the ground for an American rapprochement with China. That brought covert Chinese assistance in the fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which helped to end the cold war. It also underpinned the decades-long run of economic growth that has transformed China into a global power—and a geopolitical rival to America.
Now another shift of the triad looms. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, is due in Moscow on March 20th for a three-day visit: his first since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. At the very least it will be an emphatic display of solidarity with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. It may be more, too: American officials believe Mr Xi is weighing Russia’s request to supply it with lethal weapons, including artillery shells and attack drones, for use in Ukraine. If Mr Xi agrees, it would draw China into a proxy war with nato.
In China’s telling, Mr Xi heads to Moscow as a peacemaker, and with no offer of arms. He is likely to use his trip to repeat his call for an end to the war, and to promote a 12-point peace plan first proposed by China in February. Mr Xi will echo recent Chinese statements urging respect for all countries’ territorial integrity and opposing any use of—or talk of using—nuclear weapons.
As evidence of Mr Xi’s peacemaking credentials Chinese officials point to their country’s role in brokering an agreement on March 10th to re-establish diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To offset Western criticism of his Moscow visit, Mr Xi is likely to follow it with virtual talks with Ukraine’s president, Volodymr Zelensky. It would be the pair’s first official exchange since Russia’s invasion. That will play well in many poor and middle-income countries, and among some Westerners keen for America to be less confrontational towards China.
Yet Mr Xi’s true intentions are hidden in plain sight. While professing neutrality, he still refuses to condemn Russia’s invasion or its soldiers’ atrocities. In Moscow he will almost certainly join Mr Putin in blaming the war, yet again, on the expansion of nato. (Chinese officials and state media draw parallels with America’s bid to strengthen its alliances in Asia in preparation for a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan.) And even if Mr Xi stops short of sending Russia weapons, he will probably offer more non-military support to help sustain Mr Putin’s war. Although China largely avoids violating Western sanctions on Russia, it has not joined them. Indeed, it helps Russia offset their impact by buying more of its oil and gas, and selling it more electronics and other goods.
You call that a plan?
China’s peace plan, meanwhile, is a non-starter for Ukraine and its Western backers. It advocates an end to Western sanctions without requiring Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. It sticks closely to Kremlin talking points in arguing that security “should not be pursued at the expense of others”, nor by “strengthening or expanding military blocs”. Such points echo Mr Xi’s “Global Security Initiative”, which he proposed last year as an alternative to the American-led “rules-based international order” and will probably promote enthusiastically over the next few days.
Mr Xi’s stance unsettles some in China’s elite. It shreds the country’s claim to be pursuing a foreign policy rooted in respect for sovereignty, and undermines a guarantee it made in 2013 to help Ukraine if it were threatened with nuclear attack. It makes Chinese attempts to cleave Europe from America much harder. Chinese strategists are clear-eyed, too, about Russia’s unpredictable politics and dismal economic prospects. Arming it would expose China to severe sanctions from America and the European Union, its two biggest trading partners, hobbling efforts to revive its economy. Talk of a new cold war would harden into reality.
Yet Mr Xi’s calculations are dominated by his conviction that China is locked in a long-term confrontation with America that might lead to a war over Taiwan, which it claims as its territory. In that context Russia still represents an indispensable source of energy, military technology and diplomatic support. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would embolden America and its allies. If Mr Putin’s grip on power slipped, instability on China’s vast northern border with Russia could follow. Worst of all, it could usher into the Kremlin a pro-Western leader tempted to help America to contain Chinese power, in a mirror image of China’s own strategic shift in the 1970s.
“That is the nightmare for China,” says Li Mingjiang, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. In Mr Xi’s eyes America represents the greatest potential threat, and China has no other big power on its side to help resist Western economic or military pressure. “Russia is the only option,” he says. “It’s the same logic as in the cold war, when Mao saw the Soviet Union as China’s number-one enemy, and decided to pursue rapprochement with the United States.”
Mr Xi’s strategic considerations are underpinned by a personal connection with Russia. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a prominent revolutionary who later oversaw the Soviet experts who helped build up Chinese industry in the 1950s. As vice-premier, the elder Xi visited Moscow in 1959. He returned full of admiration, bearing Soviet-made toys that delighted his six-year-old son.
The younger Xi’s interest in Russia seems to have deepened during the seven years he spent in a remote village to which he was sent at the age of 15 in 1969, during the Cultural Revolution. The books he read are still displayed there, including “War and Peace”, a selection of Lenin’s writings, an account of Soviet battles in the second world war and “How the Steel was Tempered”, a socialist-realist novel about a man who fights the Germans, joins the Bolsheviks and becomes an ideal Soviet citizen.
Mr Xi was not alone in his regard for Russia. Senior Chinese military officers developed close ties with their Russian counterparts after Western governments placed arms embargoes on China over the crushing of pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in 1989. (They remain in place.) Since then, China has bought tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian weapons. Attitudes towards America within China’s military leadership hardened after American warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, during the Kosovo conflict. (America apologised, insisting it was a mistake.)
In the decade before Mr Xi took power in 2012, he also appears to have been influenced by leftist academics and fellow “princelings” (as offspring of Communist Party leaders are known) who became disillusioned with the West, especially after the financial crisis in 2007-09. Inspired by Mr Putin, then near the height of his power, they began to see Russia as a potential partner and to question Chinese historians’ conclusions that the Soviet Union collapsed owing to problems dating back to Stalin. Instead, they blamed Mikhail Gorbachev and his liberalising reforms.
By the time Mr Xi assumed office, he and his advisers were already bent on closer alignment with Russia. He chose Moscow for his first trip abroad, and hinted there that the two countries would work together against the West. “Our characters are alike,” he told Mr Putin. Mr Xi has since met him some 39 times, far more than any other leader, apparently bonding over common disdain for democracy and fears of American encirclement.
Sneak attack
Some of the shine may have come off the pair’s relationship after Mr Putin’s scheming last year. In February 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, he visited Mr Xi in Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics, and the two sides declared that their partnership had “no limits”. Whatever the pair discussed, Chinese officials appear to have been wrong-footed by the scale of the invasion: they had no prepared talking points or plans to evacuate Chinese citizens. Soon after the war began, China’s vice-foreign minister responsible for Russia was transferred to the radio and television administration.
Chinese perceptions of Russian military prowess have also changed since the war began. Russian successes in Crimea, Georgia and Syria had convinced Chinese generals that Mr Putin was a great strategist with an effective army. Drills between the two countries’ armed forces have focused on interoperability. Recent Chinese military reforms have replicated those in Russia. But Chinese commanders have been shocked by Mr Putin’s miscalculations over Ukraine and the lacklustre performance of Russian soldiers and weaponry.
Disillusion is not confined to military types. In December Feng Yujun, a prominent Russia expert at Fudan University, in Shanghai, made a scathing speech in which he noted that Russia had annexed millions of square miles of Chinese territory between 1860 and 1945. The Soviet Union then forced China to distance itself from the West and pushed it to enter the Korean war, in which “countless” Chinese troops were killed, he argued. Modern Russia, he went on, had not accepted its weakness relative to China and was obsessed with rebuilding its empire. “The weakest party in the China-America-Russia triangle always benefits the most,” he concluded.
Such views are now common among Chinese scholars and business figures familiar with Russia. But their impact on decision-making is limited in a system that depends increasingly on the will of one man.
Late last year some Western officials expressed hope that China was starting to distance itself from Russia, especially after Mr Putin promised to address Chinese “questions and concerns” about the situation in Ukraine when he met Mr Xi in Uzbekistan in September. Those hopes grew stronger after Mr Xi and other senior Chinese officials, without explicitly mentioning Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling over Ukraine, voiced disapproval of any such threat or attack. The statements coincided with a diplomatic push by Mr Xi to repair some of the damage to China’s economy and international relations after its long self-imposed isolation to counter covid-19.
For a while, Mr Xi appeared keen to try to reduce tensions with America. That approach seemed to gain momentum when he met President Joe Biden in Bali in November. Both men said they would try to find areas of potential co-operation. But that attempt at detente ground to a halt in February after America shot down a high-altitude Chinese balloon that it said was part of a global surveillance operation. Chinese officials have been frustrated, too, by their lack of progress in undermining support for nato within Europe.
Beyond the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing there is little hard evidence that China is distancing itself from Russia. In 2022 Russian exports of crude oil and gas to China rose, in dollar terms, by 44% and more than 100% respectively. Chinese exports to Russia increased by 12.8%. China’s shipments of microchips—which are used in military as well as civilian kit, and which the West has tried to deny to Russia—more than doubled. Some Chinese companies have even provided items for direct military use, such as satellite images, jamming technology and parts for fighter jets—although only in small quantities. Some of these deals may pre-date the war, or involve entities already under American sanctions.
China has also continued to take part in joint military drills with Russia. In November Chinese and Russian strategic bombers flew on a joint patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and landed on each others’ airfields for the first time. On the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Russian, Chinese and South African warships were exercising together in the Indian Ocean. And on March 15th Russia, China and Iran began joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman.
Double or nothing
Rather than downgrade the relationship Mr Xi appears to be strengthening it, while exploiting Russia’s miscalculations in Ukraine to tilt the balance of power in his favour. It is easy to see why. Mr Xi has won access to discounted energy supplies. And he has almost certainly extracted an assurance that Mr Putin will back him diplomatically in a war over Taiwan.
He has also gained leverage to seek high-end Russian military technology, such as surface-to-air missile systems and nuclear reactors designed to power submarines—and to press Mr Putin to withhold or delay supplies of similar items to other Russian customers that have territorial disputes with China, such as India and Vietnam. Russia could also help upgrade China’s nuclear arsenal, or work on a joint missile-warning system.
In recent weeks Mr Xi appears to have doubled down. Two days before the anniversary of Russia’s invasion he sent Wang Yi, his top diplomat, to meet Mr Putin in Moscow. There, Mr Wang said China’s strategic partnership with Russia was “as firm as Mount Tai” and pledged to work with Russia to “strengthen strategic co-ordination, expand practical co-operation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries.” One expected item on the agenda for Mr Xi’s visit will be Russia’s proposal to build a new gas pipeline to China that would divert supplies once earmarked for Europe.
Even as China extracts concessions its officials will be anxious to keep Mr Xi’s hands clean, especially after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr Putin on March 17th, accusing him of war crimes. Having been surprised once by the scale of Russia’s invasion, officials in Beijing will be keen to ensure that there is no big new offensive or egregious attack on civilians while their boss is in Moscow. Recalling Mr Biden’s surprise visit to Kyiv during Mr Wang’s trip to Moscow, they will also be wary of any American counter-moves.
Mr Xi’s proposed call with Mr Zelensky, long advocated by European and American officials, may improve the optics of his trip, especially if the Ukrainian leader makes positive noises about China’s peacemaking potential. But Mr Xi probably has little immediate interest in mediation. The Iran-Saudi deal was brewing for some time before China stepped in, and elsewhere its record as an intermediary is poor. The “six-party talks” it hosted for years over North Korea came to nothing. Likewise efforts to broker peace in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Chinese officials also calculate (correctly) that neither Russia nor Ukraine wants peace talks at the moment, as both believe they can make advances on the battlefield. Mr Xi’s peace posturing is thus more about burnishing his international image while undermining America’s, and positioning China to take advantage of whatever emerges from the war.
As for Russia’s request for lethal weapons, China is most likely undecided. America’s allegation that China is mulling sending arms may be more of a pre-emptive public warning than evidence of imminent action. Chinese officials deny any such plans exist. But China may see another opportunity to gain leverage. In public statements and private discussions its officials increasingly draw a link with America’s provision of weapons to Taiwan. “Why does the US ask China not to provide weapons to Russia while it keeps selling arms to Taiwan?” asked Qin Gang, China’s new foreign minister, at his debut news conference on March 7th.
If Mr Xi does decide to arm Russia, he may do so covertly. China has a long history of clandestine arms exports. In the 1980s it secretly supplied Chinese-made variants of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle to CIA-backed mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan. Providing Russia with artillery shells would be easy: Chinese arms-makers produce similar models and can remove markings, or add ones suggesting they originate elsewhere, says Dennis Wilder, a former CIA officer who used to track Chinese arms exports. China could also supply weaponry via third countries, like North Korea or Iran, or provide them with incentives to ship their own arms to Russia. America might detect such moves, but proving them will be harder. “All China needs is plausible deniability,” says Mr Wilder.
But the quiet approach has limits. To truly alter the course of the war might require China to supply bigger, more sophisticated weapons, such as attack drones. Those would be harder to conceal, especially if any were to fall into Ukrainian hands. And public exposure would significantly undermine Mr Xi’s efforts to present himself as a peacemaker and to undermine relations between Europe and America.
In the end Mr Xi’s decision could depend on how the war plays out, and especially on the outcome of the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive in the coming months. It could hinge, too, on the level of tensions between China and America over Taiwan, suggests Alexander Korolev, who studies China-Russia relations at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “If, by sending weapons to Ukraine, China can control the level of escalation and keep Russia going for as long as needed, then it can keep the West busy,” he says. “That makes it more feasible to deal with Taiwan.”
That is a really thought provoking story John. Russia as a Chinese vassal state ? Intriguing. The next article is also good value.Never let a good opportunity pass, Xi may have Putin by the ....s.
"To make sure Putin understands he is becoming a Chinese “vassal state” last month, Xi instructed China’s Ministry of Natural Resources to issue new map regulations that replace the current Russian names of eight places along the Russian-Chinese border with Chinese names."Heading the list was the great Russian Pacific port city of Vladivostok which was called Hai Shen Wai before Russia annexed it in 1860 during the second opium war, under threat to set Beijing ablaze."
That is a really thought provoking story John. Russia as a Chinese vassal state? Intriguing. The next article is also good value.
Thanks
Russia’s reliance on China will outlast Vladimir Putin
When Xi Jinping arrives in Moscow on March 20th for a state visit, the Kremlin ceremonies will be focused on showing not only respect to the most important foreign guest Russia has hosted since the beginning of its war against Ukraine, but also equality between the Chinese leader and his host, President Vladimir Putin. Yet elaborate court protocols will not be able to mask the growing power asymmetry between the two countries.
Mr Putin likes to frame his assault on Ukraine as an act of rebellion against American global dominance and a leap towards full Russian sovereignty. The reality is very different. Thirteen months into the war, Russia is increasingly dependent on China as a market for its commodities, as a source of critical imports, and as its most important diplomatic partner amid its growing global isolation. In 2022 China accounted for nearly 30% of Russian exports and 40% of its imports. A growing share of that trade is settled in Chinese yuan, since the West sanctions Russia’s access to the dollar and euro. With the West quickly dismantling its reliance on Russian natural resources, this dependency is set to grow.
Indeed, Russia may soon be more dependent on China than it ever was on Europe. It launched its pivot to China in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, in order to diversify away from Europe. Now that ties with the West are broken beyond repair, Russia has no long-term options other than China.
For now, China is content simply to monetise its growing geoeconomic leverage over Russia by securing discounts on its hydrocarbon exports and conquering its consumer market. But it is probably only a matter of time before China demands more political loyalty for its help in keeping Mr Putin’s regime afloat.
As Russia’s reliance on China reduces the Kremlin’s leverage, China could demand more political concessions. It could ask Russia to share sensitive military technologies, accept its naval presence in the Russian Arctic, or greenlight more People’s Liberation Army installations in Central Asia. China may also want a say on Russia’s ties to Asian countries that have their own troubles with Mr Xi’s regime. China could ask Russia not to service the military equipment that it has been selling to India for decades, for example. The Kremlin may not be able to refuse some of these offers.
Why, if the Kremlin was so obsessed about supposed American dominance in its relationship with the West, would it lock the country into deepening deference to China? The reason is that the war against Ukraine and, by extension, its Western allies, has emerged as the organising principle of Russian politics, economics and foreign policy. Mr Putin and his entourage have staked so much on this campaign that the war has become existential. Losing it, in the dark minds of the hard men in the Kremlin, means losing power, the country, and maybe even their own freedom and lives.
As censorship and repression become the norm in Russia, and the economy is increasingly put on a war footing, the Kremlin is reassessing every diplomatic relationship through the lens of its potential support for the war effort. China emerges as the most consequential partner, for three reasons.
First, its increased purchases of Russian commodities fill Mr Putin’s war chest. Second, China is an irreplaceable source of supplies for Mr Putin’s war machine, whether components for Russian weapons or microchips for industrial machines. Finally, although the Kremlin has been looking for ways to punish the West—above all America—for its support for Ukraine, so far the tools it has deployed, such as cyberweapons or energy blackmail, have not proved very effective. The Kremlin is therefore increasingly convinced that helping China, America’s primary global adversary, to dethrone its great rival is the best way to win revenge for the Biden administration’s help to Ukraine. This is why sharing sensitive military secrets with China, or otherwise enabling its military machine, no longer seems taboo.
What sweetens the pill of subservience to China is not only Schadenfreude about the upcoming demise of American hegemony, but China’s remarkable ability to massage the Russian ego and give Mr Putin public face, including through Mr Xi’s state visit. Another comforting reality is that China could not care less about repression and corruption inside Russia, so long as Chinese interests are served.
Russia’s new attitude towards China is in stark contrast to even a year ago. Before February 24th many voices in the Russian power system cautioned against a blind rush into China’s embrace, advocating a more balanced foreign policy. These voices are now silent, subordinated to Mr Putin’s tunnel vision of Russian national interests: destroying Ukraine and taking revenge on the West. The tragedy for Russia is that even after Mr Putin’s exit from the political scene, the new setup of a giant Eurasian dictatorship subservient to Chinese overlords will probably survive.
One day the war in Ukraine will end, with an unsatisfying result for all sides. After all, Russia has nuclear weapons, and there is nothing indicating that it will not use them if Mr Putin believes losing the war would mean his demise. However desirable, therefore, a return to Ukraine’s internationally recognised 1991 borders seems unlikely, just like the idea that Mr Putin and other Russian war criminals will voluntarily fly to The Hague to face trial.
Several years from now, the West will have eliminated its economic dependency on anything Russian. Russia’s economy will adjust—with enormous Chinese help—to a new model: poorer and technologically backward, but sustainable. China will consume the bulk of Russian exports and provide its only modern technology; the Russian financial system will be fully yuanised. The sanctioned leaders of the Russian security services and the military will become the country’s new elite: mostly veterans of the Ukrainian campaign, with no experience of travelling to the West since 2014, and many with children in top Chinese universities.
To restore ties with the West and crawl out from under this Chinese dominance, Russia will have to meet Ukraine’s demands of accountability for war criminals, reparations and the return of all annexed territories, with the promise of a partial lifting of sanctions as an elusive reward. That will be a tall order even in the unlikely scenario of a democratic government in post-Putin Russia, and next to impossible to the team that will probably run the Kremlin after Mr Putin finally leaves. Vassalage to China will look more familiar, predictable and beneficial. ■
Alexander Gabuev is the inaugural director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin.
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