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can see the court case:
Lawyer to Victim: So the bank lent you money that they shouldn't have?
Victim: Yes
How much did they lend you?
Victim: I don't know exactly, about $XXX
Lawyer: Did you sign this document that states the amount that the bank lent you?
Victim: Yes
Lawyer : If you had of made a large profit would you give some money back to the Banks?
Investor: errr No why should I?
Lawyer : What would have done if you made a profit?
Investor: Give some to my kids, buy a new car, pay off the house, play the Pokies.
Hi Julia,
see attached, $100,000 is the quoted figure
http://www.theage.com.au/news/busin...-under-scrutiny/2007/03/19/1174152976959.html
FWIW, I think ASIC will want to make an example of the Storm principles, if they have breached ANY regs, cause they have made ASIC look incompetent.
Not all are after a quick buck Glen42, most of these people were probably just after a secure retirement with a few luxuries after decades of toil. Cut them some slack unless you know better.
I am not a storm investor and do not know any but i do know my mother would have walked straight into something like this if her luck was out.
Hi Awg, Thank you for that.
So that's the amount payable via FICS. I'd have thought, though, that planners would have quite separate personal Prof. Indemnity Insurance through an insurance company, just as, say, doctors do.
Earlier in this thread an IT consultant said he/she had to carry a significant insurance.
Sir O: I've previously asked if you could comment on this?
When you refer to "the principals" here, do you mean the previously independent small FP's who sold to Storm?I can't believe the gall of the advisers, particularly the principals who "GAMBLED" on their businesses in the big roll up to the mothership prior to the float - and now, the principles are crying foul and demanding payment for their businesses... I can tell you for a fact they did so on the proviso that the payout would happen when Storm floated and they all had stars in their eyes - They were quoting multiples in the 15-17's for their shareholdings, and had openly discussed that if the float didn't happen straight away, they'd bide their time until it did.
Per client, or in total, awg, do you know?That sort of Professional Indemnity Insurance has limited liability as well.
Typically $5-20million. ( the insurance Co wont take on unlimited liability)
You'd have to think so, which is why I suggested earlier that 'negligence' would quite likely not be an acceptable criteria to an insurance company.I would be fairly sure that conditions of payout would limited as well
So action taken against the banks is more likely to be because they have failed to adhere to these rules than because they have loaned inappropriate amounts on the initial equity loan? Or failed to check income declarations?Hi
I know there has been a wide range of comments on this forum about lawyers (and how useful they will be) but the reality is that in most of the cases i have seen these storm clients do have grounds for legal recourse against several banks. When u provide credit for both home loans and margin loans there are very strict rules and procedures that must be adhered to by the banks.
Wouldn't it have been routine for clients to have had all this documentation at the time of the loan being granted?1. Contact your home and margin loan providers and request copies of the actual loan application forms and associated consumer credit contract schedules - they must give them to u so be firm. It may take a few days for u to receive these documents.
Wouldn't this have been checked by the client before the loan application went in? If not, then it seems you're suggesting Storm may have altered these details.2. Review the asset, liabilities and personal income details contained in the loan applications - look for irregularities such as: is your declared income correct or has it been overstated?
Per client, or in total, awg, do you know?
You'd have to think so, which is why I suggested earlier that 'negligence' would quite likely not be an acceptable criteria to an insurance company.
I am almost certain that Storm "losers" would not be able to look towards the insurance companies, UNLESS gross negligence of some kind was done by individuals,(theft, fraud), on a case by case basis.
Insurance Companies dont stay in business by taking on excessive risk
Also most "small" companies only buy as much as they realistically think they need, due to premium cost.
In my experience, the regular policy is for $10 million TOTAL.
If you want more, like a mid-size Co, you would have to negotiate an individual contract with the IC.
I seriously doubt that an Insurance Company would allow cover for poor stock market advice losing multi-millions, they would have clauses protecting themselves.
Mr Scattini said the collapse was brought about by "the greed of Storm and the banks".
He said Storm Financial investors were given bad advice by banks that should have known better
1) Why were storm, and the advisors so reluctant to sell under investors instruction? I myself, and have heard from many people that when the instcruction was given to sell that it was refused. Why? If I had suffered a 10-20% loss and felt it time to get out why were we held in against our wishes? I was held in up to around 102%.
2) How and where did the last 2 dividends that were drwan by emanuel come from? maybe this is the obvious, but are you telling me, he took dividends/commisions on margin loans and empty portfolios from failed investors? I mean where did the 24mill in the last 6months come from..
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Storm thought that it could just convert to cash the $2.5billion of client’s investments in the “Storm Badged Indexed Funds” at their instant demand. (The consequences of dropping $2.5b was irrelevant), Colonial and Challenger didn’t see it that way.
It seemed to be common knowledge around the offices that Storm advised Colonial not to sell down when clients went into margin call. When things turned nasty, those very same senior staff denied this and claimed the opposite.
Storm thought that CBA/Colonial would tide them over, leaving clients in margin call until the market improved. (Mr & Mrs Cassimatis and their senior staff are notorious for their arrogance and assumed dominance over all associated parties (including Colonial and Challenger as well as any other bank/margin lender that wanted a piece of the action).
It would be reasonable to believe Colonial’s claim that Storm were advised daily of their client’s situations. (I think I read that somewhere). All staff had access to the Colonial website. After logging on, the very first information available showed the exact number of clients in margin call, the number in buffer zone and the number close to buffer zone. This was consistently showing at around 600 to 700 clients in margin call.
Storm did not want the cash that clients held used to pay off their margin loans. If the cash was used up there would be no funds available “to buy back in”. That meant no future income, (commission, fees, trails etc) for Storm.
This may make some sense to the more investor savvy among you.
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While some retail funds earned relatively high net returns and some not-for-profit funds earned relatively low net returns over the five-year period, retail trustees using balanced or growth investment strategies for default investment options generated significantly lower net returns on average than not-for-profit trustees using balanced or growth investment strategies.
The study found that the main component of differences in net returns between fund types is expenses. Retail fund expenses, explicit and embedded, lower the net earnings of the retail sector relative to the not-for-profit sector.
The study also found that neither asset allocation nor investment manager skill explained differences in net returns between fund types. The study also examined the net return and fees for an investor with a $50,000 starting balance in each fund type. This confirmed the net under-performance of retail funds compared with not-for-profit funds and showed that retails funds have higher fees (annual, entry and exit) than other fund types on average.
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