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Hedge funds: all you need to know, in plain English

Must-read from WSJ
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Dear Investors, We're...

Hedge Funds Strain
To Find Words to Say
'Sorry' for Your Losses

By GREGORY ZUCKERMAN / WSJ
August 16, 2007

Running a hedge fund means never having to say you're sorry, at least not in so many words.

That isn't to say some hedge-fund managers don't have a lot to feel bad about. In the past few weeks, some of the biggest names in hedge-fund land -- Goldman Sachs Group, Highbridge Capital Management, AQR Capital Management, Renaissance Technologies -- have certain funds that lost as much as a third of investors' money as stock and credit markets seized up, and stocks moved in unexpected ways, in reaction to the spreading subprime-mortgage debacle.

None of these highly paid managers are prostrating themselves before their clients, begging forgiveness, however. Instead, in letters to clients, they point fingers at other hedge funds, once-in-a-lifetime events and their own computer programs.

Black Mesa Capital, a Santa Fe, N.M., hedge fund captured the "don't blame us" spirit with its letter last week, blaming "unprecedented market events," including "a very large or several very large trading entities, possibly very large hedge funds...liquidating massive" portfolios. The managers, Dave DeMers and Jonathan Spring, said they are taking "unprecedented actions" to fix its problems, a response to the "unprecedented market events." The fund lost about 10% in the first eight days of August. Black Mesa didn't respond to a request for comment.

DEAR INVESTORS,

"If the rumors are that we've had better weeks, then they are accurate. If the rumors are that we are in some pain over the recent widespread quant stock selection woes, then they are accurate. If the rumors are more severe than that, then they are simply false."
-- Clifford S. Asness, managing and founding principal, AQR Capital Management
* * *
"Regrettably we have not had good luck during these last few days of August. We have been caught in what appears to be a large wave of de-leveraging on the part of quantitative long/short hedge funds.
-- Jim Simons, president, Renaissance Technologies
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"As you know from the daily net asset value estimates which we make available to you, our performance has been disappointing."
-- Tykhe Capital
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"Based on our own research and market knowledge, we believe that this increase in volatility is technical rather than fundamental in nature."
-- Minder Cheng, managing director, Barclays Global Investors
* * *
"There was (and is) the possibility that, as great as liquidations had been so far, that it was just the beginning of a spiral of me-too liquidations. The question was, when will it end? The answer is, we don't know."
-- Dave DeMers and Jonathan Spring, Black Mesa Capital
* * *
"We have always attempted to do the very best for our investors. A loss of this magnitude in such a short period is as devastating to us as it is to you."
-- Jeff Larson, Sowood Capital Management
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"We have been actively managing our exposures through this challenging environment and will be in contact with you shortly to give you an additional update."
-- Highbridge Capital Management
* * *
Highbridge, which saw its $1.7 billion statistical-arbitrage fund lose 18% in just the first eight days of the month, sent out a letter pointing to other hedge funds, who the firm said were making similar trades, rather than explaining Highbridge's own mistakes. "As you may be aware, many hedge funds and asset management firms utilizing similar strategies are experiencing unprecedented volatility," said the firm, which has $37 billion in total assets.

Goldman's letter portrayed the firm's money-losing hedge funds as innocent bystanders, caught up in a violent market.

"The quantitative funds run by Goldman Sachs Asset Management have not been spared in this difficult environment," said the Goldman letter, sent Aug. 13, explaining why its hedge funds lost between 17% and 34% in the first 10 days of the month. "Our response has been comprehensive and immediate." Goldman didn't respond to a request for comment.

A simple mea culpa would be more satisfying for many investors. "I would like to hear an 'I'm sorry,'" says Jane Buchan of Pacific Asset Management Co., an Irvine, Calif., firm that invests in hedge funds.

The recent pain has largely centered on quantitative hedge funds, which rely on computer models of the sort more often developed by math whizzes than English majors. So, some of the explanations are heavy on the jargon. "The culprit is not the Basic System but our predictive overlay," said Jim Simons, who runs Renaissance Technologies, one of the largest hedge funds, in an Aug. 9 letter telling investors that one of his funds had lost almost 9% in the first eight days of August. He's gained back a chunk of that in the past few days.

"When you've done your best, there isn't a great deal to apologize for, the event was a whirlwind that caught everyone by surprise. It certainly caught us by surprise," Mr. Simons said in an interview. "But not having anything to apologize for and not feeling bad are two different things -- certainly, I feel bad for anyone losing money."

Lawyers say they advise hedge managers to detail losses quickly, but restrict their explanations to the facts. Owning up to mistakes or apologies could give an opening to investors to level lawsuits, they say.

"It's sort of like how doctors never say they're sorry," says David Moody, a partner at law firm Purrington Moody Weil. "It's an invitation for a lawsuit."

One major hedge-fund manager admits to using the word "sorry" in his letter to investors, but striking it at the last moment, arguing that he had nothing to apologize for. Another executive argued that funds sending out letters were treating their investors better than other big losers who have left their investors in the dark.

"Don't sugarcoat it," says Jacqueline Whitmore, a Palm Beach, Fla., author who gives speeches about business etiquette. "There's a hesitation to want to say that you were wrong, but it can be worded in a way where you can tell the truth, but it doesn't sound like this is the end of the world."

Clifford Asness, a founding principal of AQR, a Greenwich, Conn., firm, was blunt about his failure. But he blamed others, too. "Our stock-selection investment process, a long-term winning strategy, has very recently been shockingly bad for us and for all of those pursuing similar strategies," wrote Mr. Asness, whose largest fund is now flat on the year. "The very success of the strategy over time has drawn too many investors. Now, we are witnessing some of them exit, and...it's painful."

But there are times when the losses are so bad that hedge-fund honchos feel the need to give a full mea culpa. When Sowood Capital, a Boston hedge fund, was losing big money in July, few of its investors realized how bad things were getting. Then they received a letter, on July 27, and another on July 30, describing how Sowood's two key funds had lost more than 50% in just a few weeks and were winding down.

"We are very sorry this has happened," Jeffrey Larson, Sowood's founder, wrote to his investors. "A loss of this magnitude in such a short period is as devastating to us as it is to you."
 
Beware Bailouts

by James Surowiecki / The New Yorker
August, 2007

Real Estate In August of 1998, disaster loomed for the U.S. economy. Panic among investors after Russia defaulted on its sovereign bonds led to plummeting stock prices and a freeze on global credit markets. The hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management saw its multibillion-dollar portfolio evaporate in days, and investors pulled their money from any asset that had even a tinge of risk. But then the Federal Reserve came to the rescue, slashing interest rates three times in the space of a few weeks and pouring huge amounts of cash into the financial system. The stock market rebounded, and the economy boomed. Early the next year, Time put the Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, on its cover, along with the Treasury officers Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, with the headline “The Committee to Save the World.”

Nine years later, it’s been another terrible August on Wall Street. The meltdown of the market in subprime loans, which over the past six months has led to the shuttering of many home lenders and mortgage brokers, has spilled over into the broader credit market. Bankers and bondholders are demanding very high interest rates for risky loans and, in some cases, refusing to lend money at all. Hedge funds and brokerages that invested in subprime securities have found themselves stuck with billions in assets that no one wants to buy, while, in the past month, panicked investors have sent the stock market down almost ten per cent. As anxiety over a global credit crunch spread, Wall Street implored an apparently reluctant Fed to rescue investors once again. And, last Friday, that’s exactly what it did, cutting the discount rate””the rate at which it lends to banks””by half a point. In response, investors sent the stock market soaring.

For anyone with a 401(k), it was hard not to greet the Fed’s move with relief. But the short-term relief comes with a long-term cost. Money managers created the current turmoil by failing to take risk seriously, enabling borrowers with sketchy credit records to borrow money nearly as cheaply as blue-chip companies. In the past weeks, managers had been paying for their folly. The Fed’s decision to flood the system with cheap money will create a textbook case of what’s usually called moral hazard: insulating fund managers from the consequences of their errors will encourage similarly risky bets in the future.

Now, you can take a fear of moral hazard, and a desire to see foolishness punished, too far. In times of real crisis, we don’t want the Fed to follow the advice that Herbert Hoover says he got from Andrew Mellon during the Great Depression: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate. . . . Purge the rottenness out of the system.” When the health of the U.S. economy is under serious threat, the Fed should act. But in this case it’s far from clear that the turmoil was an actual menace to the underlying economy of the U.S. Bailing out hedge-fund managers was great for Wall Street, but it may not have been such a good deal for Main Street.

Wall Street so dominates our image of the U.S. economy these days that it’s easy to assume that what’s bad for the Street must be bad for everyone else. But, while it’s true that a complete market meltdown would have disastrous effects on the economy as a whole, market downturns like those of the past few weeks often have only a small effect on businesses and consumers. In part, that’s because much of what happens on Wall Street consists of the shuffling of assets among various well-heeled players, rather than anything that’s fundamental to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy. (The economy did fine before the advent of hedge funds and private-equity funds, and would probably do fine in their absence.) Similarly, while stock-market tumbles are always painful, they have no concrete impact on most American consumers, who own little or no stock. (In any case, the S. & P. 500 is still up ten per cent over the past year, which hardly suggests imminent disaster.) And, in the short run, they’re irrelevant to most corporations, too, since few companies actually use the stock market to raise capital.

The bond and loan markets do, of course, matter quite a bit to companies and to individuals, because no economy can run without a steady supply of credit. But, although standards for corporate lending have tightened in recent weeks, and interest rates on corporate bonds may have risen steadily, they’re still low by historical standards, while the rates for most traditional mortgages have barely risen. That may be why the economy as a whole shows few signs of imminent doom. Corporate profits continue to go up. Unemployment is still relatively low, and wages in the last quarter rose at a surprisingly fast rate. Likewise, in July, retail sales were healthier than expected, and industrial production was reasonably brisk.

That’s not to say that the economy has suffered no fallout from the subprime collapse. The fall in housing prices, the drying up of new construction, and the sharp rise in foreclosures in many areas are having a serious impact on employment and economic growth. But these are not problems that the Fed’s action will solve. Cutting the discount rate is not going to help subprime borrowers get new loans, nor will it get the housing market moving again. What it will do is reassure investors and save some money managers from well-deserved oblivion. It may be that the risk of a full-fledged credit crunch was high enough to make this worth doing. But there is something unseemly about watching the avatars of free-market capitalism rely on the government to pay for their bad bets. And there is something scary about contemplating the even bigger bets they’ll make in the future if they know that the Fed is there to bail them out.
 
Re: Australian Hedge Funds

Does anyone have any information regarding Australian based hedge funds? Small or large scale.

Much appreciated.
 
Borowitz Special for ASF Members
Andy Borowitz / September 11, 2007
[Andy Borowitz is an US comedian and satirist]
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Hedge Fund Managers March on Washington Largest Chauffeur-Driven Protest in Capital’s History Demanding further intervention from the Federal Reserve to protect their endangered fortunes, thousands of the nation’s leading hedge fund managers marched on Washington today.

Dubbed “The Million Mercedes March,” the protest was said to be the largest chauffeur-driven demonstration in the capital’s history.

Limousines started jamming the streets of Washington at approximately ten in the morning as irate hedge fund owners converged in front of the Federal Reserve building to demand stronger action to protect their imperiled riches.

Chanting “No Rate Cut, No Peace,” the furious money managers were pepper-sprayed by police as their protest threatened to take a violent turn.

Tracy Klujian, a hedge fund manager from Greenwich, Connecticut, said that simmering anger in the hedge fund community was “a powder keg” waiting to explode.

“We have yet to see the ripple effects of this crisis,” Mr. Klujian said. “When these guys have to freeze their trophy wives’ shopping allowances, there’s going to be hell to pay.”

Mr. Klujian’s words seemed almost prophetic as a mob of angry trophy wives looted a Ralph Lauren boutique in East Hampton, New York later in the day, stripping the establishment of its entire fall collection.

If the Fed fails to intervene, Mr. Klujian warned, an ugly situation among the nation’s wealthiest money managers will only get uglier.

“A lot of these guys are mad as hell right now,” he said. “But wait until they’re down to their last billion.”

Elsewhere, FEMA announced that it would commemorate the second anniversary of Hurricane Katrina by returning phone calls from 2005.
 
Traders claim hedge fund made them take hormones
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TRADING PLACES
By PAUL THARP and RODDY BOYD
New York Post, October 11, 2007

One of the world's richest and most secretive hedge funds is telling its traders to swallow female hormones to trade better, a lawsuit claims.
The bizarre twist on how to get wealthy fast swept across Wall Street's trading desks amid ribald laughter and groans after revelations yesterday of the shocking claims involving SAC Capital.

The firm, a powerful $10 billion hedge fund, is run by superstar trader Steven A. Cohen, one of Wall Street's most prolific players who regularly takes home $500 million a year.

It was alleged that one of Cohen's top bosses at SAC chided traders for being too aggressive - and that they must use a soft feminine touch to score in their trading pitches.

One junior trader claimed that the boss, Ping Jiang, a key producer at the big hedge fund, demanded that the young trader take female hormone pills to help erase his aggressive male ways so he could be more effeminate in his trading style.

Eventually, the hormones caused the junior trader to start wearing dresses, avoid his wife's touches altogether and allegedly begin a sexual relationship with his boss, the trader claims.

Details of the case, disclosed yesterday by Charlie Gasparino on CNBC, claimed that the boss bragged he had developed a successful trading method based on being effeminate and that other traders ought to start using it, too.

The method apparently worked for Jiang, who's listed by Trader Monthly magazine as one of Wall Street's top 100 traders, with estimated income of $100 million a year.

The junior trader, identified as Andrew Z. Tong, 37, filed a sexual harassment case against his boss, said CNBC. The case claimed the hormone pills wrecked his life, and also made him impotent with his wife, who wanted to have a baby.

Tong said that when he was instructed by Jiang to start taking an unspecified dosage of the pills to improve his trading, Tong had to search the illegal black market to find his hormone pills, the report said.

According to a court filing, Tong and Jiang met in 1998 as traders at Lehman Brothers. Tong left after three years but stayed in touch.

Although Tong sued his boss in New York State Supreme Court hoping to get publicity, a judge sealed the papers and transferred the weird tale to arbitration where both sides would slug it out privately, the report said. Tong was hired at a base salary of $250,000.

The judge also canceled oral arguments that had been set for today after Tong's lawyers appealed for a gag on any public discussion of the case. The judge agreed that the weird tale was too salacious for the public to hear. CNBC didn't say how it obtained the allegations in the case.

SAC Capital and Jiang both denied the charges.

"SAC conducted a thorough investigation and found these scurrilous accusations to be false," they said in a statement. "We will vigorously defend ourselves and are confident that these claims will be swiftly rejected in arbitration.

The CNBC report said Tong was terminated by SAC in April 2006 after working there for a year.

Sources close to the firm said he was fired for cause, but others claimed Tong was forced out of the firm after his complaints.
 
New York Times, February 12, 2008

Bad Bets and Accounting Flaws Bring Staggering Losses
By JENNY ANDERSON

Mark S. Fishman was a modern prince of the markets ”” a pedigreed money manager who raised billions of dollars at the height of the hedge fund boom.

But last week his dream collapsed. Hobbled by bad trades in the credit markets, Mr. Fishman began to shut the fund he helped found, Sailfish Capital Partners, which oversaw $2 billion just six months ago, investors said.

On Monday Mr. Fishman, 47, sat in the paneled Princeton Club of New York, explaining what it was like to battle the markets ”” and lose.

“It feels like someone has died,” Mr. Fishman said, his eyes welling up. “We’ve disappointed people, and there is no one more disappointed than me.”

Mr. Fishman is not the first hedge fund manager to run into trouble ”” and he certainly will not be the last. After years of explosive growth, this secretive, sometimes volatile corner of the financial world is entering a dangerous new era. The running turmoil in the markets is stirring fears that more of these funds will fail, some, perhaps, spectacularly.

“This will be the year with the highest number of hedge fund failures given the huge number of new and untested hedge funds,” said Bradley H. Alford, founder of the Atlanta-based Alpha Capital Management, an investment advisory business.

“Last year there were some easy trades: short financials, short subprime, long non-U.S and emerging markets. This year there’s no clear trend and no safe place to hide.” So far few funds have suffered the same fate as Sailfish Capital. But the signs are troubling. The average stock-picking hedge fund sank 4.1 percent in January. While that tumble was not as steep as the one taken by the broad stock market ”” the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index was down 6 percent ”” it nonetheless represented the hedge fund industry’s worst showing since November 2000. Few of the investment strategies employed by these funds made money.

Big-name funds are suffering. David Slager and Timothy R. Barakett, who run the Atticus European Fund, lost more than 13 percent, and Lee Ainslie, who heads Maverick Capital, lost 9 percent through Jan. 25, according to SYZ & Company, which tallies hedge fund returns. (Compare that with 2007 performance when the funds returned 27.7 percent and 26.9 percent, respectively.)

Even Goldman Sachs, which turned out record profit last year while many other Wall Street banks stumbled, is struggling to make money for its hedge fund investors. Its $7 billion Goldman Sachs Investment Partners fund, started on Jan. 1, fell 6 percent last month.

Press officers for Atticus and Goldman declined to comment. A spokesman for Maverick could not be reached.

“People who have been in business for 20 years are saying January was one of the most difficult and challenging times they have ever seen,” said a manager who oversees a fund of hedge funds, who asked not to be identified because he does business with many managers.

It is a remarkable turnabout for an industry that upended the old order on Wall Street and, in the process, redefined Americans’ notions of wealth. In recent years hedge fund money has driven up prices of everything from New York apartments to Andy Warhol paintings and reshaped the worlds of philanthropy and politics.

Managing a hedge fund has become the running dream on Wall Street. Since 2000, the number of funds has more than doubled, to 10,000. These private pools of capital now sit atop almost $1.9 trillion in assets.

Until recently, times in the industry were good, very good. On average, so-called long/short hedge funds ”” those that bet on some stocks and against others ”” returned 10.51 percent in 2007, according to Hedge Fund Research. The Standard & Poor’s 500, by contrast, returned a mere 5.49 percent, including dividends.

But making money is getting tougher. Many hedge funds are products of a bull market. Many profited by making leveraged bets on what were, until recently, steadily rising markets. Some plowed into emerging markets while others dove into the loan market. But now, as the credit squeeze tightens and talk of recession grows louder, those same markets have collapsed.

Sol Waksman, president of Barclay Group, an alternative investment database, said that three-quarters of the 1,241 hedge funds that have reported returns for January lost money.

“That’s a scary number,” Mr. Waksman said.

Many managers fear things will only get worse. The mood was bleak at a hedge fund conference given by Morgan Stanley recently at the Breakers resort in Palm Beach, Fla., according to people at the gathering.

Larry Robbins, the founder of Glenview Capital, a $9 billion hedge fund, captured the atmosphere of the conference, entitled, “2008 and Beyond,” with a bit of black humor. Asked what his strategy was for 2008, Mr. Robbins joked, “To get to, ‘and beyond,’ ” according to a person at the meeting. Mr. Robbins declined to comment.

Sailfish seemed like a hedge fund that might weather the storm. Before founding the fund, Mr. Fishman spent seven years working for Steven A. Cohen, the founder of SAC Capital Advisors, another hedge fund based in Stamford, Conn. Mr. Fishman called Mr. Cohen the “Michael Jordan” of the trading world.

Mr. Fishman and Sal Naro, a friend who worked at UBS, formed Sailfish in 2005, aiming to “build a better mousetrap,” Mr. Fishman said. The firm’s name is a play on their names.

The pair, both fixed-income specialists, quickly raised $1 billion for their flagship multi-strategy fixed-income fund, according to investor documents. Assets grew steadily, reaching $1.2 billion by the end of 2005 and $1.5 billion by the end of 2006, when the fund returned more than 12 percent. In July, the fund sat atop almost $2 billion, and exhibited relatively low volatility ”” a key factor for institutional investors.

But July proved treacherous. As the credit markets seized up, Sailfish owned seemingly safe top-rated investments, including mortgage investments, that suddenly plummeted in value.

“We are working exceedingly hard in an illiquid market to position the portfolio in a way that can withstand these conditions and enable us to participate aggressively as the market stabilizes,” Sailfish wrote to investors in August. The fund lost 12.5 percent that month.

“Wall Street was not willing to make orderly markets for high- quality short-dated paper,” Mr. Fishman recalled on Monday. “They didn’t know their own balance sheets.” (Banks have taken more than $200 billion in hits since August.)

Sailfish bounced back in September and October, but investors, alarmed by the deteriorating markets, began to take their money out of the fund. By the end of the year, Sailfish was down more than 15 percent. In January, it fell an additional 7 percent.

Last Thursday, Sailfish started to alert investors that the fund was likely to shut down, two investors said. Mr. Fishman visited investors in Chicago and California, these investors said, while Mr. Naro met with investors in New York. The fund met all its margin calls and has ample cash, said one investor who spoke with one of the principals. Neither of the fund managers would confirm that the fund was closing.

But Mr. Fishman will say what it is like to lose mony for investors ””including himself.

“It’s that sad dawning when you realize the market is so much bigger than you are,” he said.
 
How's this fund manager. Racked up top returns but got knocked out cold a few times having to close business and mortgage house and pawn silver in 1998. Even tried suing CME for allegedly betting against him. That doesn't happen does it. :eek: Then the GFC which prolly got most traders in some way. System broke.


Victor Niederhoffer

Returns

Niederhoffer Investments returned 35% a year from inception through 1996, when MAR ranked it the No. 1 hedge fund manager in the world. In 1997, Niederhoffer published a New York Times bestselling book, The Education of a Speculator.

In statistical terms, I figure I have traded about 2 million contracts, with an average profit of $70 per contract (after slippage of perhaps $20). This average is approximately 700 standard deviations away from randomness.

1997 losses

In 1997, Niederhoffer Investments was not finding many opportunities for investments and, having returned much of its funds to customers such as George Soros, began investing the remaining 100 million dollars in areas where Niederhoffer later admitted that he did not have much expertise.[6] Niederhoffer decided to buy Thai bank stocks, which had fallen heavily in the Asian financial crisis, his bet being that the Thai government would not allow these companies to go out of business. On October 27, 1997, losses resulting from this investment, combined with a 554-point (7.2%) single day decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (the eighth largest point decline to date in index history), forced Niederhoffer Investments to close its doors. In a lawsuit that Niederhoffer later filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, where he traded options, he alleged that floor traders colluded to drive the market down that day to force him out of his positions. Traders at the time said Refco may have been responsible for as much as $35 million of Niederhoffer's losses.

New fund

Since closing down his fund in 1997, he began trading for his own account again in 1998, after mortgaging his house and selling his antique silver collection. This original fund is called Wimbledon Fund, the name reflecting his love of tennis. He began managing money for offshore clients in February 2002, with the Matador Fund. Niederhoffer employs proprietary programs that predict short-term moves using multivariate time series analysis. In a five-year period beginning in 2001, Niederhoffer's fund returned 50% a year (compounded). His worst year in this period was 2004, returning 40%. In 2005, he returned 56.2% (as reported in eFinancial News). On April 6, 2006, the industry group MarHedge awarded Matador Fund Ltd. and Manchester Trading, two funds managed by Niederhoffer, the prize for best performance by a commodity trading advisor (CTA) in the two years 2004 and 2005.

However, Niederhoffer's funds were caught up in the 2007 subprime mortgage financial crisis, and the Matador Fund was closed in September 2007 after a decline in value of more than seventy-five percent.
 
So lesson number one is: Unless you personally know the manager and understand what he is doing (just you can't be bothered because you're too busy and he updates you once a week anyway), the safest place for your money is either under the mattress, at the bank or you managing it.

Why people would trust strangers to look after their money is beyond me. I mean, these are hedge fund managers, not your doctor or lawyer whom you can always trust.
 
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