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Whilst most smaller investors obviously didn't pick the crash, it is not like after considering those two snippets that it was a "great shock" by that point in time.
The main problem is that the huge trading range prior to the weekend caused panic on the Monday when it actually did fall 13%.
Also keep in mind that the P/E ratio of the S & P 500 was 32.6 before the crash!
There's the fable of Joe Kennedy (JFK's dad) selling all his shares because the kid shining his shoes was asking for investment advice. The theory being that if even the guy cleaning your shoes is speculating on stocks it's time get out.
IMO, the GFC was harder to pick. Stocks (in the US) didn't look disgracefully overpriced, although if you had even a cursory glance at an average US bank balance sheet you would seen the enormous leveraging they had. Iirc, at its peak in late 2006 Citi's leverage was out over 50x and with DTA's excluded over 90x. That implies that only 1-2% of assets need to go bad for equity to be wiped out.
ETA: I just checked and excluding DTA's would have pushed Citi's leverage out to over 280x. So somewhere approaching ~0.3% of their loans needed to go bad.