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Boeing 737 Max: Death Aircraft

I've seen this article around the net, what does this guy fly ? Drones, 172's, Gulfstreams, Triplers or something in between ? Most of it is speculation about what Boeing and FAA did or didn't do, similar sounding to the previous youtube video but with much more long winded discussion.

Had another read struggling to keep my eyes open, these items stuck out,

The bits about the nacelles acting like wings at high angle of attack exacerbating the situation sounds odd , how is this different to all the other low slung engined aircraft flying around, so what if the centre of thrust is slightly different ! why not just give it slightly less stick if manually flying.

The bit about the MCAS thinking the plane is stalling controlling motors and jacks pushing the column forward is totally incorrect, the writer mentions the Feel Computer in the same paragraph but that's another system, this person just doesn't know enough about 737's to be coming up with this.

Bit that really made me sus ! Who the hell uses the term "Punched it" ?? Normally the Autothrottle takes care of proceedings but if the pilot wants to be more hands on, he or she will "Firewall It" :)
 
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I've seen this article around the net, what does this guy fly ? Drones, 172's, Gulfstreams, Triplers or something in between ?
So what type of aircraft do you actually fly?

Personally, I fly the North American Aviation P-51 Mustang of the remote control toy variety. My favourite movie is Flight of the Phoenix (1965) , so I know what I am talking about!
 
So what type of aircraft do you actually fly?

Personally, I fly the North American Aviation P-51 Mustang of the remote control toy variety. My favourite movie is Flight of the Phoenix (1965) , so I know what I am talking about!

Nice !

Me personally ?

Parkzone Super Cub Park Flyer, Three channel remote.
 
"Shoddy work and cutting corners"
Boeing has been using Indian software engineers with no airline experience at $9 an hour to save cost on coding while sacking their experienced US programmers. This is according to Mish (a right wing blog) sources. The FAA say there are problems with other planes not just the MAXs. Scary stuff.

https://moneymaven.io/mishtalk/
 
Just delivered under the new - we reduced the checks we make now on the new planes standard to save money, pathetic

It added: "The aircraft involved in flight 1282 was delivered to us on 31 October.

More recently, Boeing said it would increase the pace of 737 Max deliveries after resolving a supply error that required it to conduct lengthy inspections of new planes and its inventory.

 
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It is criminal that the Boeing 737 Max is still flying.

There will be further incidents and loss of life before the mighty $ stops it flying via lawsuits from those killed and affected, and loss of orders for Boeing.

The Boeing 737 Max is a DOG. Further failures will be revealed.

gg
 
It is criminal that the Boeing 737 Max is still flying.

There will be further incidents and loss of life before the mighty $ stops it flying via lawsuits from those killed and affected, and loss of orders for Boeing.

The Boeing 737 Max is a DOG. Further failures will be revealed.

gg
Would be interested to know if the big cheeses in Boeing fly around in the MAX's or if they have their own personal jets.
 
What is going on inside the USA ?

"Investigators will not have the benefit of hearing what was going on in the cockpit during the flight. The cockpit voice recorder — one of two so-called black boxes — recorded over the flight's sounds after two hours, Ms Homendy said."

 
Do any of you remember making crude boats, trolleys or planes as children made out of wood? A small model with oomph was the go but we always wished for bigger.

A good model was often ruined by trying to make it bigger. It probably has something to do with fibonacci and other mystical designs.

The Max versions are DODGY. They are enlarged versions of a very good product. Avoid them if you can. I may have to be a passenger on one later this year. I am in negotiation with an Airline as to whether I can do a smoking ceremony prior to boarding. And who pays me for it. I will invoke every god there is there is, to calm me down.

gg
 
"Investigators will not have the benefit of hearing what was going on in the cockpit during the flight. The cockpit voice recorder — one of two so-called black boxes — recorded over the flight's sounds after two hours, Ms Homendy said."
This is what happens when some combination of management and tech geeks lose sight of the original reason something's being done and become obsessed with "clever" tech or following the latest trend.

That something so basic and fundamental isn't fit for purpose raises some very serious questions about the overall culture that allowed it to happen. :2twocents
 
Why is Boeing having such difficulty producing safe aircraft ?

Check out the difference between Boeing and Airbus management and construction procedures. Highlights the issue of management focused solely on figures and profit vs engineers having a critical role in ensuring quality production.

The Airbus Advantage


Today on TAP: Why Europe’s mixed economy produces safer planes than America’s financialized capitalism

by Harold Meyerson

January 18, 2024



Expand

Meyerson%20on%20Tap%20011824.jpg

Michel Euler/AP Photo

In this June 17, 2019, photo, an Airbus A350-1000 performs a demonstration flight at the Paris Air Show in Le Bourget, east of Paris.

In the wake of the midair blowout of a door on a Boeing 737 MAX 9 earlier this month, the lead that Airbus has taken over Boeing in the manufacture and sales of the world’s commercial aircraft has, not surprisingly, grown. It’s actually been growing for some time: Last year, Airbus delivered 735 new planes to airlines and leasing companies, The New York Times reported, while Boeing delivered just 528. Airbus had an order backlog of 8,600 new planes, against Boeing’s 5,626. This month’s blowout reinforced the public’s—and consequently, the airlines’—doubts about Boeing’s commitment to safety, which soared after two disastrous crashes of its 737s in 2018 and 2019.
“What used to be a duopoly” in the manufacture of commercial aircraft, Richard Aboulafia of AeroDynamic Advisory told the Times, “has become two-thirds Airbus, one-third Boeing.”

The long descent of Boeing has now become the subject of widespread analysis in the mainstream media. A story last Saturday in The Wall Street Journal began with an account of one Boeing engineer’s white paper in 2001 that warned against the company’s new commitment to outsourcing production of key parts of the aircraft it assembled. But continuing to produce the parts in-house, with the work done by Boeing’s very experienced and unionized workforce, cut no mustard with Wall Street and the company’s new-model CEOs, who no longer came to their posts from careers in production, but rather from the financial side of the industry. In 2005, the company sold its Wichita plant to a private equity firm that slashed costs before unloading the plant to Spirit AeroSystems, which has become notorious for its deficient quality inspection practices.

More from Harold Meyerson
But this fish stunk from the head. Boeing continually objected to what it said were Spirit’s high costs and inability to meet deadlines. As the workers on the shop floor and their union repeatedly noted, this led to rushed production and deficient oversight. Workers—members of the International Association of Machinists—had “great quality and safety concerns,” one union representative wrote to union leaders, but their concerns were routinely ignored by senior management, the Journal reported.

So how are work practices at Airbus different from those at Boeing? I’m not arguing that Airbus provides a panacea for 21st-century production; a chunk of their own production, for instance, is outsourced as well. But consider, for starters, who actually owns the two companies. Airbus’s four largest shareholders, in order, are the government of France, the government of Germany, the Capital Research and Management Company, and the government of Spain. Boeing’s four largest shareholders, in order, are The Vanguard Group, Vanguard Group subfiler, Newport Trust Company, and State Street Corporation (a bank and asset manager). In other words, Airbus’s largest shareholders are mainly politically accountable governments that must pay heed to such public concerns as air safety; Boeing’s are entirely investors in business for profits.

Moreover, as the merger of German, French, and Spanish companies, Airbus production is centered in nations where workers historically and currently have more power than their U.S. counterparts. Forty-six thousand of Airbus’s roughly 130,000 employees work in the company’s German factories, where workers, by law, routinely discuss production and safety issues with managers in works councils. In the U.S., the Machinists are a union in which workers do have voice and power by American standards, but lack mechanisms like works councils through which management must take at least some heed of their concerns.

In sum, Airbus’s clear leadership over Boeing in matters of flight safety stem in good measure from their differences in ownership and worker power—that is, from the European model of mitigating laissez-faire capitalism with a measure of public and worker power, and from the American model of subjecting corporate policy almost entirely to the demands of investment institutions. Which, if you track the value of Boeing’s stock, hasn’t worked out that well for those investment institutions, either.

By the way, just how outsourced is Boeing production? Only yesterday, it was revealed the door plug that blew out of the Alaska Airlines plane wasn’t actually produced in Wichita. It was produced in Malaysia, where I very much doubt that workers’ concerns about speed of production and quality oversight have much impact on their managers. More significantly, the fact that the Malaysian production of the door plug didn’t come to light until yesterday—12 days after the blowout—suggests just how profoundly outsourcing can obscure the public visibility required for corporate accountability.

 
Why is Boeing having such difficulty producing safe aircraft ?

Check out the difference between Boeing and Airbus management and construction procedures. Highlights the issue of management focused solely on figures and profit vs engineers having a critical role in ensuring quality production.

The Airbus Advantage


Today on TAP: Why Europe’s mixed economy produces safer planes than America’s financialized capitalism

by Harold Meyerson

January 18, 2024



Expand

View attachment 169166
Michel Euler/AP Photo

In this June 17, 2019, photo, an Airbus A350-1000 performs a demonstration flight at the Paris Air Show in Le Bourget, east of Paris.

In the wake of the midair blowout of a door on a Boeing 737 MAX 9 earlier this month, the lead that Airbus has taken over Boeing in the manufacture and sales of the world’s commercial aircraft has, not surprisingly, grown. It’s actually been growing for some time: Last year, Airbus delivered 735 new planes to airlines and leasing companies, The New York Times reported, while Boeing delivered just 528. Airbus had an order backlog of 8,600 new planes, against Boeing’s 5,626. This month’s blowout reinforced the public’s—and consequently, the airlines’—doubts about Boeing’s commitment to safety, which soared after two disastrous crashes of its 737s in 2018 and 2019.
“What used to be a duopoly” in the manufacture of commercial aircraft, Richard Aboulafia of AeroDynamic Advisory told the Times, “has become two-thirds Airbus, one-third Boeing.”

The long descent of Boeing has now become the subject of widespread analysis in the mainstream media. A story last Saturday in The Wall Street Journal began with an account of one Boeing engineer’s white paper in 2001 that warned against the company’s new commitment to outsourcing production of key parts of the aircraft it assembled. But continuing to produce the parts in-house, with the work done by Boeing’s very experienced and unionized workforce, cut no mustard with Wall Street and the company’s new-model CEOs, who no longer came to their posts from careers in production, but rather from the financial side of the industry. In 2005, the company sold its Wichita plant to a private equity firm that slashed costs before unloading the plant to Spirit AeroSystems, which has become notorious for its deficient quality inspection practices.

More from Harold Meyerson
But this fish stunk from the head. Boeing continually objected to what it said were Spirit’s high costs and inability to meet deadlines. As the workers on the shop floor and their union repeatedly noted, this led to rushed production and deficient oversight. Workers—members of the International Association of Machinists—had “great quality and safety concerns,” one union representative wrote to union leaders, but their concerns were routinely ignored by senior management, the Journal reported.

So how are work practices at Airbus different from those at Boeing? I’m not arguing that Airbus provides a panacea for 21st-century production; a chunk of their own production, for instance, is outsourced as well. But consider, for starters, who actually owns the two companies. Airbus’s four largest shareholders, in order, are the government of France, the government of Germany, the Capital Research and Management Company, and the government of Spain. Boeing’s four largest shareholders, in order, are The Vanguard Group, Vanguard Group subfiler, Newport Trust Company, and State Street Corporation (a bank and asset manager). In other words, Airbus’s largest shareholders are mainly politically accountable governments that must pay heed to such public concerns as air safety; Boeing’s are entirely investors in business for profits.

Moreover, as the merger of German, French, and Spanish companies, Airbus production is centered in nations where workers historically and currently have more power than their U.S. counterparts. Forty-six thousand of Airbus’s roughly 130,000 employees work in the company’s German factories, where workers, by law, routinely discuss production and safety issues with managers in works councils. In the U.S., the Machinists are a union in which workers do have voice and power by American standards, but lack mechanisms like works councils through which management must take at least some heed of their concerns.

In sum, Airbus’s clear leadership over Boeing in matters of flight safety stem in good measure from their differences in ownership and worker power—that is, from the European model of mitigating laissez-faire capitalism with a measure of public and worker power, and from the American model of subjecting corporate policy almost entirely to the demands of investment institutions. Which, if you track the value of Boeing’s stock, hasn’t worked out that well for those investment institutions, either.

By the way, just how outsourced is Boeing production? Only yesterday, it was revealed the door plug that blew out of the Alaska Airlines plane wasn’t actually produced in Wichita. It was produced in Malaysia, where I very much doubt that workers’ concerns about speed of production and quality oversight have much impact on their managers. More significantly, the fact that the Malaysian production of the door plug didn’t come to light until yesterday—12 days after the blowout—suggests just how profoundly outsourcing can obscure the public visibility required for corporate accountability.

Its the same with cars.

Americans build down to a price, Europeans build up to a standard (mostly).
 
I'll be travelling on a 737 800 soon down to Meanjin from here, unless they change Meanjin's name again, a 2 hour flight.

Will I have a quick trip to heaven should an exit door blow out?

I'll be in seat D4.

gg
 

Worth reading the full article if you've got time and I'll express my own view that the basic concept applies to an awful lot of technical, scientific, engineering, trades etc things right throughout society. In particular this bit:

"This is all about culture," he explained.

"Boeing was run by engineers. And everything was motivated by engineers. And part of that was excellence, and safety and security.

"Then in came McDonnell Douglas … Engineers have been driven down the hill and replaced by accountants, and the management style just hasn't worked."

And:

As a result of the cutbacks and the rush to meet deadlines, he said, some steps were left unchecked and mechanics were often forced to approve their own work.

"In my opinion, Boeing needs a reckoning from the top down, because, like I say, this culture has been eating at it and eating at and eating at it for 20 years," Mr Barnett said.

This is the heart of the issue in my view and has far broader implications in my view. The basic concept being the underlying cause of a wide range of issues from apartment buildings cracking up to the ongoing concerns about energy supply to the problems in education. Technical expertise has been slowly but surely pushed aside and replaced with a sole focus on economics and "soft" skills which relegates anything and anyone technical to the background.

Boeing won't be the last company to run into trouble due to this approach. It's widespread throughout countless industries of the technical, engineering, trades etc variety and has been for years now. :2twocents

hard headed accounting which takes the technical aspects for granted.
 
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