Storm Financial Group

[Solly]

It is amazing that people like you and idontgetit, after all you have seen and been through, still don't understand the damage that double gearing caused you. DOUBLE GEARING SIGNIFICANTLY MULTIPLIED YOUR LOSSES....IT DRAGGED YOU INTO NEGATIVE EQUITY WELL BEFORE THE MARGIN CALL FIASCO.

If Frank was allegedly in negative equity well before the margin call issue, I wonder what Storm's data/Ignite systems where actually reporting during this period and where this output or reporting analysis was being sent ?

Does anybody know?

 

[doobsy]

If Frank was allegedly in negative equity well before the margin call issue, I wonder what Storm's data/Ignite systems where actually reporting during this period and where this output or reporting analysis was being sent ?

Does anybody know?

Solly - my discussions with ex clients who had been devotees for a long time is that through the tech wreck of 2000-03 investors got close to the same situation. Margin calls were made, clients forced to sell some investments but not all, or came up with more cash. As that crisis was a slower moving situation and there were less clients at the time it was dealt with and clients were moved back into markets when it started to rally and their exposure that was left in the market increased to give them equity again. ( My understanding is that more important clients were "propped" up with EC monies so they wouldn't have the embaressment of telling them they were in Margin Call and would need to sell anything and that money was paid back at a later date. I believe he tried to use Storm monies to do this again in 2008 )

In this case the "overall" debt was never seen as a problem and because clients got to participate in the next rally from 3500 points to 6800 points it was soon forgotten.

I think the brainwashing of clients and advisers (most of whom came on board after this and only knew of good times and 20%pa returns) resulted in the home loan debt being ignored by all except the most cautious of Storms clients. There was always the assumption that even with a margin call there would be left over equity to build off.

What was and never is discussed is the cost of being out of the market. I am as far from a traditional "time in the market not timing the market" style of adviser and believe it is one of the great untruths spruiked by my profession but there are clear studies that show the affects of missing the first days / weeks of a rally on your overall long term return by trying to time the bottom. Any margin call would have resulted in clients having significant portions of monies in cash with an inability to quickly move back into the market unless it was on a serious bull rally. This holding in cash would result in a much reduced long term return that probably negates the "supposed" extra return provided by the gearing.

 

[doobsy]

Looking for feedback from those more passionate about this than me.

After looking through the propoganda on the commonwealth bank deception site. Sorry don't see much value there, it did prompt me to point out 2 things:

1. There is a supposed breakdown of age of clients in one article. That being the case most were 55 and under and I think we will find the bank lending will provde to be prudent enough for these clients that they will struggle to get any money back on this area. I do wait to see the result for those over 55 however.

2. The whole thing went to hell in a handbasket when CBA requested repayment of the $10M loan that Storm had. This was a company with $5B (5000 million) under advice in it's prime. Even on 0.1% trail that is $5M. Trail was more like 0.2 - 0.3% so even excluding all upfronts I wouldn't have thought $10M would have caused too much trouble to either pay off or re-finance.

Where was the money being spent?? There was the $1M wage bill for EC and JC and gold taps in the toilets don't come cheap but why did what I would have thought was a junior loan for a company that was ready to list on the ASX less than 12 months before hand cause such trouble?

 

[Harleyquin]

Doobsy how do you come to this conclusion when you consider the real possibility of the unregistered investment scheme?

I think your point 2 in your latest post is the tip of the iceberg, there's a lot going on under the surface, and this combined with the above, creates more questions than answers.

I have read the new thread that Julia has started relating to Risk and it's proving quite a talking point. I understand all that is being said re risk. How does this apply to the Storm Financial case when clients have asked for different risks, banks employ financial advisors and know that every client will have a different attitude to risk and yet both SF and all the banks involved with SF have accepted 'as the norm' that all SF clients are all high risk?

To me there can be only one answer and that is - there is a lot of criminality here.

Many people have been duped into believing that all of these organizations have at least some level of decency.

Our crime remains unchanged - we believed them all - and we are paying a huge price for our crime.

It's very easy after the event for people like Bunyip, and those he represents, to say 'you are totally responsible for this ... Your responsibility was to fully investigate this yourself'. Or one of his latest ...you can' t play catchup. You asked to play catchup Bunyip?

 

[Harleyquin]

That should have been 'WHO asked to play catchup?'.

We didn't unless you know something that I don't regarding this issue.

 

[Garpal Gumnut]

If Frank was allegedly in negative equity well before the margin call issue, I wonder what Storm's data/Ignite systems where actually reporting during this period and where this output or reporting analysis was being sent ?

Does anybody know?

Looking for feedback from those more passionate about this than me.

After looking through the propoganda on the commonwealth bank deception site.

............................................................................................................................ The whole thing went to hell in a handbasket when CBA requested repayment of the $10M loan that Storm had. This was a company with $5B (5000 million) under advice in it's prime. Even on 0.1% trail that is $5M. Trail was more like 0.2 - 0.3% so even excluding all upfronts I wouldn't have thought $10M would have caused too much trouble to either pay off or re-finance.

Where was the money being spent?? There was the $1M wage bill for EC and JC and gold taps in the toilets don't come cheap but why did what I would have thought was a junior loan for a company that was ready to list on the ASX less than 12 months before hand cause such trouble?

I have asked these questions in not as many words repeatedly but not as yet received a reply on this thread.

gg

 

[bunyip]

Doobsy how do you come to this conclusion when you consider the real possibility of the unregistered investment scheme?

I think your point 2 in your latest post is the tip of the iceberg, there's a lot going on under the surface, and this combined with the above, creates more questions than answers.

I have read the new thread that Julia has started relating to Risk and it's proving quite a talking point. I understand all that is being said re risk. How does this apply to the Storm Financial case when clients have asked for different risks, banks employ financial advisors and know that every client will have a different attitude to risk and yet both SF and all the banks involved with SF have accepted 'as the norm' that all SF clients are all high risk?

To me there can be only one answer and that is - there is a lot of criminality here.

Many people have been duped into believing that all of these organizations have at least some level of decency.

Our crime remains unchanged - we believed them all - and we are paying a huge price for our crime.

It's very easy after the event for people like Bunyip, and those he represents, to say 'you are totally responsible for this ... Your responsibility was to fully investigate this yourself'. Or one of his latest ...you can' t play catchup. You asked to play catchup Bunyip?

I didn't say you are totally responsible for this.
I didn't say 'you can't play catchup'.

I suggest you take the time to establish who said what, rather than attributing certain comments to people who never made them.

 

[shibby]

Looking for feedback from those more passionate about this than me.


2. The whole thing went to hell in a handbasket when CBA requested repayment of the $10M loan that Storm had. This was a company with $5B (5000 million) under advice in it's prime. Even on 0.1% trail that is $5M. Trail was more like 0.2 - 0.3% so even excluding all upfronts I wouldn't have thought $10M would have caused too much trouble to either pay off or re-finance.

Where was the money being spent?? There was the $1M wage bill for EC and JC and gold taps in the toilets don't come cheap but why did what I would have thought was a junior loan for a company that was ready to list on the ASX less than 12 months before hand cause such trouble?

I thought I would mention here the principals of the financial advisory firms that Storm bought; remember they were predominantly down the east coast of Australia.
I believe I know, well lets say I am 99.9% accurate that my financial advisor and her partner received about $3,000,000.00 for our scalps in June 2008.
There are lot more out there that could have taken the cash and ran rather than wait for another attempt of a float.

 

[doobsy]

Doobsy how do you come to this conclusion when you consider the real possibility of the unregistered investment scheme?

I think your point 2 in your latest post is the tip of the iceberg, there's a lot going on under the surface, and this combined with the above, creates more questions than answers.

I have read the new thread that Julia has started relating to Risk and it's proving quite a talking point. I understand all that is being said re risk. How does this apply to the Storm Financial case when clients have asked for different risks, banks employ financial advisors and know that every client will have a different attitude to risk and yet both SF and all the banks involved with SF have accepted 'as the norm' that all SF clients are all high risk?

To me there can be only one answer and that is - there is a lot of criminality here.

Many people have been duped into believing that all of these organizations have at least some level of decency.

Our crime remains unchanged - we believed them all - and we are paying a huge price for our crime.

It's very easy after the event for people like Bunyip, and those he represents, to say 'you are totally responsible for this ... Your responsibility was to fully investigate this yourself'. Or one of his latest ...you can' t play catchup. You asked to play catchup Bunyip?

Working in the industry HQ makes me think that of all the arguments the UMIS is the hardest to prove. Not only that, it is very easy to argue that MAYBE CBA were very tight with Storm but that does and should not automatically imply that the other banks were as well.

The argument behind the UMIS is that Storm and CBA were effectively selling a single bundled product. As previously discussed, there were clients who used their own banks, clients who used mortgage brokers to arrange the home loan monies, clients who did not use home monies at all but pulled out super for the initial capital etc etc. All of these clients can't argue UMIS as they had no involvement with CBA.

Point 2 is a clear one, Storm as a business also did not respect debt. That goes to the board of directors. I cannot for the life of me considering the levels of income generated 2004-2007 see why they even needed a small commercial loan for $10M apart for convenience. This is not just an EC and JC thing, this is the board overall that should have been looking to remove that risk from the business.

Haven't read Julia's new posts so can't comment but I will use my example. My business lending is with Westpac. Westpac look at my business the same as they look at any business, cashflow, costs, growth etc etc. They don't ask questions about what I recommend to clients. Why would CBA ask those questions? Should a CBA mortgage broker be asking what each client is going to do with the monies and if they say "invest it in the market" then be expected to (a) know anything at all about the market or (b) ensure the advice the client has received is legit.

Small dig here - I don't think the CBA planners know much past their own product suite so I wouldn't expect them to give a great analysis of another plan even if they did get their hands on a copy.

What are we left with? CBA had every right to call their commercial loan. I know for a fact and hope that Frank might back me up here that banks in times of crisis quite often want to call or review business loans. They are different to a 30 year mortgage.

I won't go back into the blame game but Storm were not singled out here. I am not sure of where you are based but in North Queensland the banks went from being the best friends of many business people (especially those who were exposed to property) to requesting loans be paid out or at least reduced. It sent a number of big names to the wall. Storm were not robinson crusoe in this instance.

 

[doobsy]

I thought I would mention here the principals of the financial advisory firms that Storm bought; remember they were predominantly down the east coast of Australia.
I believe I know, well lets say I am 99.9% accurate that my financial advisor and her partner received about $3,000,000.00 for our scalps in June 2008.
There are lot more out there that could have taken the cash and ran rather than wait for another attempt of a float.

Shibby

Most were paid a small nominal amount of cash and then received "shares" that would have their value realised when Storm listed (which of course never happened).

There may have been some that took more cash and less shares but most I think had a fair bit locked up with the promise of "you will get your money when we become a listed company".

 

[shibby]

Shibby

Most were paid a small nominal amount of cash and then received "shares" that would have their value realised when Storm listed (which of course never happened).

There may have been some that took more cash and less shares but most I think had a fair bit locked up with the promise of "you will get your money when we become a listed company".

Doobsy
I think you will find that it was $3,000,000 cash now or $7,000,000 shares. If there were a lot of principals who had not recieved their money or shares wouldn't they have been on the outstanding creditors list?

 

[shibby]

Doobsy
I would also like to point out that there was possibly a large amount of money owed to Macquarie as well.
I am not sure if this could be connected.
From the Rippoll Inquiry - Mr van der Westhuyzen for Macquarie Bank talking about October 2008 "we had three representatives in the Storm office. They were there for two days"
The world is crashing and Macquarie have 3 people for 2 days in Townsville. Maybe a bit far out there but?

 

[Frank Ainslie]

Storm and the CBA – Part 1

The wrongdoings of the CBA in its dealings with Storm are not in question here. That Bank has already stated on the public record that the CBA had been involved in wrongdoings in its dealings with Storm. The CEO of that bank at the time, Mr. Ralph Norris, has already admitted such.

"I wished that I'd known about it a lot earlier. If I'd known about it I would have hit it on the head. I'm not proud of the relationship that we had with Storm."

Mr Norris said "the CBA had sacked staff, improved its lending practices and had audited its business to ensure another "Storm-type situation" did not happen again." He has also stated that "he had never met Mr Cassimatis and his wife Julie and was not aware of the bank's relationship with Storm until December 2008." Yet the CBA went to great lengths to accommodate Storm including restructuring CBA’s organization in Townsville that could only have been approved by the CEO?

Mr. Norris has also claimed that the Storm-CBA connection was purely a commercial one that was "nothing special." In other words, it was an “arms-length” relationship! No more and no less!

The description of an “arms-length” relationship in a commercial sense is one where an agreement is made by two parties freely and independently of each other, and without some special relationship existing that would influence that relationship and place it outside the commercial norm.

During the parliamentary enquiry Mr. Norris recommended that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission analyse proposed financial investment models to determine how risky they were and said, "...it is now clear Storm's own model was "not appropriate" for some customers."

By stating this he was basically saying that the CBA had no inkling that the Storm model was a double gearing one with a high risk factor.

Mr. Norris has also admitted that "the CBA was making numerous margin calls on other investors during the period of the share market collapse, but clients with other institutions did not suffer the same devastating complications as those who had invested with Storm.

It is now up to the Courts to establish the CBA's degree of guilt for what occurred, and this can only be done by establishing to what extent its actions contributed to the losses that the Storm investors suffered at the end of 2008.

For those ‘Stormies’ that took out loans out with the CBA I will attempt to pre-empt the courts findings basing my case on the known facts. It will be interesting at the end of the day to find out how far off the mark I am!

I will cover all the issues including UMIS, contractual breach, and so on. I will start with UMIS Doobsy has recently made the following remarks in this regard:

"Working in the industry HQ makes me think that of all the arguments the UMIS is the hardest to prove. Not only that, it is very easy to argue that MAYBE CBA were very tight with Storm but that does and should not automatically imply that the other banks were as well.

The argument behind the UMIS is that Storm and CBA were effectively selling a single bundled product. As previously discussed, there were clients who used their own banks, clients who used mortgage brokers to arrange the home loan monies, clients who did not use home monies at all but pulled out super for the initial capital etc etc. All of these clients can't argue UMIS as they had no involvement with CBA."

He's right about not every Stormie being able to claim on the basis of UMIS because this only applies at the moment to Storm clients who were with the CBA, the Macquarie Bank or BOQ. Perhaps the claim will be made against other banks later but the focus is on these three banks at the moment. Where UMIS is concerned, the issue in law is a simple one. "Were the banks and Storm effectively operating what constitutes a managed investment scheme?" This can only be defined by examining what a managed investment scheme is and whether the arrangements Storm and the Banks had in place amount to one. In order to ascertain this, the conditions relating to managed investment schemes need to be understood. If these conditions do exist, then UMIS will have been proven to exist because the schemes were unregistered! I will explore the subject of UMIS and the CBA in my next post.

In my future postings I will also give my views on the lines of defence that I expect the CBA to use if this matter sees the light of day in a courtroom.

 

[doobsy]

Doobsy
I think you will find that it was $3,000,000 cash now or $7,000,000 shares. If there were a lot of principals who had not recieved their money or shares wouldn't they have been on the outstanding creditors list?

I think alot were, probably marked as family company names though.

 

[doobsy]

Frank

In order to be fair can we please start differentiating the different CBA parts.

CBA Banking did the lending against the homes. These people possibly have zero knowledge of any financial investment products. They know about home loans.

Colonial (a wholly owned subsiduary) provided the margin lending. They operated in their own little bubble which was all about margin lending. They do know a bit about home loans because they push a product called CALIA which links home and investment loans all as one. Funny that EC never used this product isn't it.

Macquarie - happy to be corrected but only provided margin loans to my knowledge.

BOQ - again happy to be corrected but only provided home loans. Now we know BOQ North Ward helped spruik the Storm strategy but what expertise does a bank manager have in share market investments? To my knowledge neither principal has the qualifications to be an financial planner.

Anyway, bundling CBA and jumping willy nilly between what was said about bad lending practices on home loans and some how linking that to an assumption that that means all lending including the margin lending was imprudent and they have admitted it is drawing a bit of a long bow.

 

[Harleyquin]

Bunyip I would suggest that you take the time to read back over your previous posts and not only will you find you've said something that means the same but you've said it more than once. You've also contradicted yourself on more than one occasion.

 

[Frank Ainslie]

Storm and the CBA – Part 2

Subject: Unregistered Managed Investment Scheme

“On 1 July 1998 the Managed Investments Act (Cth) (Act) introduced the concept of a managed investment scheme. A managed investment scheme is a scheme (often in the form of a unit trust) in which people contribute money (or money's worth) to acquire interest to benefits produced by the scheme. These contributions are pooled or used in a common enterprise and members of the scheme do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme.”

I must admit that when unregistered managed investment schemes were first mentioned where Storm and the Banks were concerned, they were not something I had encountered before. I therefore made a point of acquainting myself with the various aspects of such because the suggestion that unregistered managed investment schemes may have existed will play an important part in our cases against the Banks; in particular, the CBA, Macquarie Bank and the BOQ.

When addressing the various components that make up a managed investment scheme in my following comments, I have not included any reference to the CBA’s wrongdoings because the Court will, I believe, be considering this particular aspect purely on the arrangements that existed between Storm and the CBA together with the relationship that developed between those parties, and the methods that were employed to pool investors’ funds for a common purpose. The various wrongdoings (and there are many) that resulted from Storm’s arrangements with the CBA will be outlined by me in future postings in this series when addressing other matters such as “contractual breach”, “imprudent lending”, and “unconscionability”.

Basically, for our purposes, a managed investment scheme is one that has the following features:

* It is a scheme, that is, a program or plan of action coupled with the taking of steps to give effect to its purpose
* Under the scheme, people contribute money or assets in exchange for rights (called interests) to obtain benefits produced by the scheme (whether the rights are actual, prospective, contingent and whether they are legally enforceable or not)
* Any of the contributions are to be pooled or used in a common enterprise, to produce financial benefits, or benefits consisting of property rights or interests, for people who hold interests in the scheme (known as members)
* The members do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme (whether or not they have the right to be consulted or give directions)

1. It is a scheme, that is, a program or plan of action coupled with the taking of steps to give effect to its purpose.

The 18th May 2007 agreement between Storm and the CBA indicates a clear intention by them to work together for their mutual interests. Their motivation for doing so will be addressed by me in subsequent postings. This agreement and their subsequent actions demonstrate a commitment by both parties to work in partnership with a view to promoting the CBA’s services for what is now perceived as a shared gain.

There is no question in my mind that the 18th May 2007 agreement between Storm and the CBA was the chief culprit for the losses that ensued when the GFC occurred in 2008. Why? Because it blurred the lines of responsibility by both parties and provided an incentive for them to delay taking remedial actions when the circumstances demanded such. This agreement therefore remains central to the reasons why Storm and the CBA failed to act appropriately when the economic climate began to change dramatically in that year.

This agreement between Storm and the CBA will also, I believe, serve to identify when an unregistered managed investment scheme (if proven) first began between the CBA and Storm.

Following the 18th May 2007 agreement, a specific strategy was adopted by both parties to promote the CBA’s products with a view to increasing both their bottom lines.

A dedicated section was established in the CBA’s Atkenvale branch to deal with increased work, with specialist lending Staff being seconded from other CBA branches. This section used a computer-based valuation program known as VAS for the purpose of identifying customers who would be ripe for further loans.

The CBA has described the VAS as an "automated decisioning tool" which was used throughout its retail operations to determine if a loan applicant needed an Independent valuation. It is not yet clear whether VAS was used primarily where CBA’s Storm clients were concerned or was a tool used for other CBA customers as well. No doubt, this question will be asked at some stage. The loans that arose from this exercise were used to invest further in Storm-badged products.

This section of the CBA’s Atkenvale branch was in daily contact with members of Storm’s Townsville Office who had a number of former CBA employees working there. These included David McCullough, a CBA Townsville business banking manager who worked at a very high level in Storm, Camella Richards. who ran back-office systems and processes, and Kirsty Devney who did day-to-day liaison between the CBA and Storm.

2. Under the scheme, people contribute money or assets in exchange for rights (called interests) to obtain benefits produced by the scheme (whether the rights are actual, prospective, contingent and whether they are legally enforceable or not)

No problems there as I see it!

3. Any of the contributions are to be pooled or used in a common enterprise, to produce financial benefits, or benefits consisting of property rights or interests, for people who hold interests in the scheme (known as members).

During 2007 and 2008, CBA’s VAS system was used by the CBA’s Atkenvale branch to sift through the accounts of Storm’s customers for the express purpose of re-assessing house valuations with a view to offering customers increased borrowings on the supposed additional equity that was available. The CBA would then supply this information to Storm who would duly contact the customers concerned advising them to take out additional loans based on the increased equity of their properties. These additional loan amounts would then be ploughed into Storm index-linked products once Storm had extracted its 7.5% fee.

The desktop system generated valuations by keying in a property's postcode or addresses. Details about the address and size of the land and property. such as the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, were keyed in for a valuation that was provided within minutes. Many of the valuations would later be found to have been inflated when compared to market values that existed at that time.

The point being that the CBA and Storm by entering into a separate agreement between themselves and then taking the actions they did to channel their customers monies through the CBA, were effectively pooling the CBA’s Storm customers in a common enterprise.

‘Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW)’ dealt with the meaning of "common enterprise". In that case the argument was put forth that “in order to constitute a "common enterprise" there must be a joint participation in all the elements and activities that constitute the enterprise. Justice Mason disagreed. An enterprise may be described as common if it consists of two or more closely connected operations on the footing that one part is to be carried out by A and the other by B, each deriving a separate profit from what he does, even though there is no pooling or sharing of receipts of profits. It will be enough that the two operations constituting the enterprise contribute to the overall purpose that unites them. There is then an enterprise common to both participants and, accordingly, a common enterprise."

There is a similarity of the definition of "managed investment scheme" to the general definition of "making a financial investment" in s763B. The only substantive difference between the two is the requirement in paragraph (a)(ii) of the definition of "managed investment scheme" for there to be a pooling of contributions or a common enterprise. In fact, the similarities are such that any financial product that meets the general definition of "making a financial investment", that involves any pooling of investments or common enterprise and that does not fall within the specific list of exclusions to the definition of managed investment scheme mentioned in CA s9, will constitute an interest in a managed investment scheme and be regulated as such."

4. The members do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme (whether or not they have the right to be consulted or give directions)

We seem to fit the bill here as well.

Remedy: “Under the Corporations Act, a court may make compensation orders against a person who operated a managed investment scheme in contravention of the Act or against a person who was involved in the contravention.”

It is clear from the evidence at hand that the CBA and Storm had forged a special relationship that could hardly be described as “arm’s length”. The CBA cemented this relationship with Storm by extending personal and corporate loans at low interest to the directors of Storm and also gave personal loans to some of Storm’s employees The CBA also financed in part certain Storm events and promoted Storm’s services, be it indirectly.

It is unclear how the CBA will refute the charge of operating an unregistered managed investment scheme other than by finding something in the Corporations Act that its lawyers can seize on. The 18th May 2007 agreement between the CBA and Storm binds those parties together and this agreement will, I believe, play a central role in many of the additional charges that have been levied against the CBA by our lawyers as well as the one at hand; namely operating an "unregistered managed investment scheme".

 

[doobsy]

Frank - Good info for all on the forum.

Can I play devils advocate to keep the analysis going and maybe to be thought provoking.

There is mention of the arrangement in May 07. Can it be argued that the Storm Strategy was exactly the same prior to this arrangement and had been for 5+ years therefore the arrangement did not materially change the advice given to the Storm clients?

Also and I don't have a clue on the legalities here but does that mean ONLY the additional investments done after May 07 fall under the UMIS? Any existing investments before that date do not?

Can CBA argue that the valuation software was used by Storm for all clients (not just CBA borrowers) to trigger Storm to recommend to all clients that they speak with their relevant bank and increase the valuation and therefore access additional equity? Or was it just CBA/Storm clients who had re-vals done? If it was everyone, does that show that the arrangement wasn't exclusive between CBA and Storm?

You discuss the arrangement affecting responsibilities. I point to my last post on this matter. Was the arrangement between CBA home lending even known about by Colonial Geared Investments who ran the margin loans? It was the miscommunication and misunderstanding about who was in charge of margin loans (Storm was by the way - we certainly expected to be allowed to contact any of our clients if it had eventuated, not have Colonial speak with them as they needed to talk to us to get the correct advice of what to do) that led to the increased losses, not the CBA home lending dept.

Look forward to part 3

 

[bunyip]

Hey HQ,

Unforntunatly, trying to play catch up is what gets so many people into trouble, It's not funny.

It does lead even the smartest of people to do silly things, It's not just storm. I have seen people risking huges amounts on crazy things like olive groves, ostrich farms, stored barrels of whisky.

Even highly leveraged property speculation, and for some the ball bounces intheir favour others it doesn't.

The above statement from HQ, should be a warning for all the younger people that they need to start a retirement plan early, So as not to be scared into playing catch up.

Here you go Harleyquin – as you can see from the above, it was Tysonboss who made the ‘catchup’ comments, not me.

As for the other comments you wrongly attribute to me.....
I’ve never said ‘you are totally responsible for this’. I’ve said all along that a number of parties played a part in the Storm debacle – the clients, the banks, and Storm itself, and that each of these parties is responsible for the decisions they made and the actions they took. Nowhere have I suggested that any of these parties individually is totally responsible for what happened.

I’ve also said.....
Your most important responsibility when you consult a financial planner is to thoroughly research and evaluate the advice they give you.
This is particularly important if their advice is to mortgage your home and borrow vast sums of money for investment.

If you can't see the truth and common sense in this last statement after all that's happened to you, then you're a prime candidate to blow your money all over again if you get your hands on some investment dollars courtesy of a compensation ruling against the banks.

 

[Frank Ainslie]

Frank - Good info for all on the forum.

Can I play devils advocate to keep the analysis going and maybe to be thought provoking.

There is mention of the arrangement in May 07. Can it be argued that the Storm Strategy was exactly the same prior to this arrangement and had been for 5+ years therefore the arrangement did not materially change the advice given to the Storm clients?

Also and I don't have a clue on the legalities here but does that mean ONLY the additional investments done after May 07 fall under the UMIS? Any existing investments before that date do not?

Can CBA argue that the valuation software was used by Storm for all clients (not just CBA borrowers) to trigger Storm to recommend to all clients that they speak with their relevant bank and increase the valuation and therefore access additional equity? Or was it just CBA/Storm clients who had re-vals done? If it was everyone, does that show that the arrangement wasn't exclusive between CBA and Storm?

You discuss the arrangement affecting responsibilities. I point to my last post on this matter. Was the arrangement between CBA home lending even known about by Colonial Geared Investments who ran the margin loans? It was the miscommunication and misunderstanding about who was in charge of margin loans (Storm was by the way - we certainly expected to be allowed to contact any of our clients if it had eventuated, not have Colonial speak with them as they needed to talk to us to get the correct advice of what to do) that led to the increased losses, not the CBA home lending dept.

Look forward to part 3

"There is mention of the arrangement in May 07. Can it be argued that the Storm Strategy was exactly the same prior to this arrangement and had been for 5+ years therefore the arrangement did not materially change the advice given to the Storm clients?"

I have mentioned the CBA-Storm 18th May 2007 where the issue of the unregistered managed investment scheme is concerned because it highlights that the CBA and Storm had entered into an agreement that became the catalyst for pooling. This agreement was a separate agreement between Storm and the CBA that was not formally approved by any of Storm’s CBA customers because they were never notified of such and were therefore not allowed the opportunity to agree or disagree to any of its proposals. This is particular pertinent to the conditions of contract that existed where the margin loans were concerned between the CBA and its Storm customers. I will be commenting on this fully in due course.

"Also and I don't have a clue on the legalities here but does that mean ONLY the additional investments done after May 07 fall under the UMIS? Any existing investments before that date do not?"

I believe that any arrangements entered into by the CBA's Storm customers with that Bank after 18th May 2007 will be invalidated and that Bank will not be able to enforce such, if, that is, the Court finds that an unregistered management scheme did exist. Any Storm clients that had dealings with the CBA preceding this date will, I believe, be partially compensated if they took out further loans with the CBA on Storm’s advice after this agreement came into existence. I would imagine that any contractual arrangements entered into with the CBA by Storm's clients before that date would remain unaffected if this agreement didn't impact on them at all. Having said that, they will, I feel, still have a case for contractual breach which I will explain when I deal with the contractual issues relating to our cases.

In other words, compensation will, I believe, be based on partial recompense or full restitution, but it will also seek to be fair to the CBA. Whatever the Court decides, compensation if it is forthcoming will be based on a fair and equitable settlement.

This is my reading of the situation anyway. Greater minds than mine will be applying themselves to these questions and they will be getting well paid for doing so.

There is another point to consider. It may well be that the Court will rule that the scheme extended back even further depending on what is discovered during the trial. I have taken the 18th May 2007 date because it appears to be the most likely point when UMIS began but it shouldn't be taken as Gospel. This has yet to be ascertained!

"Can CBA argue that the valuation software was used by Storm for all clients (not just CBA borrowers) to trigger Storm to recommend to all clients that they speak with their relevant bank and increase the valuation and therefore access additional equity? Or was it just CBA/Storm clients who had re-vals done? If it was everyone, does that show that the arrangement wasn't exclusive between CBA and Storm?"

Again, there are issues here that I will be addressing in my various posts. For the purposes of establishing whether an unregistered managed investment scheme existed, only the actions of the CBA and Storm will, I believe, be considered by the Court. The primary question will be, "Did their combined actions constitute pooling in a common enterprise?" The Macquarie Bank and the BOQ will be facing similar charges because the former supplied margin loans and the latter supplied many of the housing loans that bolstered those margin loans. The CBA is more clear cut because different outlets of the CBA supplied both the housing and the margin loans.

"You discuss the arrangement affecting responsibilities. I point to my last post on this matter. Was the arrangement between CBA home lending even known about by Colonial Geared Investments who ran the margin loans? It was the miscommunication and misunderstanding about who was in charge of margin loans (Storm was by the way - we certainly expected to be allowed to contact any of our clients if it had eventuated, not have Colonial speak with them as they needed to talk to us to get the correct advice of what to do) that led to the increased losses, not the CBA home lending dept."

Again, this will boil down to the responsibility of bankers when lending money. I’ll be covering this aspect as well in a later posting.