Australian (ASX) Stock Market Forum

Market Risk

The Liquidity Puzzle

Robert J. Shiller
July 2007

We increasingly hear that “the world is awash with liquidity,” and that this justifies expecting asset prices to continue rising. But what does such liquidity mean, and is there really reason to expect that it will sustain further increases in stock and real estate prices?

Liquid assets are assets that resemble cash, because they can easily be converted into cash and used to buy other assets. The idea seems to be that there are a lot of liquid assets lying around, and that they are being used to get money to bid up the prices of stocks, housing, land, art, etc.

That theory sounds as general and fundamental as the theory that global warming is melting glaciers and raising sea levels around the world. Rising sea levels would explain a lot of geological and economic events. Is rising financial liquidity really a similar force? What is this theory anyway?

Traditionally, “awash with liquidity” would suggest that the world’s central banks are expanding the money supply too much, causing too much money chasing too few goods. But if that were the problem, one would cause all prices – including, say, clothing and haircuts – to rise. That is what the Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns meant when he said that the United States was “awash with liquidity” in 1971, a period when the concern was general inflation.

But the recent popular use of the term “awash with liquidity” dates to 2005, a time when many central banks were tightening monetary policy. In the US, the Fed was sharply raising rates. Central banks worldwide clearly have been behaving quite responsibly with regard to general inflation since 2005. According to the IMF, world inflation, as measured by consumer price indices, has generally been declining since 2005, and has picked up only slightly in 2007.

So it is something of a puzzle why people started using the term so much in 2005. It may have had something to do with the near-total lack of response of long-term interest rates to monetary tightening. If central banks are tightening and long-term rates aren’t rising, one needs some explanation. Liquidity is just a nice-sounding word to interpret this phenomenon.

Another interpretation is that people are saving a great deal, and that all this money is chasing investment assets, bidding up prices. Current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke raised this idea a few years ago, alleging a world “saving glut.”

But, once again, the data do not bear this out. The IMF’s world saving rate has maintained a fairly consistent downward trend since the early 1970’s, and, while it has picked up since 2002, it is still well below the peak levels attained in the previous three decades. True, savings rates in emerging markets and oil-rich countries have been increasing since 1970, and especially in the last few years, but this has been offset by declining saving rates in advanced countries.

Another interpretation is that “awash with liquidity” merely means that interest rates are low. But interest rates have been increasing around the world since 2003. Hardly anyone was saying the world was “awash with liquidity” in 2003. The use of the term has grown in parallel with rising , not falling, interest rates.

Yet another theory is that changes in our ways of handling risk have reduced risk premia. The growth of the financial markets’ sophistication has allowed risks to be sliced and diced and spread further than ever before. Indeed, the much-vaunted market for collateralized debt obligations, which divides risks into tranches and places the different risk levels in different places according to the willingness to accept them, has plausibly played a role in boosting asset prices. But this is really a theory about risk management for certain kinds of products, not “liquidity” per se .

Hyun Song Shin of Princeton University proposed a theory of excess liquidity in a paper with Tobias Adrian that he presented last month at the Bank for International Settlements in Brunnen, Switzerland. He says that it merely reflects a feedback mechanism that is always present: any initial upward shock to asset prices strengthens the balance sheets of financial institutions, so in response they borrow more and bid up prices even more.

But if that is what the term “awash with liquidity” means, then its widespread use today is simply a reflection of the high asset prices that we already have. It could even be called an approximate synonym for “bubbly.”

The term “awash with liquidity” was last in vogue just before the US stock market crash of October 19, 1987, the biggest one-day price drop in world history. The reasons for that crash are complex, but, as I discovered in my questionnaire survey a week later, it would appear that people ultimately did not trust the market’s level. As a result, they were interested in strategies – such as the portfolio insurance strategies that were popular at the time – that would allow them to exit the market fast.

The term “awash with liquidity” was also used often in 1999 and 2000, just before the major peak in the stock market. So its popular use seems not to reflect anything we can put our finger on, but instead a general feeling that markets are bubbly and a lack of confidence in their levels. Under this interpretation, the term’s popularity is a source of concern: it may indicate a market psychology that could lead to downward volatility in prices.


Robert J. Shiller is Professor of Economics at Yale University, Chief Economist at MacroMarkets LLC, which he co-founded (see macromarkets.com), and author of Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century.

[Source: Project Syndicate]
 
Mozambique (2007)

By Risk Reporter from Risk Bureau
www.minesite.com

Mozambique, among the fastest growing economies in Africa, has been drawing in foreign investors as it pushes ahead with what is commonly referred to as its mega-project model of development. Consequently, the last couple of years have been some of the most stable and prosperous in the country’s post-independence history.

Mozambique lacks the sizeable oil and diamond reserves that some other African countries are endowed with, but it does possess significant reserves of titanium and aluminium. As is now the accepted norm, China appears to be geared towards long-term investment in Mozambique; it has invested heavily in roads and its Export-Import Bank has contributed US$2.3billion towards construction of a new hydro-electric plant. Equally, India expects to acquire coal mines in Mozambique, to help it meet growing domestic demand from power plants. Further, Mozambique’s largest mining investment, Kenmare’s Moma titanium project is expected, in the first year of operation 2007 to produce total exports valued at US$58million rising to US$135million next year.

Nor are the Mozambiquean authorities ignoring the oil and gas potential, particularly in the under-developed Rovuma Basin which will be divided into seven blocks to attract the greatest possible number of companies. Already, US-based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Italy’s ENI have secured exploration and production rights to offshore Areas 1 and 4. Last month, three British companies signed contracts for oil and gas exploration in Sofala province. The government’s goal is: “to have a number of companies acquiring more concessions…”

Thus, in many ways, 2006 was a good year for Mozambique. The economy continued to grow rapidly, some analysts forecast GDP growth for the current year to reach 7.5 per cent, export revenues have climbed and political stability has been maintained.

President Armando Guebuza has continued the work of the previous administration and Mozambique has indeed, made major strides away from its former status as a `post-conflict’ fragile state. Both the World Bank and the IMF have applauded his government’s pro-market, free trading approach to the economy which has created numerous new opportunities for foreign investors. Despite the applause, foreign business can expect to face some obstacles. Ironically, the emphasis on mega projects is part of the problem. Only huge multinationals have funds and government influence to push through new business ventures effectively.

In late 2005, the governing Frelimo party set in train a series of reforms which aim to address this problem. Much of the Portuguese era legislation which still governs business is to be overhauled and replaced with an IMF-approved laissez-faire regime. The paperwork involved in setting up new businesses is expected to be drastically reduced. Other measures, also backed by international bodies like the World Bank, are being passed to ensure greater accountability in government spending.

The Guebuza regime has also managed to maintain political stability. Given that Frelimo and the main opposition Renamo party fought one another for the best part of a decade, relations between the two are remarkably cordial. Renamo has acknowledged that it receives mostly fair coverage from state controlled radio and television stations. Opposition politicians are mostly able to criticise the government without fear of arrest, and democratic procedures are mostly observed in parliament. Although allegations of vote rigging were made after Guebuza’s election, international observers concluded that they were not serious enough to change the result.

Even so, it is worth remarking that the need to appease former enemies and maintain stability has hampered efforts to fight corruption. The legacy of Mozambique’s civil war is relevant here. Official anti-corruption campaigns are often used to exert political pressure on opponents, and have a poor reputation for impartiality. Mr Guebuza made combating corruption one of the key aims of his last election campaign, regardless of the fact that his time in office has allowed him to become one of the country’s richest businessmen.

These then are issues for any foreign investment in Mozambique. While it applauds the country’s achievements thus far, the World Bank has named corruption and bureaucracy as two of the key obstacles to development and progress in Mozambique. Ironically, it is the mega-project model that raises concerns over Mozambique’s longer-term future. While highly rewarding in the short term, it has a poor long term pedigree. An economy dominated by a few multinational corporations and government agencies is uniquely vulnerable to corruption. Mega-projects are also socially and politically corrosive. Relative to the revenue they generate, they are not labour intensive. The Mozal plant was responsible for more than half Mozambique’s 2005 GDP growth, but employs a little under 1,000 people.

Forecast = Looking good
A buoyant economy and a stable democracy all make Mozambique an appealing prospect for investment. While it is foolhardy to crystal ball gaze, the current administration is moderate in tone and is expected to stay that way.

Bullet Points:

• Good governance and booming economy encourage investors
• Corruption and bureaucracy remain problematic


[Note - A few OZ companies are already present in Mozambique: BHP Billiton, Riversdale Mining(RIV/coal), Mavuzi Resources(MAV/gold), Mamba Minerals(MAB/gold)]
 
What's behind the market turmoil

By Evan Davis
Economics editor, BBC News
August 17, 2007


It's taken for granted in most of the coverage of the current market troubles, that sub-prime problems in the US mortgage market, are causing declines in world share prices. But why are they having such a widespread effect?
The best guess is that there are a potential $100bn (£50bn) worth of sub-prime mortgage defaults, from less than credit-worthy borrowers, mainly in the US.

So why was $120bn (£60bn) wiped off shares in London alone on Thursday?

The reason must be that there are deeper links between sub-prime lending and equities.


Banking sector losses

First, there are some sub-prime losses among banks (or the people to whom they've lent), and banks are listed on the stock markets.

So banks may be worth less than we thought last year.

And it only adds to the problem that we don't know which banks have sub-prime losses, and the banks themselves may not even be sure.

But the second and more important problem for shares is not caused by banks, but hedge funds.

Hedge fund calls

They have typically borrowed money to invest (and they've often borrowed shares and other securities too).

But terms and conditions apply to their loans: lenders tell the hedge funds the debt must not rise above a specified proportion of the total fund.

It would be like your bank telling you that your mortgage can't rise above 90% of the value of your house.

Now what would happen if the value of your house fell?

You would have to find some cash to repay some of the mortgage to ensure it was still not above 90% of the new lower value.

Forced sales

Hedge funds are in that predicament now.


The losses they've endured on some investments trigger the need to repay cash to prevent their loans breaching their terms.

One way for hedge funds to find cash is to sell shares.

Note that this does not mean the hedge funds are insolvent - they just need cash, and the easiest way to find it is to sell shares, pushing down the prices.

This potentially could be a bit perverse, with the market getting into a vicious circle of falling prices, cash requirements and more falling prices.

If this was the only reason shares were falling, it would probably mean it was a good time to buy them.

But our list of reasons for shares to fall is by no means complete yet.

Lending dries up

The third link is that all kinds of bank lending have been affected by the failure of the sub-prime market.

This is because the whole market in second-hand debt has been paralysed by the sub-prime problems, with traders barely able to value the IOUs in which they have stakes.

This affects the banks, who are sitting on debt they'd like to sell on, but can't. And it affects corporate borrowers, particularly the kind of borrowers who have been using debt to finance highly-leveraged takeovers.

Those takeovers have helped prop up the stock market, and if they now evaporate, the stock market will probably fall.


The real economy

Finally, the tightening of credit conditions in the US housing market and beyond may have real economic effects that depress corporate profits.


The world has been very dependent on US consumer spending.

If that diminishes as the housing market and stock markets dive, then companies are in a pickle, the world over.

It explains why the mining stocks have been among the biggest fallers - if the world economy slows, we won't be needing so much of the stuff they get out of the ground.

The end of the cycle

That's the list of connections between sub-prime and equities.

But there are other things going on in equities too.

Most notably, corporate profits are at a high level; and that might be a sign we are at the peak of a cycle and tougher times are ahead.

We could have surmised this some weeks ago, but other market events might have concentrated minds on it.

Will equities fall further?

Well, I'm afraid the one thing lacking from the arguments here are any numbers.

We might identify the broad issue, but what the traders have to do is to calibrate them and put a price on them all.

What stock markets are going through at the moment means they are struggling to do just that.
 
A timeout to assess uncertainty

Amy Brinkley
Chief risk officer, Bank of America
Source: CNN, 19 August 2007

There's no question that the risk of a slowdown has increased due to the hit to business confidence and the wider credit spreads. Also, consumers' reduced ability to get credit could impact spending. There will continue to be pain in both the subprime mortgage and the leveraged loan markets. In the leveraged loan market, unlike the subprime market, the credit fundamentals haven't changed. But there's an oversupply of new issues--$237 billion worth of leveraged loans in the pipeline. They will have to work through the system before we have equilibrium.

We knew these corrections would come. The surprise is the degree of volatility and the effect on liquidity, especially short-term liquidity. The very substantial changes in the financial markets over the past five years have presented new challenges. We have new players: foreign investors, hedge funds, and private equity firms. And we have new products--more complex products than in the past. The changes do distribute risk more broadly, but they've contributed to the uncertainty. Getting a handle on where the risk is isn't as easy as it used to be when banks made loans that defaulted when they were bad. These more complex products are less transparent, so it's difficult to determine the value. And the hedge funds are less transparent. The uncertainty creates a higher level of risk aversion. That, in turn, creates liquidity risk. People want to sit on the sidelines until they think they have it all figured out.

Where does it go from here? The longer there's risk aversion, the greater the impact on the markets. The oversupply of leveraged loans will take a few months to go through the system. The subprime issues will continue to be problematic through 2008. But these are healthy corrections for the long term. We don't see broad signs of weakness in the economy, and that's what matters most. Global economic growth is expected to remain strong. The U.S. economy continues to be sound. One of the most important indicators is low unemployment, at 4.6%. We're seeing steady gains in personal income. There's a continued acceleration in exports. And corporate balance sheets are strong.
 
Market Risk - The Detrimental Nature of the Herd Mentality

Author: Lenny Broytman
August 20, 2007

Sophisticated technology aimed at properly assessing risk associated with trading asset-backed securities are essential for any of today’s large banks but according to experts, this much-needed technology could also be backfiring all the same.

Sophisticated technology aimed at properly assessing risk associated with trading asset-backed securities are essential for any of today’s large banks but according to experts, this much-needed technology could also be backfiring.

According to reuters.cok.uk., some of these systems have added fuel to the fire that is the liquidity crisis surrounding the subprime situation when investors hurried to sell at the very first sign of trouble. When the mortgage collapse in the US spread across numerous asset classes, banks quickly ceased lending to one another in a move that Reuters says, no risk management model ever saw coming.


"These risk management systems create risk," Avinash Persaud, Chairman of Intelligence Capital Ltd, a risk consultancy. "If you give investors the same set of data they end up with a similar portfolio, so when volatility rises they all end up having to sell the portfolio," Persaud added.

According to one Frankfurt-based analyst close to the investment banking sector, one-day Value at Risk valuations, which are used by both banks and investors alike to measure how far the value of a portfolio may and/or can fall in a single day, just don’t work in these kinds of situations.

Risk management models are essential. They assess risk as they should. They monitor future situations with a fair amount of accuracy investors value. But all of these things can only go so far. According to many, these risk models can also spark a herd mentality that can lead to market patterns that are unnecessary and oftentimes, stem from fear.

Many financial experts agree that these tools can only be utilized properly if and when the data they are fed into is accurate. Furthermore, investor follow-thru has to be a little bit more than just the natural, one-size-fits-all solution that everyone else in the market is going to resort to.

"Trading models have been calibrated for stable market conditions and cheap money," said a consultant at a financial audit firm in London. "The game was: 'let's not get caught when the music stops.'"

Experts note that the ailing credit market is not the only source of fear for investors.

"Models have correlation elements built in and in theory certain assets should not be correlated," said the consultant. "When there is a general panic, everything gets correlated," said the London-based consultant.

It is for many of these reasons that the larger banks are not relying as much on these risk management models as their less-experienced counterparts are. A lot of these experienced banks understand the concept of fear-driven short-term investors ruining portfolios by dumping assets in a wild stampede.

"You have a mentality that the (risk management) model gives you some sort of control but you also have banks that combine these models with the experience of analysts and a distinct risk management culture," said Michael Dawson-Kropf at credit risk agency DBRS.


"I would suspect that more people saw this (crisis) coming than are prepared to admit it, but the nature of the beast is you don't know when it is coming and if you quit too early you may be fired for it," the Frankfurt-based analyst added.

"People must ask not what happens to a portfolio if there is a repeat of the Asian crisis but what happens to a portfolio if I am part of a herd," said Persaud.


Source: www.riskcenter.com
 
Must read by James Grant
****************

The Fed’s Subprime Solution

JAMES GRANT
New York Times, August 26, 2007

THE subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 is, in fact, a credit crisis ”” a worldwide disruption in lending and borrowing. It is only the latest in a long succession of such disturbances. Who’s to blame? The human race, first and foremost. Well-intended public policy, second. And Wall Street, third ”” if only for taking what generations of policy makers have so unwisely handed it.

Possibly, one lender and one borrower could do business together without harm to themselves or to the economy around them. But masses of lenders and borrowers invariably seem to come to grief, as they have today ”” not only in mortgages but also in a variety of other debt instruments. First, they overdo it until the signs of excess become too obvious to ignore. Then, with contrite and fearful hearts, they proceed to underdo it. Such is the “credit cycle,” the eternal migration of lenders and borrowers between the extreme points of accommodation and stringency.

Significantly, such cycles have occurred in every institutional, monetary and regulatory setting. No need for a central bank, or for newfangled mortgage securities, or for the proliferation of hedge funds to foment a panic ”” there have been plenty of dislocations without any of the modern-day improvements.

Late in the 1880s, long before the institution of the Federal Reserve, Eastern savers and Western borrowers teamed up to inflate the value of cropland in the Great Plains. Gimmicky mortgages ”” pay interest and only interest for the first two years! ”” and loose talk of a new era in rainfall beguiled the borrowers. High yields on Western mortgages enticed the lenders. But the climate of Kansas and Nebraska reverted to parched, and the drought-stricken debtors trudged back East or to the West Coast in wagons emblazoned, “In God we trusted, in Kansas we busted.” To the creditors went the farms.

Every crackup is the same, yet every one is different. Today’s troubles are unusual not because the losses have been felt so far from the corner of Broad and Wall, or because our lenders are unprecedentedly reckless. The panics of the second half of the 19th century were trans-Atlantic affairs, while the debt abuses of the 1920s anticipated the most dubious lending practices of 2006. Our crisis will go down in history for different reasons.

One is the sheer size of the debt in which people have belatedly lost faith. The issuance of one kind of mortgage-backed structure ”” collateralized debt obligations ”” alone runs to $1 trillion. The shocking fragility of recently issued debt is another singular feature of the 2007 downturn ”” alarming numbers of defaults despite high employment and reasonably strong economic growth. Hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities would, by now, have had to be recalled if Wall Street did business as Detroit does.

Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, in the 1940 edition of their seminal volume “Security Analysis,” held that the acid test of a bond or a mortgage issuer is its ability to discharge its financial obligations “under conditions of depression rather than prosperity.” Today’s mortgage market can’t seem to weather prosperity.

A third remarkable aspect of the summer’s troubles is the speed with which the world’s central banks have felt it necessary to intervene. Bear in mind that when the Federal Reserve cut its discount rate on Aug. 17 ”” a move intended to restore confidence and restart the machinery of lending and borrowing ”” the Dow Jones industrial average had fallen just 8.25 percent from its record high. The Fed has so far refused to reduce the federal funds rate, the main interest rate it fixes, but it has all but begged the banks to avail themselves of the dollars they need through the slightly unconventional means of borrowing at the discount window ”” that is, from the Fed itself.

What could account for the weakness of our credit markets? Why does the Fed feel the need to intervene at the drop of a market? The reasons have to do with an idea set firmly in place in the 1930s and expanded at every crisis up to the present. This is the notion that, while the risks inherent in the business of lending and borrowing should be finally borne by the public, the profits of that line of work should mainly accrue to the lenders and borrowers.

It has not been lost on our Wall Street titans that the government is the reliable first responder to scenes of financial distress, or that there will always be enough paper dollars to go around to assist the very largest financial institutions. In the aftermath of the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, the genius-directed hedge fund that came a cropper in 1998, the Fed ”” under Alan Greenspan ”” delivered three quick reductions in the federal funds rate. Thus fortified, lenders and borrowers, speculators and investors, resumed their manic buying of technology stocks. That bubble burst in March 2000.

Understandably, it’s only the selling kind of panic to which the government dispatches its rescue apparatus. Few object to riots on the upside. But bull markets, too, go to extremes. People get carried away, prices go too high and economic resources go where they shouldn’t. Bear markets are nature’s way of returning to the rule of reason.

But the regulatory history of the past decade is the story of governmental encroachment on the bears’ habitat. Under Mr. Greenspan, the Fed set its face against falling prices everywhere. As it intervened to save the financial markets in 1998, so it printed money in 2002 and 2003 to rescue the economy. From what? From the peril of everyday lower prices ”” “deflation,” the economists styled it. In this mission, at least, the Fed succeeded. Prices, especially housing prices, soared. Knowing that the Fed would do its best to engineer rising prices, people responded rationally. They borrowed lots of money at the Fed’s ultralow interest rates.

Now comes the bill for that binge and, with it, cries for even greater federal oversight and protection. Ben S. Bernanke, Mr. Greenspan’s successor at the Fed (and his loyal supporter during the antideflation hysteria), is said to be resisting the demand for broadly lower interest rates. Maybe he is seeing the light that capitalism without financial failure is not capitalism at all, but a kind of socialism for the rich.

In any case, to all of us, rich and poor alike, the Fed owes a pledge that it will do what it can and not do what it can’t. High on the list of things that no human agency can, or should, attempt is manipulating prices to achieve a more stable and prosperous economy. Jiggling its interest rate, the Fed can impose the appearance of stability today, but only at the cost of instability tomorrow. By the looks of things, tomorrow is upon us already.

A century ago, on the eve of the Panic of 1907, the president of the National City Bank of New York, James Stillman, prepared for the troubles he saw coming. “If by able and judicious management,” he briefed his staff, “we have money to help our dealers when trust companies have [failed], we will have all the business we want for many years.” The panic came and his bank, today called Citigroup, emerged more profitable than ever.

Last month, Stillman’s corporate descendant, Chuck Prince, chief executive of Citigroup, dismissed fears about an early end to the postmillennial debt frolics. “When the music stops,” he told The Financial Times, “in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and danceWe’re still dancing.”

What a difference a century makes.


James Grant, the editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, is the author of “Money of the Mind.”
 
The average total compensation of risk managers in the US

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Masters of Risky Universe
Specialist Executives Gaining Prominence Amid Market Jitters
By RENÉE SCHULTES / WSJ
September 21, 2007

The temporary closure of three funds managed by BNP Paribas Asset Management over a squeeze in liquidity last month left a lasting impression in the risk-management community. At few times in the past five years has the role of the risk manager been as important as it was during the summer when bond and equity markets swung wildly.

Such volatile trading conditions have forced chief executives to demand daily and weekly updates of the market risk in their portfolios to help avoid situations like that at BNP Paribas, which was forced to suspend fund redemptions because it would have meant selling assets at severely depressed prices.

But the evolution of this risk-manager role started well before the summer. Since the late 1990s, several firms have appointed chief risk officers, who oversee all operational and investment risk with many also sitting on the executive committee.

FMR Corp.'s Fidelity Investments, the U.S. mutual-fund manager, was among the first to do this in 1995 when James Lam joined as chief risk officer to develop a risk-management function across the company. He left in 1998 and now runs James Lam & Associates, a specialist risk-management consultancy.

Fidelity declined to comment on how it manages the role today, but said: "While security concerns preclude us from discussing specific issues or practices in detail, we can tell you that we employ robust risk-management measures and invest aggressively in security. We employ extensive physical, electronic and procedural controls, which we regularly monitor and adapt to respond to changing requirements and advances in technology."

Other buy-side houses have followed in Fidelity's footsteps. Kenneth Winston, global chief risk officer for Morgan Stanley Investment Management, is responsible for operational and investment risk management. "One of the key principles of the role is independence, so where possible, the risk manager should have the ability to render independent views. That's an important part of the reporting line," Mr. Winston said.

Mike Woodward, president of executive-search firm Risk Talent Associates, said: "The chief risk officer has moved into the executive suite. Boards want an independent oversight of the risk...someone who wakes up every morning thinking about risk."

Mr. Woodward said he believes banks and fund-management companies could look to the risk-manager function as the precursor to becoming chief executive. He said: "Traditionally people have gone from chief financial officer to chief executive. As the chief risk officer, you get your fingers dirty. I think we will start to see some firms rotate people through that function who are on the chief executive track."

As the demands of the risk-manager role have grown, so too have salary levels. "As these buy-side firms build more and more nontraditional strategies, the risks are much more significant," Mr. Woodward said. "They are going to need to build more talent around risk management that is more typical of the sell side. That's going to put pressure on compensation and the market. There's a shortage of professionals and as Asia develops it will draw talent from the U.S and U.K."

As the 2007 Risk Talent Associates Professional Compensation Survey shows, compensation for risk specialists in asset management is growing, rising an average of 17% last year from a year earlier. Salaries increased an average of 6%, while cash bonuses and noncash bonuses increased 27%.

Total compensation for a chief risk officer at a traditional asset-management firm was $837,000 last year and $1.3 million for the same role at a hedge fund, according to the survey.

However, others believe transforming the risk manager into an executive function is a step too far.

Hendrik du Toit, chief executive of Investec Asset Management, said: "We would be cautious about having a distant chief risk officer who just looks at processes. We want someone on the ground and getting his hands dirty because what is the difference between that high and far-removed chief risk officer and the audit committee? They are almost the same. Our audit committee, which is chaired by nonexecutives, asks all those questions and satisfies itself with the process. We don't think you need another individual doing that, but rather someone who deeply understands the investment process."
 
Inflation Higher? Count Your Blessings, Mr. Bernanke
By Greg Ip -- WSJ; 17 OCT 2007

Consumer prices rose 0.27% in September from August, an annual rate of 3.2% - after an annualized drop of 1.7% in August, the Labor Department reported. Stripping out energy and food, core inflation rose to an annualized 2.7% from 1.8%. “Consumer inflation is not yet rolling over and playing dead,” warned Wells Fargo in a research note.

Still, a glance at figures released the same day for Zimbabwe offer some perspective. Inflation there hit an annualized 7,982.1% in September, up from 6,592.8% in August, Reuters reports, quoting the government’s Central Statistical Office. Despite the admirable precision of that inflation rate, “Experts estimate it is actually much higher,” the news agency says.

How did local traders react to the news? “The [inflation] figures don’t matter, what matters is to stay alive and that’s what we are trying to do here,” one foreign currency trader told the agency. Police have been trying to drive black-market currency traders off the streets.
 
A Catastrophe Foretold
By PAUL KRUGMAN | NY Times | October 26, 2007

“Increased subprime lending has been associated with higher levels of delinquency, foreclosure and, in some cases, abusive lending practices.” So declared Edward M. Gramlich, a Federal Reserve official.

These days a lot of people are saying things like that about subprime loans ”” mortgages issued to buyers who don’t meet the normal financial criteria for a home loan. But here’s the thing: Mr. Gramlich said those words in May 2004.

And it wasn’t his first warning. In his last book, Mr. Gramlich, who recently died of cancer, revealed that he tried to get Alan Greenspan to increase oversight of subprime lending as early as 2000, but got nowhere.

So why was nothing done to avert the subprime fiasco?

Before I try to answer that question, there are a few things you should know.

First, the situation for both borrowers and investors looks increasingly dire.

A new report from Congress’s Joint Economic Committee predicts that there will be two million foreclosures on subprime mortgages by the end of next year. That’s two million American families facing the humiliation and financial pain of losing their homes.

At the same time, investors who bought assets backed by subprime loans are continuing to suffer severe losses. Everything suggests that there will be many more stories like that of Merrill Lynch, which has just announced an $8.4 billion write-down because of bad loans ”” $3 billion more than it had announced just a few weeks earlier.

Second, much if not most of the subprime lending that is now going so catastrophically bad took place after it was clear to many of us that there was a serious housing bubble, and after people like Mr. Gramlich had issued public warnings about the subprime situation. As late as 2003, subprime loans accounted for only 8.5 percent of the value of mortgages issued in this country. In 2005 and 2006, the peak years of the housing bubble, subprime was 20 percent of the total ”” and the delinquency rates on recent subprime loans are much higher than those on older loans.

So, once again, why was nothing done to head off this disaster? The answer is ideology.

In a paper presented just before his death, Mr. Gramlich wrote that “the subprime market was the Wild West. Over half the mortgage loans were made by independent lenders without any federal supervision.” What he didn’t mention was that this was the way the laissez-faire ideologues ruling Washington ”” a group that very much included Mr. Greenspan ”” wanted it. They were and are men who believe that government is always the problem, never the solution, that regulation is always a bad thing.

Unfortunately, assertions that unregulated financial markets would take care of themselves have proved as wrong as claims that deregulation would reduce electricity prices.

As Barney Frank, the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, put it in a recent op-ed article in The Boston Globe, the surge of subprime lending was a sort of “natural experiment” testing the theories of those who favor radical deregulation of financial markets. And the lessons, as Mr. Frank said, are clear: “To the extent that the system did work, it is because of prudential regulation and oversight. Where it was absent, the result was tragedy.”

In fact, both borrowers and investors got scammed.

I’ve written before about the way investors in securities backed by subprime loans were assured that they were buying AAA assets, only to suddenly find that what they really owned were junk bonds. This shock has produced a crisis of confidence in financial markets, which poses a serious threat to the economy.

But the greater tragedy is the one facing borrowers who were offered what they were told were good deals, only to find themselves in a debt trap.

In his final paper, Mr. Gramlich stressed the extent to which unregulated lending is prone to the “abusive lending practices” he mentioned in his 2004 warning. The fact is that many borrowers are ill-equipped to make judgments about “exotic” loans, like subprime loans that offer a low initial “teaser” rate that suddenly jumps after two years, and that include prepayment penalties preventing the borrowers from undoing their mistakes.

Yet such loans were primarily offered to those least able to evaluate them. “Why are the most risky loan products sold to the least sophisticated borrowers?” Mr. Gramlich asked. “The question answers itself ”” the least sophisticated borrowers are probably duped into taking these products.” And “the predictable result was carnage.”

Mr. Frank is now trying to push through legislation that extends moderate regulation to the subprime market. Despite the scale of the disaster, he’s facing an uphill fight: money still talks in Washington, and the mortgage industry is a huge source of campaign finance. But maybe the subprime catastrophe will be enough to remind us why financial regulation was introduced in the first place.
 
The New York Times | November 18, 2007
Economic View

Crazy Little Thing Called Risk
By PETER L. BERNSTEIN

BACK when I was managing other people’s money, I had a client, a doctor, who enjoyed giving away money to his daughters. He was lucky, because an extended bull market was under way with only minor interruptions. The more he gave away, the more the market replaced what he had parted with. As generosity appeared to be a cost-free form of recreation, he considered the whole thing a riskless enterprise.

Whenever I saw my client, he immediately thanked me for making him whole after his most recent spate of giving. I always had to remind him that his gratitude was misplaced. Don’t thank me, I warned him. Thank all those nice people who are willing to pay higher prices today for the stocks you bought earlier at lower prices.

This client, who assumed that the steady multiplication of his money would continue indefinitely, without risk, keeps popping up in my memory. Although this episode happened back in the 1950s, it contains a deep truth worth exploring now, because his experience gets to the roots of what investment risk is all about.

A naïve approach to risk might have been appropriate in an era when economic activity was almost totally agricultural. For most of human history, in fact, the main source of economic risk was the weather. But nobody can do anything about the weather. Risk management in those days was therefore a matter of religion, incantation or superstition. Rain dances in one area were matched by novenas in another. Appeals to God’s will or the fates seemed to be the only way to deal with the risks that weather could wreak.

That model of risk management changed radically during the Industrial Revolution. As more and different kinds of goods and services came to market, a wide variety of risks replaced the longstanding and single-minded concerns about the weather. What will our suppliers charge? Will customers pay the prices we set? Will they want the new products we are developing? Will our competitors beat us to the punch? Will they start a price war? Should we raise our employees’ wages, and, if so, by how much? Can the engineers rearrange our production to be more efficient? Will our bankers smile or frown when we seek credit? Will our interest rates rise or fall?

Today, risk has shifted from a bet on what nature will provide to an intricate series of bets on what other players in the economy will decide ”” and how each will respond to the others’ decisions. Instead of a throw of the dice, economic activity has become an intense interchange among companies, employees, suppliers, customers, owners, borrowers, lenders and financiers. The interaction has become more complex over time, so the answers to the above questions will in turn provoke new questions, answers and decisions among these groups.

Most important, the essence of risk itself has been fundamentally transformed. Risk today depends upon the consequences of what somebody else will do, not on what God or nature will provide. Risk management means protecting oneself from the adverse and unexpected decisions others may make and, in the process, making better decisions than they do. John von Neumann, who developed game theory, referred to these interactive patterns of decision-making as the sphere of combat and competition.

My client acted as if his portfolio was immune from others’ adverse choices. He wasn’t alone in that thinking then, and he wouldn’t be alone now. A look at recent events shows that many investors are following in his footsteps. Three months ago, for example, subprime paper was an investment rated Aaa for most investors, which meant they believed they were virtually certain of receiving the return they expected. But then homeowners began to default on their subprime mortgages, and suddenly, the paper was risky, because other investors were making adverse decisions. People who wanted to sell their homes found that prospective buyers were offering much less, and homeownership was suddenly transformed from riskless to risky.

In recent weeks, chief executives have departed from leading financial institutions like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. Such institutions have hit the headlines for the magnitude of their losses, which occurred because other investors wanted to pay lower prices for the exotic financial assets the banks had been so comfortable holding. Those assets appeared risky. And then investors reduced the prices they would pay for all types of financial assets that they feared had become too risky to attract buyers. And so on down the line.

It is not the market that is rising or falling at any moment, even if we commonly speak as though it were. In truth, prices move in response to the buying and selling decisions of countless investors, who are constantly considering the likely decisions of countless others. Incantation may still go on ”” for example, “In the long run, stocks will always go up” ”” but it may not change the decisions of other investors.

In the 1950s, those other investors made my doctor-client happy. Today, he would have no reason to thank them or me.


Peter L. Bernstein, a financial consultant and economic historian, is the editor of the Economics & Portfolio Strategy newsletter.
 
Bank writedowns set to exceed $112bn

Dawn Cowie
Financial News Online US
15 Jan 2008

Writedowns by banks look set for a further increase as JP Morgan, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch this week publish fourth-quarter results. They are predicted to add to the $78.5bn (€53.2bn) total recorded since November.

Goldman Sachs analysts William Tanona, Betsy Miller and Neil Sanyal predict the three US banks will notch up combined fourth-quarter writedowns of $33.6bn. That would boost the total to $112.1bn. The analysts said in research last month the figures are “likely to be significantly larger than investors are anticipating”.

Citigroup, which tops the table of writedowns, is expected to declare a further $18.7bn of writedowns in relation to collateralised debt obligations when it publishes its results tomorrow, taking its total writedowns to $33.3bn.

Goldman’s analysts estimate Citigroup would be exposed to about $25bn in CDOs after the next writedown so it needs to preserve capital and raise fresh finance. The researchers predict Citigroup will raise $5bn to $10bn and cut its dividend by 40% this year.

JP Morgan will publish results on Wednesday, having reported writedowns of $1.6bn. It is expected to announce a further $3.4bn writedown, which would leave it with $5bn exposure to CDOs. The bank, which last week hired former British Prime Minster Tony Blair as a senior adviser, avoided the worst of the US credit problems last year, having steered clear of structured investment vehicles and mortgage-backed investments.

Merrill Lynch is also due to report fourth-quarter results this week and is expected to announce a $15bn writedown, according to a New York Times report that cited people briefed on the plan. That will take its tally to $22.9bn, leapfrogging Morgan Stanley and UBS into second position in the league table of writedowns. Goldman’s analysts estimated that Merrill would make a $11.5bn writedown and said the bank would be exposed to about $8bn in CDOs.

Merrill Lynch and Citigroup are also set to announce further capital injections from sovereign wealth funds to compensate for mortgage losses, having raised a combined total of $14bn at the end of last year.
 
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