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So an assumption about Buffett and a Uni subject - Is that all you bring to the table? I reckon you have at least read RM's book? What else?
Buffett is on TV, and you have to trust people on TV, haven't you seen the Lego Movie?
It's easy to fall in love with complicated formulae, and maybe it was just me but I was quite proud to be able to work out a beta result for CAPM. And with all these cash flows, how good it was to plug in a whole bunch of numbers and get a nice and neat "value"... and if I had stayed with the Masters degree, I would actually come to know what alpha is and how to model all these nonsense too.
Like i said, if you're certain of the accuracy of all the factors in your model, it's the way to go.
Just I doubt anyone could accurately estimate a company's CURRENT earning power, let alone know that and able to predict other influences on the business.
Now you have lost me - are you making some assertion now about us using beta and CAPM? and whatis the reference to Buffett meant to mean?
Yes he is - you should listen to him carefully.What i am saying is that Buffett is a very smart man, and as far as I can see, sounds like a very decent man too.
When a person that smart, and that successful, tells you this is how he value a company... maybe there's something to it.
...............
And yes, beta and CAPM is rubbish.
It's a bunch of complicated maths built on false foundation.
It's insane to say that in order to make more money, you have to take on more risk.
That's like telling a person that to make money, they have to go to the casinos, and bet all on black or something.
It occurs to a lot of ordinary people that gamblers lose money because they took on more risks by playing against the casino, and those who doesn't take risks gambling get to keep their money.. and those that put more thought into their work, take a few a risk as possible, actually make money out of it - at least more often than a risky gambler.
But let say CAPM is right on this risk-reward assumption. They're wrong in how they define risk.
An average person like myself would have thought that a risky business is one that doesn't make money, not ones whose market price fluctuate more than the averages of other businesses in a representative index.
1. Before Tax NPV $2.78 (discount rate 15.00%)
After Tax NPV $2.88 (discount rate 10.50%)
As I expected the valuations should either be exactly the same or at least very close.
I am not sure why the After Tax NPV is 3.6% or $0.10 higher. I assume that it has to do with the difference between 28.5% and 30% and the effect on the discount rate....
2. The only "grey area", and one that I am stilling working through myself is the terminal value.
If you are using a perpetuity (or a number based on a proportion of a perpetuity) that includes a discount rate which is equal to the cost of capital, wouldn't this effect the IRR? Should the discount rate on the perpetuity be the hurdle rate? There's a big difference for example 1 / 0.11 and 1 / 0.15 even if it is a far dated cash flow at the end of the calculations.
I guess what I am saying is that if your discount and hurdle rate are the same thing, then perhaps this isn't an issue?
I agree that yes, a company's value is the discounted present value of future earnings [net op. cash flow]...
1. When a person that smart, and that successful, tells you this is how he value a company... maybe there's something to it.
The guy doesn't use a computer, doesn't even have a calculator... and he's able to decide within a few minutes the value or businesses worth billions.
How could he or anyone do that?
2. These models you guys are using is based on the assumption that you could accurately predict the future... and by using a couple growth assumptions, a few scenarios, you get a few nice rounded figures and congratulate yourselves for knowing how this and that will impact this and that.
That's nice but that's no more simplistic than a "simple" perpetual annuity approach.
But unlike the simple model of valuing a financial asset, your models are more dangerous because, among other things, you might not be aware that your growth forecasts and assumptions are influenced by general market or economic sentiments..
... that and you seem to think that the reported earnings, averaged out or whatever, is the earnings and all you need to do to get an edge is to accurately predict the future and its impact on your company.
3. Me, i preferred to pay for what i see now... and if the future is brilliant, i'll pay an appropriate price for that brilliance when it happen... and if what i see now is pretty good but the world is saying it's going to end, well i don't know if that's the case so let's not bet on it.
4. And it could be just me again, but I find it pretty hard to know a business well enough to even have a reasonably confident idea of its earning power.
5. An average person like myself would have thought that a risky business is one that doesn't make money, not ones whose market price fluctuate more than the averages of other businesses in a representative index.
1. Although post-tax FCF is 0.7 x pre-Tax FCF, it is not the same thing as discounting post-tax FCF by an interest rate which is 0.7x the pre-tax interest rate. Compounding effects do surprising things. To see the fuller effect, do not assume the company stabilizes after five years and watch the valuations diverge materially. The discount rates required to make these NPVs have the anticipated relationship changes depending on your reinvestment assumption. If the dividend is fully franked I don't see this - care to make the point with an example so I can grasp what you are getting at?
One small wrinkle, I think Craft produced a valuation using pre-tax FCF and gross dividends using the pre-tax discount rate as is appropriate. He found the ratio of valuations differed by a ratio of 1.5% attributable entirely to the value of the PPL. The gross dividends in the growth phase, however, are not distributing full franking credits that accrued. Allowing for this, the after tax valuation would then be a little further lower than the pre-tax valuation to allow for franking not distributed (and never will be distributed under these assumptions). Agree with this - its basically the same as the levy issue.
Craft: This is a problem with using pre-tax DCF. On a net of tax basis, no adjustment would be required for your discount rate as the impact of the PPL is just an item that reduces discretionary FCF. The switch between the tax mix worsens your after tax NPV as you would expect if the discount rate is held constant. On a pre-tax basis, you continue to have the same FCF and, if you are thinking in pre-tax terms, this should just stay the same....but you know it isn't when it comes down to it. So I guess you should add some sort of 'fudge factor' to make allowance for it.
The general practice that I have seen is that these calcs are done on a full equity basis. That is, you need to reorganize the company accounts to produce the after tax FCF as if the company had no leverage. Mostly, that involves adding back the cost of interest payments and adjusting tax paid accordingly. This accounts for differences in capital structure across companies. You then discount that figure with what you would like the company to return if you owned the entire share base which can include considerations of your own capital structure - ie. you can factor in your own leverage etc. Because franking is a factor in Australia, you would also discount the value of franking to whatever degree you think is right for you (usually it is 60-100% to allow for the fact that not everyone values franking).
Cheers
Given your vast repository of knowledge, I'm surprised you think earnings = net operating cash flow. Crack open those text books again, my friend.
I really think you should read up on what you're saying because you have made a lot of very simple mistakes. Nothing wrong with that of course, I make them all the time, but you're on here telling everyone else they're wrong.
You never answered my question about how you're system would have fared in 2007, or with mining services stocks a couple of years back. The idea of jusy accepting today's earning at face value and extrapolating them to the end of time, and checking back in a couple of years if things don't work out would have had you shuffling down the footpath in your bathrobe and slippers.
I have just recently read the textbook actually. And over time, a company's net operating cash flow should approximate its reported net earnings.Do you want me to quote the textbook and page number?
I have just recently read the textbook actually. And over time, a company's net operating cash flow should approximate its reported net earnings.Do you want me to quote the textbook and page number?
I have just recently read the textbook actually. And over time, a company's net operating cash flow should approximate its reported net earnings.Do you want me to quote the textbook and page number?
Luu
Although net earnings will converge to operating cashflow as reinvestment in the business ceases and the asset base is fully depreciated, that doesn't happen for businesses which are growing/shrinking their capital base for at least part of the forecast period. Using the same discount rate, the discounted value of FCF will not equal that of net earnings.
McLovin was correct to say you can't just substitute one for the other. It only becomes right under a very special condition of zero reinvestment through the entire forecast horizon.
Cheers
Net operating cash flow excludes non-cash items (like depreciation and amortisation) that net earnings do not. Your text book is wrong if it's saying the net ocf will approximate net earnings over time.
Anyway, you've got your system. Good luck with it.
I'm taking a break for a while.
Thanks.
I think you've misunderstood that I make a zero growth assumption. Growth is already implied in the C/i... that I expect it to grow at least by i. And if next year or there about it grows i+x, or if its growth is i-x... that growth has nothing to do with my expectations, it's just what the business does.
Your farm example there agrees with my understanding more than you think.
Post #364
The calculation is to find the value of an expected cashflow [ie Earnings], at a required interest rate, extending that to infinity [or a couple hundred years, depend on how precise you want]
ie. PV = lim(n to infinity) C/i x [1 - (1/(1+i)to n ] (i checked with a textbook)
When you extend n far enough into the future, (1/(1+i)to n approaches zero... leaving you with PV = C/i
Post #365
But no, that's where i think there's a misconception about required rate of return and growth.
A required rate of return is return on capital, on equity, not growth in sales or growth in earnings by 8pc into infinity.
7 or 8%, depends... could be 6 or 9...
But no, that's where i think there's a misconception about required rate of return and growth.
A required rate of return is return on capital, on equity, not growth in sales or growth in earnings by 8pc into infinity.
So if the company earn 8% next year... and kept it back, i expect it will reinvest that 8% and compound it at 8 or higher... if not, return to me, its owner in terms of dividends or whatnot so i can find other opportunities.
No company can grow sales, let alone earnings, by 8% or 10 or 20... and i don't expect companies i look at to do so
Post #386
I remember reading/hearing an interview where Charles Munger said he never saw Buffett do a discounted cash flow model like the ones you guys are into
Hi RY1. Although post-tax FCF is 0.7 x pre-Tax FCF, it is not the same thing as discounting post-tax FCF by an interest rate which is 0.7x the pre-tax interest rate. Compounding effects do surprising things. To see the fuller effect, do not assume the company stabilizes after five years and watch the valuations diverge materially. The discount rates required to make these NPVs have the anticipated relationship changes depending on your reinvestment assumption.
One small wrinkle, I think Craft produced a valuation using pre-tax FCF and gross dividends using the pre-tax discount rate as is appropriate. He found the ratio of valuations differed by a ratio of 1.5% attributable entirely to the value of the PPL. The gross dividends in the growth phase, however, are not distributing full franking credits that accrued. Allowing for this, the after tax valuation would then be a little further lower than the pre-tax valuation to allow for franking not distributed (and never will be distributed under these assumptions).
1. Although post-tax FCF is 0.7 x pre-Tax FCF, it is not the same thing as discounting post-tax FCF by an interest rate which is 0.7x the pre-tax interest rate. Compounding effects do surprising things. To see the fuller effect, do not assume the company stabilizes after five years and watch the valuations diverge materially. The discount rates required to make these NPVs have the anticipated relationship changes depending on your reinvestment assumption.
Luu
Your understanding of required rate of return and growth are misconceived.
If you expect growth to equal your discount rate (" Growth is already implied in the C/i... that I expect it to grow at least by i") and discount it by the same discount rate and are using a discount rate like 8%, your company is worth infinity. Your earnings will become the world economy as I said before.
You have misunderstood and misapplied a perpetuity model. C/i Is the present value of C into perpetuity if C does not change...zero growth. Check your text book and read it again. ("PV = lim(n to infinity) C/i x [1 - (1/(1+i)to n ] (i checked with a textbook)")
Buffett allows for growth. Your model does not. That's about the biggest difference imaginable for valuation purposes. There is no more important factor than the assumed difference between perpetuity growth and discount rate. "Your farm example there agrees with my understanding more than you think."...but your understanding is fundamentally inaccurate, he forecasts path ways that fade as opposed to extrapolates forever, allows for growth rates different to discount rates....each of these violates your understanding as documented in your posts and actions as similarly detailed.
If you want to persist with perpetuities for all companies despite the fact that this is far more inaccurate than even simple allowances for known factors that will effect earnings in the coming period, what you actually need is the Gordon Growth Model. PV = c x (g/(i-g)) where g is the growth rate. When g = 0, meaning no growth, the Gordon Growth model collapses into what you have been using to justify your valuations. That's a pretty big error. If you think that the rate of growth equals your discount rate ("Growth is already implied in the C/i... that I expect it to grow at least by i. " and where i is your "required interest rate") then if i=g and the present value goes to infinity.
"No company can grow sales, let alone earnings, by 8". Yet when you are using an required interest rate of "7 or 8%, depends... could be 6 or 9..." it basically tells you that the growth rate that you assume must be different to the required discount rate and, yet, your current formulation makes no allowance for differences between your assumed growth rate and required discount rate. Didn't this occur to you?
Luu...these are big errors. One possible reason your valuations make no sense to you and why you find no worth in pursuing more expansive approaches is that your approach is built from fundamental misconceptions from the outset.
Cheers
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