Belichick did the right thing

[Timmy]

Is it better to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally?

Any NFL football fans know what happened on Sunday night (US time).

Bill Belichick (head coach of the New England Patriots) decided to go for 2 yards on 4th down, on his own 29 yard line, up by 6 points with just over 2 minutes to play. But, on that 4th down play, the Patriots didn't get the 2 yards. The ball was thus turned over to the Colts, who scored a touchdown and won the game by 1 point.

It was a great game, and a great ending. But, Belichick has been tongue-lashed and lambasted for his decision, I think very unfairly.

Weird to be bringing this up on an Aussie stock forum, but this story has spilled into financial newspapers and blogs for, I believe, very good reasons.

Anyway, some of the stories I have read, and some of the comments that make sense to me:

Source: http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/bill-belichick-is-great/

Going for a first down on fourth and short yardage in your end zone is likely to increase the chance your team wins (albeit slightly)...
If his team had gotten the first down and the Patriots won, he would have gotten far less credit than he got blame for failing. This introduces what economists call a "principal-agent problem." Even though going for it increases his team's chance of winning, a coach who cares about his reputation will want to do the wrong thing.

Source: http://fridayinvegas.blogspot.com/2009/11/monday-morning-quarterback.html

Obviously, when Belichick's gamble failed, the entire Monday Morning QB universe came down on him for his "horrendous decision." Advanced NFL Stats, however, attempts to quantify the expected value of the decision to go for it instead of punting ....
You can play with the numbers any way you like, but it's pretty hard to come up with a realistic combination of numbers that make punting the better option. At best, you could make it a wash

Source: http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/25516.html

The type of response we see to Coach Belichick's decision is too often what we also see in public policy debates: there is a bias for what is seen versus what is not seen. One can easily blame Belichick's decision for the Patriots losing the game. But there was still a significant probability that the Patriots would have lost the game had he made the opposite decision and punted...
This is the same reason the FDA is more likely to disapprove a healthy drug than approve an unhealthy drug. If the FDA approves a drug that kills people, the media and the general public will go crazy. But they don't see the fact that every year, the FDA is disapproving relatively healthy drugs and costing lives.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574540100532247022.html

Put simply, Mr. Belichick is taking flak because he decided, in the middle of a close, hard-fought and emotionally charged game against a major rival, to throw caution to the wind. In other words, he's being pilloried for not being a wimp.
Somehow in American football, the punt””a clear and unambiguous symbol of surrender and retreat””has become the hallmark of sensible coaching.

So, is it better to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally? (Yes, unfortunately Bilichick failed unconventionally ...).

 

[McCoy Pauley]

I've seen some of the articles that the New York Times published earlier this year going through the statistics on going for it on fourth down as opposed to punting. I think there's even a college in the States where the head coach always (and I mean always) goes for it on fourth down and never has his special teams punt because he's figured that on the statistics he's more likely to win than not.

But I think the issue is (as the first comment on the Freakonomics blog states), Belichick went for it on the fourth down as a once-off, an outlier. The statistics are predicated on a team going for first downs on fourth downs all the time.

 

[Timmy]

I think there's even a college in the States where the head coach always (and I mean always) goes for it on fourth down and never has his special teams punt because he's figured that on the statistics he's more likely to win than not.

The WSJ article talks about

Kevin Kelley, a high-school football coach at Pulaski Academy in Little Rock, Ark., who has become famous for his strategy of virtually never punting.

Could be him?

But I think the issue is (as the first comment on the Freakonomics blog states), Belichick went for it on the fourth down as a once-off, an outlier. The statistics are predicated on a team going for first downs on fourth downs all the time.

That is an interesting point.

 

[Nyden]

Many parts of the story made very little sense to me, at least until I researched that 'punt' refers to kicking a ball, as opposed to placing a bet

 

[nomore4s]

I would have thought it was all about managing risk and the probabilities that go with it. I personally would have thought punting gives you the higher probability of winning the game, at least then you are forcing the opponent to come up with good plays to win the game.

The problem was the situation of the game and the field position he was giving up. Because he was giving up such good field position with so little time left the chances of him facing total ruin (losing the game) if his play failed were significantly higher.

While it is great having stats saying attempting to get the 2 yards slightly increases your chances of winning surely this situation is like tossing a coin - each coin toss has only a 50% chance of a head or tail no matter what the previous data suggests. So while over time he might have an edge he was virtually betting everything (winning the game) on this one random outcome.

You would probably also need to look at the situation of the entire season as well ie if his team are 6-1 his play takes on slightly less significance but if they are 3-3 and fighting for a spot in the finals the risks slightly increases.

 

[Wysiwyg]

The problem was the situation of the game and the field position he was giving up. Because he was giving up such good field position with so little time left the chances of him facing total ruin (losing the game) if his play failed were significantly higher.

Yes field position is a critical 'parameter' in football although his own 29 yard isn't good field position

 

[Mr J]

Not good field position, but punting it would likely have resulted in far better field position than if the conversion failed. I think Nomore4s raises an excellent point: while the conversion attempt may have had a slightly better ev, by choosing that option Belichick was overbetting.

 

[nomore4s]

Yes field position is a critical 'parameter' in football although his own 29 yard isn't good field position

It is for the other team, when you hand possession over only 30 yards out instead of 80.

 

[skc]

This is interesting... and illustrate where people judge the soundness of a decision based on the outcome.

To illustrate:

Suppose you play a coin toss game. Heads you win $2, tails you lose $1. You bet head... a sound decision. But tail came up.. does that change the soundness of your decision?

But I totally agree with the point regarding the circumstances.

Given the same coin toss game, but you are only allowed to play once. The wager is now heads you win $2m, tails you lose $1m. Will you still play?

 

[McCoy Pauley]

I would have thought it was all about managing risk and the probabilities that go with it. I personally would have thought punting gives you the higher probability of winning the game, at least then you are forcing the opponent to come up with good plays to win the game.

The problem was the situation of the game and the field position he was giving up. Because he was giving up such good field position with so little time left the chances of him facing total ruin (losing the game) if his play failed were significantly higher.

While it is great having stats saying attempting to get the 2 yards slightly increases your chances of winning surely this situation is like tossing a coin - each coin toss has only a 50% chance of a head or tail no matter what the previous data suggests. So while over time he might have an edge he was virtually betting everything (winning the game) on this one random outcome.

You would probably also need to look at the situation of the entire season as well ie if his team are 6-1 his play takes on slightly less significance but if they are 3-3 and fighting for a spot in the finals the risks slightly increases.

I'd say that Belichick thought that if he had the Patriots punt, Manning would have less of a chance to score a touchdown but the chance would still have been high anyway - how many times has Manning driven the Colts for a score in the last two minutes of a game? I reckon it would be a reasonably high percentage.

However, if the play had come off and the Pats get a first down, the Colts would not have had the time to mount the winning drive - in fact the clock would have been managed to ensure the Colts don't get the ball back.

I'd say that at 6-2, the Patriots are unlikely to get home field advantage through the playoffs. At 7-1, the chances of getting home field advantage increase significantly. I reckon that would have been a factor.

 

[Mr J]

McCoy, letting in a score to have a chance to counterattack has been done before, which in this case sounds like it would have given the Patriots about 2 minutes to get into position for a field goal. Field position is important, but so is time management.

 

[McCoy Pauley]

The WSJ article talks about [Kevin Kelley] Could be him?

Yep, that's right.

ESPN video interview with Kevin Kelley: http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=4577094&categoryid=null

Story back on Kelley and his high school team from 2007: http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=easterbrook/071113 (you'll need to scroll down a little, but the story notes that on 4th-and-1, a team has 75% of converting the fourth down). A number of the quotes from Kelley are eerily predictive of what Belichick went through after the Colts-Pats game.

This was the story I remember reading a few months ago: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/jon_wertheim/09/17/no.punt/index.html

 

[Wysiwyg]

Yes field position is a critical 'parameter' in football although his own 29 yard isn't good field position

In addition, protecting profit (the points ahead) with field position AND 110 % committed defense. Either but preferably both of these two trailing stops would have increased the chance of success considerably.

 

[McCoy Pauley]

McCoy, letting in a score to have a chance to counterattack has been done before, which in this case sounds like it would have given the Patriots about 2 minutes to get into position for a field goal. Field position is important, but so is time management.

Hmm, maybe my lack of sleep last night is catching up with me but I'm not sure I understand your point, Mr J. Can you explain it to me again?

On time management, the Jets lost because Maurice Jones-Drew decided (apparently on his own accord) to take a knee at the Jets 1 yard line rather than score the touchdown and give the ball back to the Jets when a successful field goal would give the Jags the win. Gerrard took the knee on the next two plays and they accordingly kicked the winning field goal.

Apparently Rex Ryan was telling his defenders not to tackle Jones-Drew in the hope he'd get into the end zone, score the touchdown and give the ball back to the Jets.

 

[Mr J]

I'm not sure I understand your point, Mr J. Can you explain it to me again?

As you just pointed out yourself, there is some history of letting the opposing team score, to allow your team a chance to counterattack. We've got two choices here.

If the Patriots punt, there's still a good chance that the Colts score. If the Patriots get the ball back, they will very likely be short on time to make their own drive to field goal range.

If the Patriots go for it and fail, they let in the touchdown and go for a game-winning drive of their own and with 2 minutes on the clock. If the Patriots convert the 4th, they have a decent chance of putting the game beyond a touchdown, and a chance of running out the clock completely.

The problem is that when the Patriots failed, they didn't let Indy score. Instead they let them use up the clock. 2 minutes inside 30? I don't know the stats this year, but I imagine Indy has a pretty good conversion rate inside the redzone. How's the Patriot's defense at the moment? For the coach to go for it but not be willing to let the Colts score, he has to be damn confident his defense (which was clearly overpowered in the 4th) can stop the opposing offense. It also suggests he didn't have confidence that his team's offense could strike back.