That's a good point. I did consider that if the big banks were taking a lot more LMI in-house it would mean that the overall risk in Genworth would probably reduce as the Big 4 seem to be responsible for most of the higher LVR loans on their books. Whilst this probably means lower margins, it could also be offset by lower delinquencies. I think it's a positive, lower returns perhaps, but much less earnings volatility (and business default risk) over the cycle.One thing that crossed my mind; With the banks being forced to raise their capital buffers and receiving no capital requirement offset for insured mortgages the banks might be thinking - we have to hold the capital anyway, why not self insure and claw back some of the lost ROE from higher capital requirements.
I didn't realise that this was in the Murray enquiry. I did realise that Genworth have lobbied for this change very hard over the years and continue to do so. If you think about it, it's a solid recommendation. Not sure what the politics (and vested interests) involved are, though.David Murray's financial services enquiry recommended that mortgage insurance be recognised in the capital framework where appropriate, if that ever gets implemented it would be a game changer in favour of GMA retaining the banks as customers.
Ves said:Based on the LVR / change in price / insured amounts in their 30 June 2015 presentation, I'm a lot more comfortable with say a 15% fall in house prices and approaching 5% delinquency than I was initially. They'd still lose a lot of capital, maybe even up to the excess amount above, but I don't think it'd come close to knocking them out. Would be still equity left.
What happened in 2010 in GMA's business? The claims development triangle (4.4b - annual report) basically reduced by 2/3rds from the prior year. Did they reduce their business or was this actually a genuine reduction in what they thought they'd pay out? They haven't underestimated (so far), to be fair. In fact conditions look very benign per that table. If I'm reading that correctly, it is a decent map of where things can go when GFC type events hit.
Nope, it only applies to loan defaults (ie. when the borrowing stops making payments and the loan gets called in). They can't force you to sell your house if the market goes backwards, so there can be no claim, as the lender hasn't made a loss on the loan at that point.Does LMI protect the lender if the borrower goes into negative equity but is still keeping up with their payments?
... Like most things in life, the beauty of situations like this are that they are not black and white. Often you can find something you're on the bearish side of for instance, but the market can be potentially far more bearish than you. It's all about probabilities and nuances by that stage.
Thanks craft, I haven't go around to checking out Genworth US yet. I'm sure their story is a rollercoaster given what happened in the last decade.
I think, when looking at GMA, naturally one needs to weigh the prospect of a serious housing downturn occurring in Australia. But any assessment of that probability needs to be realistic.
Yep, GMA is a macro bet on housing valuation..... end of story for me - too much earnings risk that I don't have the competence to assess, Maybe on the backend of a major down turn which shakes it to its core I might be interested, that is when, with my limited knowledge I would be more confident that they have priced the risk they carry effectively. But I'm a pussy.
Yep, GMA is a macro bet on housing valuation..... end of story for me - too much earnings risk that I don't have the competence to assess, Maybe on the backend of a major down turn which shakes it to its core I might be interested, that is when, with my limited knowledge I would be more confident that they have priced the risk they carry effectively. But I'm a pussy.
A perspective on why housing/land may be overvalued from a long term perspective.
https://www.prosper.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Prosper-Australia-Senate-Housing-Submission.pdf
A good RBA speech for another perspective.
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2015/sp-dg-2015-08-12.html#t4
Yep, GMA is a macro bet on housing valuation..... end of story for me - too much earnings risk that I don't have the competence to assess, Maybe on the backend of a major down turn which shakes it to its core I might be interested, that is when, with my limited knowledge I would be more confident that they have priced the risk they carry effectively...
Thanks for the links.
I found the first of the papers the most informative,
The complication here comes from the fact that Australians are both owners of housing assets and consumers of housing services. We don't just own housing and the land on which it is built, but we also live in that housing, and on that land. And that housing and land provide us with valuable services.
If housing is fairly valued – in the sense that the price of housing is equal to the present discounted value of the future rents – then the rise in prices implies an increase in the expected future cost of housing services.
So, from the perspective of society as a whole, much of what is gained on the one hand is lost on the other: there are windfall gains from higher land prices but then everyone pays more for housing services.[10]
How any one individual is affected by all of this depends upon their own circumstances.
It is quite likely that these trends will continue with it becoming more commonplace for parents to help their children in the property market. This has both economic and social consequences. Of course, if this type of intergenerational assistance does become more common, then fewer parents will be able to use the capital gains that they have benefited from to boost their own consumption. Instead, in effect, they will be using those capital gains to support the following generations with their higher housing costs. Alternatively, if it turns out that today's generations use their capital gains to increase their own spending, then they will have less ability to help their children. If this were to happen, I suspect that, over time there would be some downward pressure on the price of housing, relative to incomes, as future generations deal with the high cost of housing.
Thanks for the links.
I found the first of the papers the most informative, particularly page 8 which dealt with the debt-to-cashflow ratio. The authors rightly acknowledge that this ratio is key because it goes to the serviceability of per capita debt of which mortgage debt is overwhelmingly the dominant form of debt for most Australians.
In light of the recent discussion on whether Australia is or is not in the midst of a property bubble that is about to burst (or to seriously deflate) Ã la US subprime mortgage crisis, I was reminded of the phenomenon of "representiveness bias" to which the psychologist Daniel Kahneman first drew attention in his book Thinking Fast and Slow.
In Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge (a great book for value investors) David Dreman describes the form that this bias typically takes in assessing stock market opportunities:
"In the market, representiveness might take the form of labelling two companies or two market environments as the same when the actual resemblance is superficial. Give people a little information and click! they pull out a mental picture they're familiar with, though it may only remotely represent the truth. The two key ways that representiveness bias leads to miscalculations are that it causes us to give too much emphasis to the similarities between events and does not take into account the actual probability that an event will occur and it reduces the the importance that we give to variables that are actually critical in determining an event's probability" (underlining added).
I can't help but think that much of the fear that a slowdown in the Australian mortgage market will lead to something like, even if not on the scale of, the US subprime crisis is an example of representiveness bias at work.
Just my penny's worth.
Where is this discussion you are talking about. It appears that is you talking about things not being like the USA rather then anybody particularly saying that it will be...
Keen to see you can share the same Triathlete
Thanks for the links.
I found the first of the papers the most informative, particularly page 8 which dealt with the debt-to-cashflow ratio. The authors rightly acknowledge that this ratio is key because it goes to the serviceability of per capita debt of which mortgage debt is overwhelmingly the dominant form of debt for most Australians.
View attachment 64570
The authors say that, where the ratio rises to 20 and above, it is in the "calamity zone" and seriously threatens "household solvency" (interestingly, the "calamity zone" is not a precise measurement, the authors note, but is merely a "rule of thumb" - whatever that means). As you can see from the table, both housing and investment stock peaked in the "calamity zone" in 2008 and both have been steadily declining since then. The table is current up to 2013 and this paper was written at the end of February 2014. I'd be interested to know whether the trend has reversed and started climbing back into the "calamity zone" since the data were gathered in 2013.
By leaving the answer to that issue hanging renders the dire predictions of the paper a little underwhelming because the size of mortgage debt is meaningless unless one can get a sufficiently clear measurement of the ability of borrowers to service that debt. Until and unless the debt becomes so great that borrowers can't service it, you are not going to get a mortgage meltdown in any meaningful proportion.
I don't understand the chart. If mortgage debt to net cashflow is around 20, then an interest rate of 5% would leave nothing to put food on the table, pay off credit cards, ... or any of the principal.
The serviceability of debt has improved since despite increasing housing debt to disposable income ratios. This occurs because interest rates on the debt has declined in the interim.
Ok I'll play
$1000
it's lower than $2.44 in 12 mths.
Get your cheque book out, Daffy Duck.
Show me where I said it would never trade above $2.44
You did not say that GMA "would never trade above $2.44". As I quoted you above, you must know that.
You said you will bet that "it's lower than $2.44 in 12 mths". They are your words.
Now, any reasonable person who speaks the Queen's tongue would understand your words to mean that you were betting against GMA being higher than $2.44 at any time over the course of the next 12 months.
By that measure, you lose.
Joe got my direct transfer of 1 k when I said I would in September.
He keeps it win or lose.
I said sentiment would win in a month---so that's still going.
You then made it a year so that is also still going.
Show me where I said it would never trade above $2.44.
Start saving!
Now if you want to take up the second part of the bet Ill send Joe off another K
and ill trade it in and or out as the bet states. Joe keeps another K wether I win or lose.
You send him a K in 12 mths if I perform better than you as stated in the bet
and another K if Sentiment (price) is lower than $2.44 in 12 mths.
Joe gets 2K regardless---if you take up the bet.(Stage 2)
You have a habit of moving goal posts.
But hey Joe has a good cause happy to support.
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