In my previous comment I mentioned that I thought that the much vaunted “traction” of various initiatives were evident in FY2014, which requires comparing 1HY2014 with 2HY2014 to notice. Additionally, if one drills down, one finds that due to the net effect of various one-offs, FY2014 compares better with FY2013 than statutory reporting suggests, and so from the underlying performance perspective, the low point was in FY2013, not FY2014. What we should see in the 1HY2015 results is more “traction”, rather than the first buds of it. In
http://www.thorn.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/TGA-FY14-Full-Year-Results-Presentation.pdf you can see the following.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FY2014 - - - - FY2013
Reported NPAT - - - - -- $28,151K - - - $28,021K
Debt Sale - - - - - - - - - - ($810K) - - - ($1,404K)
Rent Drive Buy Trial - - - - $239K - - - - - $136K
CEO Change - - - - - - - - - $500K - - - - - - - nil
New System Impact - - - - $358K - - - - - - - nil
Tax Effect - - - - - - - - - - ($86K) - - - - - $380K
Underlying NPAT - - - - $28,352K - - - $27,133K
The presentation ends with, “The continued investments in new business opportunities are expected to deliver solid NPAT growth to above $30M.”
Intuitively, to see underlying improvements in FY2014 makes sense, because the major drag on profits has been the investment in Thorn Equipment Finance (TEF), and TEF's lease book grew from $12.122M at 31/03/2012 to $46M.521M at 31/03/2013, and to $63.6M as at 31/03/2014, and hence there was a growing finance margin to cover the relatively fixed costs of the TEF team that had been set up to be supported by a $100M lease book.
A similar dynamic is occurring at Thorn Financial Services (TFS), except that the team was substantially put in position in the closing months of FY2013, so FY2014 bore the brunt of that positioning expense, and FY2015 will see TFS's loan book grow to better absorb that overhead. The other significant drag on FY2014 was the Rent-Drive-Buy trial run, but this initiative is not being pursued, so that expense should decline.
If one extracted NPAT for FY2012, FY2013 and FY2014 from Morningstar metrics, and assumed FY2015 was going to be $30.2M (i.e., above $30M), and extracted the share tallies reported for those years, and invented a tally for FY2015, you would end up with the following:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2012/03 - - 2013/03 - - 2014/03 - - 2015/03 est
Net Profit - - - - - - - - - - $27.8M - - $28.0M - - - $28.2M - - $30.2M
Shares Outstanding - - - - 146.4M - - 147.6M - - 149.5M - - 151.0M
Share count increase - - - - - - - - - - 0.82% - - - 1.29% - - - 1.00%
EPS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $0.190 - -- $0.190 - -- $0.189 - - $0.200
However, if you adjust the NPATs for FY2013 and FY2014 to the underlying NPATS, as detailed earlier, you get the following:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2012/03 - - 2013/03 - - 2014/03 - - 2015/03 est
Net Profit - - - - - - - - - - $27.8M - - $27.13M - - $28.35M - - $30.2M
EPS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $0.190 - - - $0.184 - -- $0.190 - - - $0.200
The exact metrics are not important, all I want to demonstrate is that in my view the low point was FY2013, and that the heralded traction started in FY2014. If you look at the current Thomson Consensus Estimates, the mooted EPS for FY2015 is given as $0.206. This simply flows from what can be taken from management's outlook of “above $30 million”. A ejaculated number like “above $30 million” could easily be 5% higher, and that would give an EPS of $30M*1.05/151M = $0.209, so for now, somewhere between 20 cents and 21 cents should suffice. EPS should grow by 2 cents in FY2016, and 3 cents in FY2017 (the extra cent coming from the expiry of the $1.76M annual amortisation of NCML's Customer Relations asset.
I am hoping the SP will hit $2.60 if the traction-is-happening story plays out as I suspect. Of course, it may not.