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This is the definition of a positive expectancy. Lots of people talk about positive expectancy and it is easy to understand as an 'outcome' but what produces a positive expectancy? An edge I hear people say - but what is an edge? Well the normal answer seems to be anything that gives a positive expectancy, which just puts us into a loop, where the question of what is an edge doesn't need to be answered.
Do we need to understand what an edge is if we can observe its positive expectancy?
If you don’t understand it how do you know if it has stopped working until after you observe its outcome as a negative expectancy and the damage is done to your account?
If you are relying on edge identification purely through historical expectancy outcome, How accurate is your data? is it a valid positive expectancy or invalid data.
Even if your data is perfect, how do you know it is a robust edge and not a data mined expectancy? Huge numbers of variables you can dream up will have positive expectancy on historical data just through randomness without any likelihood of future utility.
Is it valid to only identify an edge as positive expectancy outcome?
If not, what than is an edge?
Are you saying the only possible edge is accurate prediction of price?
....
What's this got to do with stops?
IMO you cant define if stops are a risk/money management expense or an integral part of the process that creates your edge until you can define the 'cause' of your edge.
Then it dawned on me - I was assuming that a 5% stop loss would execute at a price exactly 5% (rounded to nearest $0.01) below purchase price, which is not going to be the case. So, I've put in 5% slippage, each 5% stop loss would actually execute at 10%, 10% at 15%, etc. This brought the result down, but still it is substantially above the benchmark:
I tried a High PE strategy, that underperforms the benchmark. I'll spare everyone looking at another graph - the result, again, was that stop losses improved the performance of even an underperforming strategy.
This analysis stands at complete odds with RY's statement that stop losses do not improve the expected return and are simply a risk management mechanism, which is likely to bring down returns, not improve them. When my analysis disagrees with RY, my default stance is that I made a mistake. What did I miss?
RY, how was your data backtested? I ask, because I know standard backtests that re-balance yearly may not be very suitable for testing stop losses.
I ran a P/B strategy for the last 6 months, with a 5% stop loss and 5% slippage. That beat the same strategy without stop loss by a whopping 16.13%. Attached is a spreadsheet with all the trades, in case anyone is kind enough to look at it and spot an error.
View attachment 60698
Stops do not make money. An edge that creates genuine positive expectancy is the only thing which generates returns on average, through time. Stops do not make money on average through time and reduce your expected profit if you have positive expectancy. In trying to explain this, it is important to separate what makes money and what does not. Edge makes money on average, through time. You will see evidence of belief that stops create expected returns throughout the threads in and of themselves. It cannot.
Risk management is important. I am not doing away with it at all. However, risk management does not make money. It determines magnitude of risk and can alter the shape of your outcomes. You can reshape the distribution via stops (let's not get into mispriced options) to change hit rate, for example. Placing trailing stops will increase hit rate. But it will change the reward profile to offset it in a way that will not change the central expectation. To suggest otherwise is to move into alchemy.
All this pedantry is required here just to divide the role of stops into risk management and/or return generation. It sits squarely in risk management. It has a valuable role to play in regard. I use stops, for example.
RY I understand where you are coming from.
But some positive expectancies are only in existence with a defined price based exit. The stop is required for the positive expectancy to even exist. The stop in this case cannot be considered only in the risk management realm.
To differentiate between what you are saying and where some of the Techs are coming from you need to be able to define the cause of your edge.
It doesn't help in reconciling this discussion that many historical edges identified by only positive expectancy are mined from random distribution skews of no real edge at all and people don't understand that - which is why I am asking what people think the cause of their edge is. Does the cause of your edge require an exit?
Or are we defining stops narrowly here as only arbitrary risk management exits isolated from the edge itself, in which case as you say they can’t be anything but be an expense over the long haul.
I ran a P/B strategy for the last 6 months, with a 5% stop loss and 5% slippage. That beat the same strategy without stop loss by a whopping 16.13%. Attached is a spreadsheet with all the trades, in case anyone is kind enough to look at it and spot an error.
View attachment 60698
Yep, we're really on the same page and the rest of this is semantics which you can file as you please.
Then it dawned on me - I was assuming that a 5% stop loss would execute at a price exactly 5% (rounded to nearest $0.01) below purchase price, which is not going to be the case. So, I've put in 5% slippage, each 5% stop loss would actually execute at 10%, 10% at 15%, etc. This brought the result down, but still it is substantially above the benchmark:
View attachment 60697
I tried a High PE strategy, that underperforms the benchmark. I'll spare everyone looking at another graph - the result, again, was that stop losses improved the performance of even an underperforming strategy.
This analysis stands at complete odds with RY's statement that stop losses do not improve the expected return and are simply a risk management mechanism, which is likely to bring down returns, not improve them. When my analysis disagrees with RY, my default stance is that I made a mistake. What did I miss?
RY, how was your data backtested? I ask, because I know standard backtests that re-balance yearly may not be very suitable for testing stop losses.
I ran a P/B strategy for the last 6 months, with a 5% stop loss and 5% slippage. That beat the same strategy without stop loss by a whopping 16.13%. Attached is a spreadsheet with all the trades, in case anyone is kind enough to look at it and spot an error.
View attachment 60698
Once stopped, share will not be bought again the next 365 days.
Any takers?
....
The result comes out of options theory. . . . . here's the argument in a highly simplified framework that actually goes to the binomial lattice methods for options pricing.
. . . .
That's it. Any single pathway through this garden of forking paths can do whatever it wants. This includes completely defying expectations. If you run the simulations, you will see that there is a reasonable chance of that happening for nearly everything you might reasonably try. What matters for this discussion is whether stops change your return expectations for the better.
.
In this context of using stop losses to protect against unacceptable, unexpected (large) moves in the SP, isn't the appropriate distribution the Poisson Distribution rather than the Binomial ?
"The Black-Scholes Model
l
The binomial model is a discrete-time model for asset price
movements, with a time interval (t) between price movements.
l
As the time interval is shortened, the limiting distribution, as t -> 0,
can take one of two forms.
–
If as t -> 0, price changes become smaller, the limiting distribution is the
normal distribution and the price process is a continuous one.
–
If as t->0, price changes remain large, the limiting distribution is the
poisson distribution, i.e., a distribution that allows for price jumps.
l
The Black-Scholes model applies when the limiting distribution is the
normal distribution , and explicitly assumes that the price process is
continuous and that there are no jumps in asset prices." (http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/option.pdf on Page 12)
and
"The Poisson distribution can be applied to systems with a large number of possible events, each of which is rare. How many such events will occur during a fixed time interval? Under the right circumstances, this is a random number with a Poisson distribution.
. . .
Applications of the Poisson distribution can be found in many fields related to counting:
. . .
The number of jumps in a stock price in a given time interval.
. . . " (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisson_distribution)
Black Scholes assumes log-normal distribution of returns. This lattice is modeling along those lines. The lattice approach was invented by Merton and the approach produces returns that asymptote to the Black Scholes formulation. Binomial converges to normal at the asymptote. It's bloody amazing that central limit stuff. Poisson can be suitable where you do not know the variance. In this case you do.
I don't want to delve too far into option pricing models in this thread. But obviously volatility is the issue that gives rise to market participants trying to devise stop-loss strategies, yet not get stopped out so often that the practice becomes a source of loss instead in its own right.
With regard to B-S / Binomial / Normal / Lognormal, one of my finance textbooks has this to say; "[A]s the number of subintervals (or nodes in the lattice in your terminology) increases, the number of possible stock prices also increase. . . . . [and] the graph approaches the appearance of the familiar bell-shaped curve. In fact, as the number of intervals increases . . . the frequency distribution progressively approaches the lognormal distribution rather than the normal distribution."
That is all well and good, but there is a footnote attached to the last sentence. "Actually, more complex considerations enter here. The limit of this process is lognormal only if we assume also that stock prices move continuously, by which we mean that over small time intervals only small price movements can occur. This rules out rare events such as sudden,extreme price moves in response to dramatic information (like a takeover attempt)."
Moreover, the same textbook lists three "important assumptions underlying the [Black-Scholes] formula". The third of the three they list is "Stock prices are continuous, meaning that sudden extreme jumps such as those in the aftermath of an announcement of a takeover attempt are ruled out."
That is, the models rule out of consideration precisely the fluctuations that this thread is discussing.
You state that "In this case you do (know the variance)". But you only know the historical variance over an arbitrarily selected period of time. Choose a different data interval and you will get a different historical variance figure. There are different ways to try to model forward volatility estimates (e.g. (G)ARCH http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autoregressive_conditional_heteroskedasticity) but no method of assessing historical, or estimating future volatility can give you confidence that a sudden short-term change in price (spike or otherwise) will not adversely affect your position.
So a long-term investor may well be able to ride out a short-term volatility spike. So might a day-trader. It will depend on the usual things such as risk-tolerance, money management etc. The usual. Including, perhaps, the use of a stop-loss.
Too much pontification
....
The result comes out of options theory. It's fairly straight forward. Given your quant skills and for those inclined to stochastic thinking, here's the argument in a highly simplified framework that actually goes to the binomial lattice methods for options pricing.
- You have a fair coin (ie. no forecasting power).
- We flip this coin 10 times. Heads, tails are the only outcomes.
- Picture a set of expanding branches. Time 0 is the start. If you flip heads, you move to node H. T otherwise. Flip again, now you have nodes (HH, HT/TH,TT) and so on.
- The values ascribed to H = +1 and T=-1. Profit is simply the sum.
- Do this a gazillion times and at t=10 you will have a normal distribution with mean at zero and standard deviation sqrt (10).
- If you load the coin and give it a 2% greater chance of throwing heads to represent the presence of forecasting power, your distribution at t-10 shifts. The standard deviation hardly moves. That's edge.
- You can insert stops at any of the nodes you want. Say you want to stop on touch of -5. Anything pathway that hits this figure sees you leave the simulation for that round at -5.
- Do that a gazillion times and you will find your distribution skews to the positive, but your expected outcome drops if you have an edge, or does not move if you don't.
View attachment 60699
That's it. Any single pathway through this garden of forking paths can do whatever it wants. This includes completely defying expectations. If you run the simulations, you will see that there is a reasonable chance of that happening for nearly everything you might reasonably try. What matters for this discussion is whether stops change your return expectations for the better.
I am not able to replicate your figures.
However, the approach you have adopted has strong and likely unintentional bias built in. You seem to be comparing the performance of a portfolio which is an equally weighted one along some measure. You then select a portion in which those which have performed poorly enough along the journey to warrant being stopped out against it. These are removed. What is left is a censored sample which removes all the 'bad' stocks ex-post. Unsurprisingly this generally does a lot better than the uncensored sample. This methodology is unsuitable for the stated purpose of assessing whether stops add value or not on an expectations basis.
Take your largest negative and positive outlier out and then consider both sets of results in light of RY’s post 863.
Also you are introducing a time frame outcome to your system I.e. the exit is no longer just PB>2 or de-listed but the lesser of market price in 6 months or PB>2 for the non stoped system. Introducing this time frame constraint means identifying current momentum is probably going to help and it could be argued the stop does that as the price either has to get on with it or you move on to the next candidate.
The real question is if you let the PB>2 or delisted exit criteria run its full and natural course until everything was exited what would the ultimate return (compound annual return) of that system be compared to running the system with the stop over the same period.
That was the point of my posts. Oh and to find out what people think is the 'cause' of the edge they utilise. Any takers?
I think you expanded your stock universe too much. Its including some micro caps that
a) do no volume
b) have incorrect book value
See attached. I've computed avg daily vol in the past 6m, and then taken each position to be the max of (arbitary) $20k or 30% avg daily val, then adjusted each return accordingly.
The avg return is actually very close to 0 (still outperformed the index though)
Eg RDG is your outlier winner. However have a look at the market depth today! Not something you can really take a swing at.
View attachment 60703
Why this condition?
Your edge has nothing that indicates momentum in the direction of a positive trade.
Only a statistic.
Net Assets. We buy when P/B < 0.7, we sell when P/B > 2. Is this a proven or hypothetical edge?
Says nothing about its strength in the market NOW.
Does the method buy the stock back in 12 mths regardless of whether it is of less or more value to 12 mths ago.
A simply buy when it rises 10% above todays price should help.
Point is there are so many variables its next to meaningless.
Alpha is zero sum prior to costs. Given it is zero sum, someone with no insight can't suddenly generate returns by whacking down stops. A second person will eventually meet them on a forum and then whack down stops too. They'll all do it and then suddenly everyone with no idea what is going on is making money in a sub-zero sum game. Suddenly the most reliable thing to do is to have no idea but whack down stops. More stops the better. That's alchemy. Stops do not create returns in and of themselves on average through time.
All these reminds me of a story I heard somewhere. It goes something like this:
Two country Gentlemen at a bar were having philosophical debates and somehow it got to them debating how many teeth does a horse in the barn outside have.
One said that horses are of that genus, related to this and that; and this and that have this many teeth... horses being bigger and eat grass and at certain age it have this many teeth;
The other argued that it depends on the origin of the horse in question... Arabian horses would have this many teeth, factor in the climate and this and that, it would have this many teeth at this and that age, depends on age and birth and health blah blah.
They debated back and forth, back and forth into the early hours... still keep going until a lowly, uneducated bartender told them...
The barn's unlocked, why don't you guys just go out there and open the horse's mouth and start counting.
---------
With investing, you don't have a lowly, uneducated bartender telling you... you got at least two self-made multi-billionaire investors telling you to go and open the horse's mouth and start counting. But somehow real, smart, investing just doesn't work like that.
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