I read the situation differently. I understood that each of the feeder funds would attend a meeting (perhaps at a fancy hotel and at great expense to each of the funds), and members of the respective funds would elect, subject to constitutional changes in those funds in the event the proposals were successful, to "sell" or "hold" (duh!) their respective share of the units invested by each member's respective feeder fund in the FMIF. What a mess.
What a mess, indeed it is so!
When I met with two of the directors late last month, I twice asked this question and both the answers I heard to mean that the feeder fund investors would indeed get to vote on the Constitution changes. Recalling the biblical tale of the **** crowing thrice (forgive me but given the circumstances I found that recollection a little amusing), I asked the question for a third time - the final response making it clear that the feeder fund choices would be limited to either "hold" or "sell" only if FMIF investors approved the proposed changes to the FMIF Constitution (also earlier LM material stipulated that 'no choice' would be deemed to be "hold").
Given the uncertainties, and a lack of confidence borne from LM's past changes of position, I will be asking LM for formal advice to confirm the position. Wish me luck....
While you're there, why don't you ask them why the name of the fund includes "first mortgage" when they've lent on at least one second mortgage?
Ask them how they'll resolve the matter of the loans made by the fund whereby they're lent money (as manager to another fund) to that same asset on a second mortgage security (financials 30 June 2011 - page 32 - note 11):
"The LM MPF has second mortgages on loans that are first mortgages of the Scheme totalling $46,158,276"
Would that asset be sold off (since it's already impaired) even if the other fund loses its second mortgage loan?
Also ask why there was a need for a "priority agreement" since the securities rank in your fund's favour in any event.
"The company sometimes follows the fund with its own money, creating a second mortgage. "We can't end up behind a hostile lender," Mr Sullivan said."
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/busines...-at-city-pacific/story-e6frfh4f-1111114202243
It seems to me that not putting itself behind a "hostile" first mortgage holder meant that the first mortgage holder (the CPFMF controlled by City Pacific) would not act unilaterally to the detriment of the second mortgage holder - in other words, a safe place to be.
You might ask the manager why the manager put itself in such a situation. ".
A couple of investors have expressed surprise to Dinga about some of the issues raised in this forum.
All the information posted to date has been gleaned from the fund's accounts, RG 45s, or communications from the manager to investors.
If the issues give rise to surprise, and you're an investor in LM's income fund, then it's time to do some reading and perhaps even to get some professional advice.
Nothing said on this forum should be taken as gospel - information contained in postings should be checked against source documents - in particular, the fund's financial reports and RG 45s.
It's not unusual for investors not to bother to read and understand the financial reports and RG45s. While such ignorance may be fine (but not recommended) in a fund that's paying dividends and not losing ground, it's not the same if you've an interest in LM's IF or feeder funds.
Everything posted in this thread has been disclosed by the manager - it's only a matter of looking for it, and finding it.
Tks ASICK - I stand corrected, my education continues and I will indeed pose those questions to LM.hahaha
Dinga, LM didn't include your comments or the comments of those who share your concerns. Why aren't I surprised?
The EIF is full of various classes - before members think that new investment is a good thing, they should keep in mind that while the manager must treat all members of the same class EQUALLY, the manager need only treat different classes FAIRLY.
Which 'new investor' would stand equally with existing investors or would stand behind existing investors?
I'd hardly think that possible.
I'd be asking LM for particulars about the new investor spruik.
While you're asking, you might like to ask for public disclosure of some of the comments running against LM's planned scheme.
Isn't it all so exciting? I'm sure many lookers-on such as myself are just as interested in the expert opinions as you are.
I'll end where I started: hahaha
... LM apparently is holding Advisor Forums around Australia between 23 July and 3 August to "... facilitate active discussion of the proposed liquidity mechanism for the closed funds, the processes involved, the fund assets and scenarios of the financial modelling regarding the “sell” and “hold” pools - as an opportunity for Advisors "...to develop further understanding prior to the investment allocation step, when you will be guiding your clients in relation to their allocations". Seems like we investors can shortly expect to receive the modelling - am hoping LM will repeat this exercise and provide investors with similar opportunities.
Geez, I just realised that there's no example of the procedure set out in the proposed constitutional amendments, so I thought I'd have a go at it. This is my take on the proposed scheme:
Corporations Act 601FC(1)(d) requires that all members must be treated equally
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s601fc.html
Those who stay will retain (and better) the $0.80/unit, while those who leave redeem at $0.64/unit. I wonder how this complies with s. 601FC(1)(d) Corporations Act?
The trouble (as I see it) it doesn't matter what the BUSP (expected unit price) is, it's the AUSP (actual unit price) that matters. I'd be surprised if the BUSP is too far away from the unit price (BP), but I wouldn't be too surprised if the AUSP is.
BUSP (expected unit price from asset sales) is NOT BP (fund unit price as at the invitation date), as the example discloses, a BUSP of $0.48/unit might return an AUSP $0.64/unit for those who “sell” and better the original $0.80/unit for those who stay.
Of course, there's a lot more to this story, because those who stay have to consider the market, any discount suffered by those who leave, and the ongoing costs of maintaining the assets. If AUSP is substantially reduced from BP, then that could very well scare the pants off those who stay. But, since the deal is struck and they have to hold on for a further 3 years under the terms of the deal, it could be quite a hair raising ride.
If you choose NOT to sign up in the “Sell” pool, then you're deemed to be locked up in the fund for at least another three more years in the absence of further Investor Allocation Requests!!
Also, as BP (in relation to AUSP) is calculated as at the invitation date, then if the invitation date for the unit sale program is quite some time earlier that the actual sale date (to calculate AUSP), then this very well might cause some real problems for those who stay and give a substantial benefit to those who leave (in the event that fund unit price has dropped during the period).
This is how I see the deal in the absence of any example to lead me to think otherwise.
Hi Dinga, I know what it's like to lose in a managed investment fund and I can understand your frustration.
I look forward to seeing your request to LM for working examples - I'm sure they'll be able to clarify the situation.
I've been looking at the definition of Actual Unit Sale Price (AUSP):
http://www.moneymagik.com/LM_info_pack.pdf
(Schedule 1, proposed clause 9A.1)
"Actual Unit Sale Price means, as at any Trigger Date for a Unit Sale Program, the price per Unit
calculated in accordance with the following formula:
(NP x BP) + NID - SD
(BV
where:
NP means the amount in the Net Proceeds Account as at that Trigger Date,
BV means the Book Value of the Sale Assets whose sale contributed to the Net Proceeds held in the Net Proceeds Account as at the Invitation Date of that Unit Sale Program,
BP means the Book Price of a Unit as at the Invitation Date of that Unit Sale Program,
NID means the Net Income Distributions as at that Trigger Date divided by the number of Sale Units (where that number is as adjusted under clauses 9A.4, 9A.21, 9A.22 and 9A.23),
SD means the duty (if any) payable to any Office of State Revenue on the transfer of a Unit under the Transfer Facility as at the Liquidity Date for that Trigger Date;"
I note that each of BP and BV are calculated as at the invitation date. I had previously noted that if the invitation date was quite some time before the actual sale occured that those who "sell" might benefit, but it seems that probably will not be the case because the ratio of BP/BV might probably stay the same if all assets reduce/increase in value at the same rate over time. However, if the assets being sold were to devalue at a faster rate over time than those assets in (as you say) the "hold basket", it will be those who "sell" who will incur a loss which is greater than they otherwise might have expected.
You might care to ask LM how the proposed scheme complies with Corporations Act s. 601FC(1)(d) since those who leave will redeem units at a price which will be less than the fund's current value (NTA/units on issue).
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