Storm Financial Group

[Jifromoz]

This was in the paper this morning.

http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/ne...financial-advice/story-fndo2j43-1226527878811

It appears he has been banned for life.

 

[bunyip]

This was in the paper this morning.

http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/ne...financial-advice/story-fndo2j43-1226527878811

It appears he has been banned for life.

Sounds like Fullerton Smith well and truly deserves his permanent ban from providing financial services. I believe that many thousands of people would be delighted if EC and JC copped the same. Not that it’s likely to happen.

 

[bunyip]

Someone sent this to me, not sure where he got it. It's quite long but is well worth a read. Many of these truths are evident when we examine the Storm debacle. The comments in red are mine.

15 biases that make you a bad investor..........

Investing shouldn’t be hard. Buy quality companies at good prices and hold them for a long time. Not much more to it than that. Yet so many investors ”” maybe most ”” fail to beat a basic index fund. Why?Blame your brain. We come hardwired with all kinds of biases that cause us to misinterpret information and push us into regrettable decisions. Here are 15 of the biggest.

Confirmation bias
Starting with an answer, and then searching for evidence to back it up.

If you start with the idea that hyperinflation is imminent, you’ll probably read lots of literature by those who share the same view. If you’re convinced an economic recovery is at hand, you’ll probably search for other bullish opinions. Neither helps you separate emotions from reality.

Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-B) vice-chairman Charlie Munger is a fierce advocate of the intellectual strategy of Charles Darwin, who regularly tried to disprove his own theories, and was especially sceptical of his own ideas that seemed most compelling. The same logic should apply to investment ideas.

Recency bias
Letting recent events skew your perception of the future.

When we’re in a bull market, you think it’ll last forever.

(The success of the Storm strategy was heavily dependent upon the bull market lasting indefinitely. The strategy was always going to implode once the next bear market arrived.)

When we’re in a recession, you think we’ll never recover. After a banking crisis, you think another is right around the corner. Rarely is that actually the case ”” it’s usually the other way around ”” but it’s what feels right when memories are fresh in our minds.

Backfiring effect
When presented with information that goes against your viewpoints, you not only reject challengers, but double down on your original view.

(On this Storm thread we have frequently seen people attacked and ridiculed and denigrated because they put forward opposing views to those held by some Storm investors.)



Voters often view the candidate they support more favourably after the candidate is attacked by the other party. In investing, shareholders of companies facing heavy criticism often become fanatical, die-hard supporters for reasons totally unrelated to the company’s performance.

Anchoring
Letting one piece of irrelevant information govern your thought-process.

Best example: Investors anchor to the idea that a fair price for a stock must be more than they paid for it. It’s one of the most common, and dangerous, biases that exists.

“People do not get what they want or what they expect from the markets; they get what they deserve,” writes Bill Bonner.

(If you go into the marekt with your eyes closed and start taking serious risks, you’ll end up getting seriously burnt. Harsh but true.)

Framing bias
Reacting differently to the same information depending on how it’s presented. Example:

“Google shares surge to highest level in five years.”

“Google shares haven’t gone anywhere in five years.”

Both statements are true.

Skill bias
When education and training causes confidence to increase faster than ability.

The best example is the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. Staffed thick with PhDs and two Nobel laureates, the fund exploded in 1998 under an incomprehensible amount of leverage. Behind the failure was raging overconfidence. “The young geniuses from academe felt they could do no wrong,” Roger Lowenstein wrote in the book When Genius Failed.

Warren Buffett said this about the firm’s sixteen-person management team:

They probably have as high an average IQ as any sixteen people working together in one business in the country … just an incredible amount of intellect in that group. Now you combine that with the fact that those sixteen had extensive experience in the field they were operating in … in aggregate, the sixteen probably had 350 or 400 years of experience doing exactly what they were doing. And then you throw in the third factor: that most of them had virtually all of their very substantial net worths in the business …And essentially they went broke. That to me is absolutely fascinating.

(Sound familiar? Storm owners and Storm financial advisers invested heavily in the Storm strategy. Apparently they were fully convinced that it was the way to riches, despite all the evidence to the contrary.)

Hindsight bias
Out of literally millions, only a handful of investors truly saw the financial crisis coming.

If you disagree with that statement and respond, “No, any idiot could have seen it coming from a mile away,” you’re suffering from hindsight bias. Only after the fact do all the puzzle pieces make sense. That’s why bankruptcies outnumber billionaires.

(I disagree with their opinion on this one. Almost every media outlet was giving dire warnings almost every day for a good 12 months before the economic crisis hit with full force. To be unaware of what was coming you’d have to be blind or deaf or just plain disinterested.)

Pessimism bias
Underestimating the odds of something going right. Financial advisor Carl Richards writes:

We focus so much on protecting ourselves from negative surprises (job loss, disability, divorce, death .. the whole catastrophe) that we forget to factor in the positive ones (a raise, a business that works out, a new career, a new bull market) that can sometimes change our entire outlook.

Halo effect
“If we see a person first in a good light, it is difficult subsequently to darken that light,” writes the Economist.

(The combination of heavy gearing and a bull market produced outstanding results for Storm investors from 2003 to late 2007. Many of them appear to have regarded EC as a genius who could do no wrong. Accordingly, they appear to have believed in him with almost religious fervor, even accepting the outrageous advice to keep borrowing and investing more and more money despite the fact that the stock market was collapsing and the world was in the grip of a full-on economic crisis. Even after they were wiped out, some Storm investors continued to throw their support behind EC, refusing to hold him in any way responsible for their downfall.)

Mutual fund manager Bill Miller beat the S&P 500 for 15 years in a row ”” one of the best track records ever. He became, and largely remains, an investment legend.

Yet Miller’s flagship fund fell so hard over the last few years that his career-long track record just barely squeezed by an index fund. Jason Zweig of the Wall Street Journal wrote last year: “Over the full stretch since Mr. Miller became lead manager of the fund in 1990, he has gained an average of 9.39% annually, versus 9.14% for the S&P 500.”

Does this hurt his reputation? Yes. But not as much as you might think. Despite a distinctly mediocre long-term record, I suspect Miller will always be remembered as a legendary investor.

Illusion of control
Thinking that your decisions and skill led to a desired outcome, when luck was likely a big factor.

If you’ve ever made money day trading and patted yourself on the back for a job well done, you’re probably a victim of the illusion of control.

Escalation of committment
The classic “throwing good money after bad.”

(Storm investors were losing money hand over fist once the market turned bearish, yet some continued throwing good money after bad by repeatedly increasing their borrowings and piling even more heavily into the market.)

Doubling down on a plunging stock, not because you believe in its future, but because you feel the need to make back losses. Happens all the time at blackjack tables, too.

Negativity bias
Assuming perpetual doom, that problems will never be fixed, and that all hope is lost.

This bias has been rampant for the last four years, and has caused many to forgo investing opportunities of a lifetime.

Ostrich bias
Ignoring reality when it’s screaming in your face, usually in an attempt to rationalise a certain viewpoint.

(Both Storm management and Storm clients ignored reality when it was screaming in their faces, by staying in the market while it collapsed, and in many cases borrowing even more money to further increase their investment.)

Great example: A recent survey of 1,000 investors showed an average of more than half of respondents said the market declined in each of the last three years. But it didn’t. The S&P 500 rose 26.5% in 2009, 15.1% in 2010, and 2.1% last year. Pessimism trumped reality.

Risk perception bias
Attempting to eliminate one risk, but exposing yourself to another, potentially more harmful, risk.

Here’s an example I’ve written about before: In the year after 9/11, air travel fell, and car travel jumped. Understandably, people suddenly felt planes were more dangerous than cars.

But statistically, the opposite is true. In his book The Science of Fear, Daniel Gardner notes that if there were a 9/11 every day for an entire year, the odds that you’d be killed by terrorists are one in 7,750. By comparison, the annual odds of dying in a traffic accident are one in 6,498. German professor Gerd Gigerenzer estimates that the increase in automobile travel in the year after 9/11 resulted in 1,595 more traffic fatalities than would have otherwise occurred. Add in the impact stress had on our health, and the reaction to 9/11 may have been more deadly than the attack itself. “People jump from the frying pan into the fire” said Gigerenzer.

Today, an untold number of investors are choosing the perceived “riskless” safety of bonds trading at record high valuations, because they don’t want the risk of volatile stocks. Ten years from now, there’s an uncomfortably high chance they will be victims of risk perception bias. From the frying pan of stocks right into the fire of bonds.

 

[Julia]

That's very good, Bunyip.
Everything we do is coloured by our existing biases, most of which we don't recognise.
Then the need to rationalise our mistakes just extends these biases.
As a result we learn little.

Great example: A recent survey of 1,000 investors showed an average of more than half of respondents said the market declined in each of the last three years. But it didn’t. The S&P 500 rose 26.5% in 2009, 15.1% in 2010, and 2.1% last year. Pessimism trumped reality.

On this, I think perhaps the pessimism derives mostly from the ongoing global uncertainty, with no apparent solution for the debt problems of the US and Europe.

Thanks for posting. A good reminder to us all.

 

[bunyip]

That's very good, Bunyip.
Everything we do is coloured by our existing biases, most of which we don't recognise.
Then the need to rationalise our mistakes just extends these biases.
As a result we learn little.


On this, I think perhaps the pessimism derives mostly from the ongoing global uncertainty, with no apparent solution for the debt problems of the US and Europe.

Thanks for posting. A good reminder to us all.

No problem, Julia.

I’ll probably cop the usual scornful, sneering comments from the usual people. But what the heck – someone needs to post something useful on here to help educate investors.....it may as well be people like you and me and Doobsy and SJG and Judd, and one or two others who try to help.

 

[bunyip]

Can anyone tell me if Storm and the Banks had kept their end of the bargain ie . selling down when they said they would. Is it feasible that an investment in a managed fund covering the ASX200 and using a Margin loan with a maximum LVR at 60 % would have worked ? This includes paying down the loan and handing it in so as not to incur any more interest. Also moving the leftovers if any ? to a term deposit for example. I understand there would be losses but would it be possible to walk away with something and play another day ?
I'm just curious as all the above scenarios and all the previous crashes dating back to 1929 / 30 and including the 1987 stock market crash and 9/11 were all covered in the Storm seminars .

I’d be very interested to know the details of the Storm strategy back in 1987.
Storm claimed their strategy withstood the ‘87 crash. If this is correct, then there were clearly some significant differences in the strategy in 1987, as opposed to the strategy which was so disastrous in 2008.
Remember that the 2007/08 crash was tame compared to the crash in October, 1987. Once the market peaked and then stated falling in late 2007, it took several months to shed the first 20% of its value.
Compare that to 1987 when it plunged 25% in one day, and 50% in just over a month. No way in the world could the Storm strategy have withstood such a sudden and brutal plunge if it had occurred in 2007/08, without inflicting brutal losses on Storm clients. And there’s no way it could have withstood the same plunge back in 1987 either.......unless it was a substantially different strategy back then compared to what it was in the last few years of Storm’s life.

 

[Frank Ainslie]

No problem, Julia.

I’ll probably cop the usual scornful, sneering comments from the usual people. But what the heck – someone needs to post something useful on here to help educate investors.....it may as well be people like you and me and Doobsy and SJG and Judd, and one or two others who try to help.

Hi Bunyip!

Do I detect a hint of sensitivity? Get a life! We've been copping sneering comments from all quarters for four years now.

"...someone needs to post something useful on here to help educate investors.....it may as well be people like you and me and Doobsy and SJG and Judd, and one or two others who try to help."

I agree with the sentiment but not with your method of going about helping people. The only way this forum will be useful to would-be investors is to make clear to them what caused the Storm Financial disaster so that they can avoid what we could not.

You were not involved! Therefore, you are not in a position to inform them of anything because you weren't there. Only those that were caught up in this financial debacle can say it as it really is because we know what really happened. We are not using conjecture or uninformed opinion. We are talking from personal experience. Why, therefore, do you believe that anyone should listen to what you say?

With respect no one is interested in what you and others would have done. That is not the issue. The focus of this forum should be on what really happened and how any future would-be investors can avoid the same happening to them.

"If people are not prepared to learn from history, the same mistakes will continue to occur." We know what happened. I suggest therefore that you listen to what we have to say rather than give us your version of something you know little about.

Have a good day!

 

[Frank Ainslie]

I don't think Doobsy said it was illegal in its design and purpose.



How you could just ignore the home loan in your total LVR calculations is beyond me.
What did you think had happened to that debt?

Hi Julia,

It has already been ascertained in Court that the people that invested in Storm relied for the most part on Storm managing their financial affairs. Remember that not everyone is share literate like you.

Was it unreasonable for unsophisticated investors to place such reliance on Storm? After all, people had paid Storm good money to manage their portfolios. That included ascertaining the correct LVR's relating to their portfolios. How could anyone for one moment think that Storm was not doing the right thing by them?

I think people out there have to understand that trying to apply their own standards to what occurred is unproductive. This is one of the most complicated cases in legal history and its outcome will set new precedents.

The one thing that many on this forum want to do is to take deceptive conduct and misleading advice out of the equation. You cannot! The Banks are in the dock now because they aided and abetted Storm in a scheme designed to churn money out of Stormies. They placed their own interests above those of their clients/customers. There are laws in place that are designed to cater for this. That's why the Banks are being prosecuted and the directors of Storm will be.

This Court case is costing millions. I think it's time people asked why the Banks are in Court rather than asking why people invested in Storm to start with or why they relied on Storm to manage their affairs. Was Storm's scheme as daft as many on this forum profess. Of course it wasn't. Go to any bank site in Australia today and look at what those banks have to say about margin loans. Almost all of them without exception still talk about using the equity in one's house to buy shares.

People that still keep pushing the "What were you thinking of?" or "Why didn't you keep close tabs on what Storm was doing?" bandwagon have missed the point altogether. It's not about that! Rather, it's about the one-fit advice that Storm gave everyone and their arrangements with the CBA and MBL that cut across their contractual obligations to their Storm customers. Never more so than in the Banks'approach to margin calls.

 

[Julia]

Deja vu.

 

[Frank Ainslie]

Hi Doobsy,

“Going to make the mistake of getting involved in this forum again.” Perhaps you like Ricky Ponting should reconsider because your batting is not improving!

Before dealing with your comments which I think are surprisingly harsh for someone that is a financial adviser, I will make some general observations about your industry and its attitude to Storm. In so doing I am doing what quite a few on this forum do and that is using conjecture without any real evidence. I can only base it for the large part on your attitude and your readiness to label Storm as a rogue operator whilst defending your industry at every available opportunity despite that industry’s obvious failings. Storm Financial was a financial advisory firm that had everyone's approval whilst it existed.

I believe that Storm was a thorn in the side of most other financial advisers in the industry because it became a dominant player in the market. Storm had the infrastructure in place and arrangements with certain major banks that very few could match. It was also selling a commodity that few could match. What Storm was doing was not illegal in its self because it seemed to be operating within the legal parameters laid down. However, appearances can be deceiving as we have all found out since.

When Storm collapsed in early 2009 it must have come as a great relief to some of its competitors. “How the mighty have fallen!” There were also some who would have said, “I told you so!” whilst conveniently forgetting that they had been dumb and dumber until that point.

What you and your ilk forget, Doobsy, is that when you give people advise you play with their lives. They rely on you for sound advice, and if that advice is perverted because you as a financial adviser are putting your interest above theirs, the consequences can be appalling. The death count in Redcliffe alone from the Storm fall-out is 10 to date so what must it be in Queensland and other States?

What was that you said? “Stormies in their earlier years have been taught a nasty lesson on getting rich quick.” In the circumstances this is not only an uninformed statement to make but one that contradicts an earlier statement by you. It seems that your opinion differs depending on your mood. Rather than chiseling on people’s grave stones, “Greed is good!” my advice to you is to revamp the wording to read, “I trusted the wrong people and paid the price!”

“Lets be clear here. It was not a requirement of a margin lender to find out where the equity offered as security came from. It is now. Back then all the rules said were that you had to offer security to the margin lender. In doing so you were giving them the right to take that security should the loan go bad and you could not meet the margin call.”

You sound like a mouthpiece for the banks! And why, may I ask are you constantly talking theory which has no place in any discussion concerning Storm. It’s what happened that counted; not what should have happened or how things all work in normal practice. There was nothing normal about what Storm and the banks did. If there were, the cuprits would not find themselves in the dock today.

“Lets take a step back. For a NON storm client who had a margin loan - they offered equity (in the form of shares/managed funds/cash) to the margin lender and the ML then gave them a loan against that equity. Why is it the ML responsibility to ensure the equity offered is legit and wasn't sourced from other borrowing? SURELY the guy applying for the loan knows where the equity came from and knows whether part of it was funded from their house equity. Surely they know that if the margin loan gets triggered and the ML takes the equity offered to protect that loan that they are left with little to no equity to pay back the other loan and therefore the equity (whether borrowed or taken from super or cash from a property sale) is going to be lost.”

Again you are talking theory. In the ‘Appliance’ document it outlines conditions that breach the margin loan borrowers’ conditions of contract with MBL. The assigning of the responsibility by the MBL to Storm for making margin calls is one such instance.

“On the monitoring of loans. BS BS BS BS BS BS. Lets look at LVR on the margin loan. Loan value - pretty frickin simple to get from the lender. As most pre-paid interest the value did not change throughout the year unless there was another step taken. This was TOO EASY to know correct values.”

Everything seems pretty “frickin simple” to you! Is it because you’re a financial adviser perhaps? Is it because you are trained in these things? Is it because you are paid for giving clients advice because you are a professional and your clients are not? If everything is "fricking simple" as you claim, why do people need you in the first place?

Nothing was simple as far as Storm’s clients were concerned so stop trying to say that it was! By claiming that it was, you and others in the industry are trying to pass the buck. Storm managed our portfolios and Storm was responsible for everything connected with that process. We didn’t pay them a fortune to just pick their noses!

I say to you now that you and others in the industry are guilty by association. You have let greed get in the way of your clients’ interests and you are protected by inept laws and leniency when any of you does the wrong thing. The bitter pill for investors is that you blame your clients for your own inadequacies when anything goes wrong.

If you want to get any runs on the board this years, focus on the ball, and not on pet theories that do not match the facts. Better still, sit for a while in Court with me and find out what really went on. For that matter, some on this forum should join you because there is a lot of cant still being expounded here which does not tally with what really occurred.

 

[cynic]

....
Risk perception bias
Attempting to eliminate one risk, but exposing yourself to another, potentially more harmful, risk.

Here’s an example I’ve written about before: In the year after 9/11, air travel fell, and car travel jumped. Understandably, people suddenly felt planes were more dangerous than cars.

But statistically, the opposite is true. In his book The Science of Fear, Daniel Gardner notes that if there were a 9/11 every day for an entire year, the odds that you’d be killed by terrorists are one in 7,750. By comparison, the annual odds of dying in a traffic accident are one in 6,498. German professor Gerd Gigerenzer estimates that the increase in automobile travel in the year after 9/11 resulted in 1,595 more traffic fatalities than would have otherwise occurred. Add in the impact stress had on our health, and the reaction to 9/11 may have been more deadly than the attack itself. “People jump from the frying pan into the fire” said Gigerenzer.
...

I agree that risk perception bias exists, but believe this was not the best example on offer,though it does happen to illustrate bias in a manner which seems somewhat removed from Gigerenzer's intent.
Basically this is a classic example of statistics painting a distorted picture whilst providing insufficient data to support those assertions.

No account is given of the aggregate travel time by air compared to road when assessing the true level of comparative risk. Most people with whom I am personally acquainted spend many more hours on the road than they do in the air, so the fact that the number of road fatalities exceeds the number of air fatalities alone is hardly surprising. Incidentally, I went to school with a couple of people whom later became pilots. One of them was a commercial pilot until his last fateful flight. (Of course pilots do spend a lot more time in the air than many other professionals, so again, hardly surprising!). I've known relatives of two people whom died on the road, but of the six road/roadside fatalities personally known to me, four were vehicular suicides, one lost a game of chicken with a train and the other was shot with his own service revolver (he'd just booked the same motorist twice on the same night). As for hijackings, a girl I knew back in 1985 was on a plane when it was hijacked by terrorists.

So, Gigerenzer's example illustrates how a small data omission can result in a grossly inacurrate representation of risk! I see evidence of these types of distortions almost every time I read one of our popular tabloids. There've been articles by academic "genii" making wildly inacurrate deductions and declaring them as proven facts! It would seem that the only people left in the world with a working appreciation of statistics are those whom exploit the inherent flaws when marketing their products to the unsuspecting public. I'm sure Storm's financial salespeople/planners had plenty of statistical information (and pretty graphs) to support their claims regarding the efficacy of their scheme.

When it comes to crtical thinking and analysis, our education systems appear to have failed us dismally! For decades now, I've witnessed uncritical thinkers in IT,education,government, media,medicine and academia! What hope is there for the future generations when our society is so analytically and statistically myopic? Whom will teach the importance of considering the sufficiency of data first, before gravitating to potentially erroneous conclusions?

Based upon my personal experiences of a relatively small cross-section of the populace, I am not at all surprised that people continue to be duped by "experts" painting artificial perceptions of risk.

@Frank, please don't misinterpret this as support for your claims regarding the "victim" status of Storm's clients. I am largely in agreeance with Julia,Bunyip and other dissenters - life's far too short to spend torturing oneself over past betrayals.
All clients had a vulnerability which I believe is symptomatic of deficiencies within our society. Any number of unscrupulous financial products marketers would have been more than happy to oblige by exploiting those same vulnerabilities. Storm simply got to ex-"Storm"-inate them first!

 

[doobsy]

Might as well have some fund so here we go

Before dealing with your comments which I think are surprisingly harsh for someone that is a financial adviser, I will make some general observations about your industry and its attitude to Storm. In so doing I am doing what quite a few on this forum do and that is using conjecture without any real evidence. I can only base it for the large part on your attitude and your readiness to label Storm as a rogue operator whilst defending your industry at every available opportunity despite that industry’s obvious failings. Storm Financial was a financial advisory firm that had everyone's approval whilst it existed.

Who? The regulators? Some pencil pushers with a checklist that have never offered advice? Speak to advisers in FNQ and you would have found some 90% loathed Storm and warned clients consistently of the dangers of the strategies. I know advisers that wrote letters to ASIC letting them know that although the strategy was legitimate it was dangerous and they should re-look at the rules. I laugh at your ability to generalise.

I believe that Storm was a thorn in the side of most other financial advisers in the industry because it became a dominant player in the market. Storm had the infrastructure in place and arrangements with certain major banks that very few could match. It was also selling a commodity that few could match. What Storm was doing was not illegal in its self because it seemed to be operating within the legal parameters laid down. However, appearances can be deceiving as we have all found out since.

Storm was a force in NQ, nowhere else. It was expanding but most people south of the tweed had never heard of them.

It was selling a commodity? It was selling a promise. Hope is not a strategy and they hoped markets would continue on the "exponential" growth trend of 1980 - 2007

I will say it again - it was not illegal. What may be found to be illegal is the special deals, the lending, etc but the strategy was not illegal.

To prove this I have just taken on a client from another planner that has the same set up. It was done to reduce non-deductible debt on the house using borrowing (redraw on home loan + margin loan) to ramp up distributions and pay down the non ded debt. Borrowing was done on the margin loan at a much more conservative level but it is the SAME strategy. Has it worked? Yes and No. They have no more non-deductible debt however now have deductible debt of about the same and an investment that is still down about 35% from when they started (2006).

What you and your ilk forget, Doobsy, is that when you give people advise you play with their lives. They rely on you for sound advice, and if that advice is perverted because you as a financial adviser are putting your interest above theirs, the consequences can be appalling. The death count in Redcliffe alone from the Storm fall-out is 10 to date so what must it be in Queensland and other States?

I forget nothing Frank but I am realistic. If there is guilt that you want to lay on someone call your mate Stuart Drummond.

Your hatred runs so deep that you can't see that in every aspect of your life people offer you services and you can CHOOSE to accept them or not. They are there to help but ALL of them need to make a dollar or they would be considered charities. Show me an industry people use in day to day life where the client self interest is put first in all cases?

What was that you said? “Stormies in their earlier years have been taught a nasty lesson on getting rich quick.” In the circumstances this is not only an uninformed statement to make but one that contradicts an earlier statement by you. It seems that your opinion differs depending on your mood.

Frank I deal with the younger ones. I am helping them back on their feet, not by flaming a hatred of all things financial but by offering a service that is relevant and sustainable.

You sound like a mouthpiece for the banks! And why, may I ask are you constantly talking theory which has no place in any discussion concerning Storm. It’s what happened that counted; not what should have happened or how things all work in normal practice. There was nothing normal about what Storm and the banks did. If there were, the cuprits would not find themselves in the dock today.

As I have shown above, plenty of clients out there who engaged in the same strategy just not as aggressively. Using your logic then all of their strategies are illegal too. This forum spends an inordinate amount of time on the strategy so I am just ensuring the understanding that it was not illegal. From day dot I have kept the same line about the lending, special deals etc so try another way to paint me as a lover of all things banks and storm.

Let me also just clarify something. I just went through my client book, we have 3 margin loans listed. 3. That is 1% of my client base. That is why I am still here and still have all my clients.

The assigning of the responsibility by the MBL to Storm for making margin calls is one such instance.

Has this been proven in court yet? I may have missed it!

“On the monitoring of loans. BS BS BS BS BS BS. Lets look at LVR on the margin loan. Loan value - pretty frickin simple to get from the lender. As most pre-paid interest the value did not change throughout the year unless there was another step taken. This was TOO EASY to know correct values.”

Everything seems pretty “frickin simple” to you! Is it because you’re a financial adviser perhaps? Is it because you are trained in these things? Is it because you are paid for giving clients advice because you are a professional and your clients are not? If everything is "fricking simple" as you claim, why do people need you in the first place?

Again, step down from the high horse before replying. It may help you from looking silly in front of the forum. I have never said it was the clients job. I have always said Storm had this responsibility. I was referencing their "claim" that they did not have up to date data and didn't know clients positions. Subject dropped.

Nothing was simple as far as Storm’s clients were concerned so stop trying to say that it was! By claiming that it was, you and others in the industry are trying to pass the buck. Storm managed our portfolios and Storm was responsible for everything connected with that process. We didn’t pay them a fortune to just pick their noses!

See above. You got it, just a bit slow.

I say to you now that you and others in the industry are guilty by association. You have let greed get in the way of your clients’ interests and you are protected by inept laws and leniency when any of you does the wrong thing. The bitter pill for investors is that you blame your clients for your own inadequacies when anything goes wrong.

Awesome - thanks for that. You know the funny thing is that I don't care and neither do my clients who are happy and don't need to vent on forums so don't ever show up on something like this. They do show up to meetings and pay my fees so I will assume they are ok with what I do.

If you want to get any runs on the board this years, focus on the ball, and not on pet theories that do not match the facts. Better still, sit for a while in Court with me and find out what really went on. For that matter, some on this forum should join you because there is a lot of cant still being expounded here which does not tally with what really occurred.

I'm busy helping people. I'd rather be ensuring the strategy I put in place to ensure a widow gets paid an anti-detriment payment from her husbands superannuation fund if triggered and she gets the cash so she can go down to the sunshine coast and see her new grandson. Sitting with you would just be depressing.

 

[bunyip]

Hi Bunyip!

Do I detect a hint of sensitivity? Get a life! We've been copping sneering comments from all quarters for four years now.

"...someone needs to post something useful on here to help educate investors.....it may as well be people like you and me and Doobsy and SJG and Judd, and one or two others who try to help."

I agree with the sentiment but not with your method of going about helping people. The only way this forum will be useful to would-be investors is to make clear to them what caused the Storm Financial disaster so that they can avoid what we could not.

You were not involved! Therefore, you are not in a position to inform them of anything because you weren't there. Only those that were caught up in this financial debacle can say it as it really is because we know what really happened. We are not using conjecture or uninformed opinion. We are talking from personal experience. Why, therefore, do you believe that anyone should listen to what you say?

With respect no one is interested in what you and others would have done. That is not the issue. The focus of this forum should be on what really happened and how any future would-be investors can avoid the same happening to them.

"If people are not prepared to learn from history, the same mistakes will continue to occur." We know what happened. I suggest therefore that you listen to what we have to say rather than give us your version of something you know little about.

Have a good day!

Poor Frank.......disillusioned and deluded, angry and disgusted, resentful and bitter – a tormented life. It was an unfortunate day when you allowed greed to replace common sense.

I liked your comment ‘If people are not prepared to learn from history, the same mistakes will continue to occur.’
But when I go back over some of your posts and see you scoffing at the value of basic investment education for private investors, when I see you making crazy statements such as ‘investors don’t need to be prudent and cautious’, when I see you telling people there was no way to spot the risks........well Frank, I suspect that you’ve learnt nothing from history and you’re a prime candidate to make the same mistakes all over again if you get your hands on some compensation money.

Anyway, I hope you can put your troubles aside for a few days to celebrate the joy of the festive season with your family and friends.

Merry Christmas to you Frank.

 

[bunyip]

I believe that Storm was a thorn in the side of most other financial advisers in the industry because it became a dominant player in the market. Storm had the infrastructure in place and arrangements with certain major banks that very few could match.
It was also selling a commodity that few could match.

So tell us, Frank.......what was this wondrous commodity that Storm was selling that very few could match?

They were certainly adept at selling bull**** – I doubt if many financial planning firms could match them in that department. Was that the commodity you’re referring to?
All that stuff about how safe and conservative it was to mortgage your home when you’re near retirement age and borrow loads of money to chuck into the market along with your own money. Then borrow loads more through double gearing, and chuck that into the market as well.
All that crap about helping you ‘on your journey to capitalism’.

Promises and bull**** – those were the main two commodities that Storm were selling. But anyway, it was tempting enough to entice you to take the bait.

 

[Defender]

I’d be very interested to know the details of the Storm strategy back in 1987.
Storm claimed their strategy withstood the ‘87 crash. If this is correct, then there were clearly some significant differences in the strategy in 1987, as opposed to the strategy which was so disastrous in 2008.
Remember that the 2007/08 crash was tame compared to the crash in October, 1987. Once the market peaked and then stated falling in late 2007, it took several months to shed the first 20% of its value.
Compare that to 1987 when it plunged 25% in one day, and 50% in just over a month. No way in the world could the Storm strategy have withstood such a sudden and brutal plunge if it had occurred in 2007/08, without inflicting brutal losses on Storm clients. And there’s no way it could have withstood the same plunge back in 1987 either.......unless it was a substantially different strategy back then compared to what it was in the last few years of Storm’s life.

From what I also was told, Storm had a successful track record, which included the 1987 crash. Operating under a different name then, of course.

My opinion is that when Cassimatis's goal of floating Storm (and making a mega motza) became his holy grail, and all consuming passion, he needed to maximize funds under management to make the float as desirable as possible for potential investors, in the float (not his client base investors).

Existing clients borrowings and investments were then maxed out. LVR's became higher, and more risky. I doubt this level of risk characterized Storm's early years. I suspect there were special arrangements with banks, that clients new nothing about. Some banks lending to clients may also have had vested interests in financing the float. Just my speculations, for what they're worth.

I am confident that Storm could have easily managed their clients investments safely through the GFC, if it was their first priority.

 

[doobsy]

From what I also was told, Storm had a successful track record, which included the 1987 crash. Operating under a different name then, of course.

My opinion is that when Cassimatis's goal of floating Storm (and making a mega motza) became his holy grail, and all consuming passion, he needed to maximize funds under management to make the float as desirable as possible for potential investors, in the float (not his client base investors).

Existing clients borrowings and investments were then maxed out. LVR's became higher, and more risky. I doubt this level of risk characterized Storm's early years. I suspect there were special arrangements with banks, that clients new nothing about. Some banks lending to clients may also have had vested interests in financing the float. Just my speculations, for what they're worth.

I am confident that Storm could have easily managed their clients investments safely through the GFC, if it was their first priority.

Storm didn't exist until 03/04 ish. Before that he tried out the strategy as OzDaq which got him in trouble with Nasdaq (the stockmarket) as people thought he was more than he actually was (sound familiar).

Before that he was an MLC planner and before that an MLC insurance agent. Stories I have been told were that he has always been very good at finding ways to get some extra fees while making it look like he was doing you a favour. But those are stories.

He may have back tested his theories on 1987 but the strategy didn't exist then. Does anyone remember how hard it was to get a bank loan then let alone re-finance a place and withdraw equity?

 

[doobsy]

View attachment duncan_hughes.pdf

 

[Julia]

Does anyone know what is happening with the court action(s)?
Is it ongoing?
Is there any suggestion of a date when a conclusion to the whole affair will be reached?

 

[matty77]

Hindsight bias
Out of literally millions, only a handful of investors truly saw the financial crisis coming.

If you disagree with that statement and respond, “No, any idiot could have seen it coming from a mile away,” you’re suffering from hindsight bias. Only after the fact do all the puzzle pieces make sense. That’s why bankruptcies outnumber billionaires.

(I disagree with their opinion on this one. Almost every media outlet was giving dire warnings almost every day for a good 12 months before the economic crisis hit with full force. To be unaware of what was coming you’d have to be blind or deaf or just plain disinterested.)

great post Bunyip, there are some things in there that I have done in the past, it was good to be reminded of those things so I dont do them again.

The above comments... may be relevant to a few people here. Its easy in hindsight to say anyone could see Storm was a disaster that was always going to happen.. but would you have had the same opinion before it all turned to ****? And of course everyone will say yes, but we know that aint the truth.

 

[SJG1974]

View attachment 49833

Doobsy, do you have the rest of the article?